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The Impact of Ethno-Religious Conflict on Foreign Policy: Nigerian Case

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Abstract

This work analyzes the impact of ethnically and religiously motivated conflict on Nigerian foreign policy. Here Boko Haram armed group whose motivators to emerge are mainly religious and ethnic is chosen as the case. It analyzes the impact of ethnically and religiously motivated Boko Haram armed menace in the north-east of the country on Nigerian foreign policy. In the context of bilateral relations, this work looked at how Boko Haram menace affected US-Nigeria bilateral relations, EU-Nigeria bilateral relations, the relations between Nigeria and its neighbors, Nigeria-African Union relations and Nigeria-ECOWAS relations.

Keywords

Nigeria, Nigerian Foreign Policy, Ethnic Conflict, Religious Conflict, Boko Haram.

Introduction

Nigeria is an ethnically and religiously diverse, politically weak but, from the point of population and natural minerals, it is extremely rich. Nigeria is a country which is not able to manage its diversity thoroughly. Of course, there are many factors capable of affecting the foreign policy of Nigeria, but how the ethnically and religiously motivated armed group, Boko Haram, affects Nigerian foreign policy is a matter of discussion. Even though Boko Haram was established in the early 2000s, its activities were relatively peaceful to those after 2009. The group has rounded out its sphere of influence after 2009 and its activities have become more aggressive since 2009. Additionally, the medium of its activities has become more intricate and it has gained access to arms. After 2009, its activities have begun to be more violent and the group resorted to armed violence. Now the group's activities are aimed at the Jonathan administration and it is imperative to look at how Boko Haram armed group affects the foreign policy of Jonathan administration. The group is judged as a terrorist group on the basis of the definition of terrorism on the official website of FBI and the US government's designing it as an Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO). Boko Haram fits into both definitions of terrorism, international and domestic terrorism.

Origins of Boko Haram

The religious group, Boko Haram, which terrorizes the north-east of Nigeria in particular, was established in 2002 in Maiduguri, Borno state, in the north-east of the country by Mohammad Yusuf. The name 'Boko Haram' is often translated from the Hausa language as 'western education is haram or a sin' and it's a name attributed by the media. However, the group names itself

as 'Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad' in Arabic. The original aim of Yusuf was to set up a religious group, yet later the objective of the group shifted. The western type of education was believed to be sinful and Yusuf constructed a mosque which was owned by his father-in-law belonging to the group and initiated a school where Muslim children could get education in accordance with the teachings of Islam. Since the group believe that the western education non-complies with Islamic teachings, the schools in the north of the country were targeted as the mere places to attack so that students were forced to withdraw themselves from schools and schools were driven to shut down.¹ It could be claimed that between 2002 and 2009 was more peaceful in regard to the time frame after 2009. When the group's leader Mohammed Yusuf was captured and killed during the police custody without a fair trial, the group's activities increased nationwide, but particularly in the north.² The group foregrounded itself more when its members became a party to intra-Islamic group violence in Plateau State and, thenceforth, the group somehow has a share in almost 10.000 people slaughtered.³ The motivations that helped form such a terrorist group are the number of the unemployed, poverty and the injustice (Omede 2001: 100) in the north, particularly in the north-east of the country. However, it is predicted that resorting to a religious discourse is not

1 Yvonne Ndege and Azad Essa, "The rise of Nigeria's Boko Haram: An in-depth look at the shadowy group as violence continues to wrack the West African country's northeast", 30 September 2013, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/09/201397155225146644.html>, accessed September 20, 2013.

2 Yunus Pürçek, "Boko Haram: Nijerya'nın Diz Çöktüğü An", 13 October 2013, Zaman, http://www.zaman.com.tr/yorum_boko-haram-nijeryanin-diz-coktugu-an_2151690.html, accessed October 13, 2013.

3 "Boko Haram history", 29 January 2013, <http://thenationonlineng.net/new/boko-haram-history/>, accessed 20 September, 2013.

the primary impetus behind the group. It is the northern unemployed youngsters who fuel Boko Haram, feeling disturbed by the so-perceived corrupted federal government whose aim is to steal the oil monies pouring into the state coffers.⁴ It is viewed as quite normal to see furious people with the system in a society where the ill-mannered policies prevail and the oil wealth of the country is ripped off by the state elites. On the other hand, some claim that the war on Western education by Boko Haram is misunderstood. Boko Haram contends that if a person is educated by Western education and makes use of it to personalize the public money of the state then the education is sinful. While the initial goal of the group was to set up a religious group, soon it was transformed into a terrorist group. The economic, political and religious motivations are intertwined. It is hard to separate one motivation from another. It is true that why the group originated was more due to economic and political reasons than religious one. Walker justifies that the source of most of the violence is political, in other words, due to vie for 'control of government patronage' (Walker 2013). He discusses that:

Boko Haram has grown at a time when there are many national issues that draw anger and feed the group. This includes the continued killing and corruption perpetrated by the police on people connected to the group; the brutal manner in which the police behave to the public at large; the financial corruption of the government; the moral corruption of the religious establishment (as per-

ceived by Boko Haram); a festering conflict in Plateau state; a perceived wider attack on Islam by a government currently led by a Christian president; the end to the "zoning deal" that saw power rotate between north and south; and the terrible political economy, the general poverty, and the poor state of northern Nigeria. It is anger at these issues that sustains the group and gives it recruits to continue its work (Walker 2013).

The northerners' feeling of desolation by their leaders has the lion's share in forming such illegal groups. The northern people seem to be desperate; thus, they look for their own methods of securing more shares from the oil revenues. It is an allegation that there exist corrupt components in the security forces that fuel the violence by Boko Haram to secure more shares from the security contracts (Ndege and Essa 2013). So long as these malignants are not removed from the security forces, the armed conflict will continue to surface itself. Boko Haram owes much of its growth to that of the attitude of the Nigerian police and army as well. Walker opines that people in the north-east are less likely to be terrorized by Boko Haram than they are by the police and the army (Ndege and Essa 2013). In a similar vein, Al-Jazeera claims that the Nigerian security forces outnumbered Boko Haram in the number of the people slaughtered and the raided security forces by Boko Haram take their revenge on civilians.⁵ It is evident that the security forces and Boko Haram mutually feed each other, yet the civilians are

4 "Boko Haram's Rise in Nigeria Sparks Civil War Fears", 21 January 2012, <http://www.voanews.com/content/boko-harams-rise-in-nigeria-sparks-civil-war-fears-137850723/150975.html>, accessed November 5, 2013.

5 "Report: Nigerian forces 'killed more civilians' than Boko Haram this year", 15 October 2013 <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/10/15/amnesty-hundredsosuspectedbokoharamdyinginprison.html>, accessed September 25, 2013.

subject to this armed conflict and they are severely harmed, injured or slain during the armed conflict.

Objectives of Boko Haram

Boko Haram began simply for religious purposes but later transformed and began to be formed as a reaction to the Western type of education in Nigeria. Dismissing the western-type education and inaugurating an education in accordance with Islamic teachings counts as the purpose of life of Boko Haram. Another primary objective of Boko Haram is to establish a state governed in accordance with the Islamic teachings. In order to achieve this, Boko Haram wants to bring and institutionalize Sharia Law throughout Nigeria. Even though some 12 states are governed by Sharia Law in the North, yet the Northerners still seem to be irritated in that so long as the Sharia Law is not implemented throughout the whole country, it seems difficult to establish a full Sharia Law in the country (Zenn 2013). However, the southerners who are predominantly Christians are not contend with the idea of spreading Sharia Law nationwide. They reckon that the intention of the northerners is to drift Nigeria to the edge of a political collapse which ultimately yields to a new election where the northerners could elect a Muslim president (Zenn 2013). As to how the federal government allowed the northerners to impose Shaira Law is owing to the fact that the local northern politicians sponged off the idea of implementation of Sharia Law for their private purposes, ultimately leading to the imposition of Sharia Law in 12 states in the north (Tande 2012). Even though 12 states implemented and are governed by it, Boko Haram reacted as a reflex to Sharia Law's not being implemented as the way they intended it to be. The group has had long standing future plans on how to replace the federal

government as well. It will act in small units and it will flourish and ultimately step into shoes of the federal state (Walker 2013). It is striking though that the act of replacement of the federal state is not only made up of plans. The group functions like a mini-state to perform the chores of a state such as 'providing welfare handouts, job training, jobs in mini-industries, resources for the rest of the community, and a "moral police"' (Walker 2013). It is also believed that so long as the federal government do not eradicate the lingering poverty that the north combats and establishes schools accredited by the northern Muslims, the terror in Nigeria look unlikely to end (Chothia 2013).

Ethno-Religious conflict and Nigerian foreign policy

Is Boko Haram only a domestic issue or an international one? Does that have the capacity to affect the foreign policy of the Jonathan administration? In fact, at the onset, the group was more a domestic issue and it was underestimated and ignored by the federal government. However, it turned into a rolling snowball effect and flourished in the north-east of the country. Boko Haram, quite local with respect to geography, was able to draw the global attention on itself and came to the forefront upon bombing the UN premises in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria, in August 2011. It is reported that it is likely that Boko Haram had a contact with Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb and connection with al-Shabab of Somalia with regard to the sophistication of the arms utilised to attack on the UN building and it is perceived as an assault on the 'global community', not only on Nigeria.⁶ Therefore, since then, Boko Haram

⁶ "Abuja attack: Car bomb hits Nigeria UN building", 26 August 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14677957>, accessed September 30, 2013.

was approached with great discretion both by the Nigerian government and the global community.

Boko Haram and US-Nigeria Relations

The US-Nigeria relations commenced upon Nigeria gained her independence from Britain in 1960. However, it is difficult to speak about a real foreign policy agenda between Nigeria and the United States due to the military takeovers intermittently from 1965 to 1999. The bilateral relations between the US and Nigeria gained momentum after 1999 and it peaked in April, 2010 when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Nigerian Secretary to the Government of the Federation Yayale Ahmed inaugurated the US-Nigeria Binational Commission (NBC). It is originally designed to boost the strategic ties between the two states on a wide array of mutual interests.⁷ The NBC operates on five important fields of interest: good governance, transparency and integrity; energy and investment; regional security; Niger Delta; and agriculture and food security.

As to how the US is engulfed in the matter of Nigeria's domestic issue and how Boko Haram has an impact on Nigeria-US relations is entirely based on the US strategic interests in Nigeria. Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau's declaration Jihad on the US and declaration of the US president Barrack Obama as 'terrorist in the afterlife' is another aspect indicating how the US is pulled in the domestic issues of Nigeria. Shekau proclaims the US as the cornerstone of 'anti-secular, anti-Christian, anti-democracy, and anti-Western'(Zenn 2013)

agenda of Boko Haram. The US government had already declared the three leaders of Boko Haram as terrorists, Abubakar Shekau, Abubakar Adam Kamar and Khalid el Barnawi, on the grounds that they had some links with Al-Qaeda. That is, all the wealth that belonged to these three men in the USA would be suspended and they are forbidden of any close contact with American citizens. The U.S government issued an award of \$7 million to the person who could provide information that will help the US government to capture him (Odiogor 2013). The group's leader Ebubakar Shekau declared that they are powerful enough to counter the USA and outran the Nigerian security forces in capacity. State Department spokesperson told that "we are committed to taking any and all steps toward countering Boko Haram as long as we believe such steps will be effective in advancing US interests and objectives". Thus, the United States transferred security forces in 2012 to assist Nigerian government to counter the Boko Haram insurgency and vigilance technology to enhance the border security in 2013 (Odiogor 2013). Even though Boko Haram is not a direct threat to the American interests in Nigeria, and it has nothing to do with Boko Haram, Nigeria and the US meet on the common ground that it is a terrorist group for Nigeria, which threatens Nigeria's stability, and it is a terrorist group for the US due to its forging allies with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

The USA attaches importance to Boko Haram, not because it is an immediate threat to American interests in Nigeria, but it is becoming a part of global terrorist network, al-Qaeda. Consequently, the US government was likely to declare it as an FTO. However, Nigerian government counter-lobbied so as not the US government pass such an act. The Nation promulgated on August 11, 2012 that the Federal Government was pleaded by the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton

7 <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prsps/2010/09/147023.htm>, accessed September 30, 2013.

on Boko Haram. The US would not declare Boko Haram as an international terrorist group. The Federal Government was concerned that once the USA pronounced Boko Haram as an FTO/ITO, the innocent Nigerians would suffer from strict measures at the US airports and visa denials. It would also preclude the foreign investors from investing in Nigeria which would ultimately affect the Nigerian economy terribly. Once the US had added Boko Haram on the list of FTOs, the European Countries would follow the US as well (Alli 2012). Even though declaring Boko Haram as an FTO would enhance the capacity of the US to combat this terrorist group and it would signal to the rest of the world that what its characteristics is (Meehan 2012), the US seemed rather reluctant to declare it as an FTO. The challenging existence of Boko Haram not only affects Nigeria's decision-making process on foreign policy but it tempts the US and other major powers to interfere in the domestic affairs of Nigeria.

The Boko Haram menace is now on the foreign policy agenda of the Federal Government of Nigeria. It urges the president Jonathan Goodluck to call on US help on encountering the insecurity conditions posed by Boko Haram (Agba 2013) and the Nigerian government pursues a security-based foreign policy with the US other than the economic bilateral relations. Even though Nigeria is a wealthy country of the mineral sources, the Federal Government seeks more US funds to be able to establish a more secure border with her neighbour, Niger (Chwalisz 2013).

Vice President Joe Biden's portraying Nigeria as the 'America's anchor in Africa' is a lucid indication that Nigeria is indispensable for the US interests in Africa. It is a pivotal country for the USA since it is the fifth largest oil exporter to the US. Nigeria is

more than an important country for the US economy and energy sector. The Boko Haram menace is on the bilateral foreign policy agenda of both the US and Nigeria.

Despite the vigorous effort shown by the federal government of Nigeria, the US government designated and declared Boko Haram and its affiliate Ansaru as FTO on November 13, 2013. The US Department of State designated Boko Haram so as to protect the Nigerian civilians and to make sure that human rights are protected as well on the grounds that the lethal group has forged bonds with AQIM. The US Department of State designated it as an FTO after another deadly attack on BeniSheikh in September, 2013 and they killed over 160 people.⁸ The designation necessitates "a prohibition against knowingly providing, or attempting or conspiring to provide, material support or resources to, or engaging in transactions with, Boko Haram and Ansaru, and the freezing of all property and interests in property of the organizations that are in the United States, or come within the United States or the control of US persons".⁹

The Nigerian government welcomed the decision hoping that it would not harm the innocent Nigerians' travel in and out of the US and engagement in the economic activities said the Vice President Namadi Sambo.¹⁰

8 "US names Boko Haram as 'terror organisation'", 13 November 2013, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/11/us-names-boko-haram-as-terror-organisation-20131113155818371998.html>, accessed December 1, 2013.

9 "Terrorist Designations of Boko Haram and Ansaru", 13 November 2013, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/11/217509.htm>, accessed December 1, 2013.

10 "Designation of Boko Haram as terrorist organisation should not affect innocent Nigerians", 04 December 2013, <http://www.nanngroonline.com/section/general/designation-of-boko-haram-as-terrorist-organisation-should-not-affect-innocent-nigerians-sambo>, accessed December 1, 2013.

While the Federal Government of Nigeria was lobbying against a probable decision of declaring Boko Haram as a terrorist group by the US, now it welcomes the decision. What has changed over time? The fact is that Nigeria is hopeful that its innocent people will not get affected, the foreign business investments will keep flowing into the country and, most importantly, it will get more aid from the western countries under the veneer of countering Boko Haram. That's why Nigeria does not rise against the US decision.

Boko Haram and EU-Nigerian Relations

Europe and Africa, by and large, and Britain and Nigeria have a symbiotic relation. They have indispensably mutual importance for each other. Europe has a history in Africa; thus, it wants to continue its exiting ties with Africa.

It must be comprehended that Nigeria is a pivotal country for the EU for two ends. The first is owing to Nigeria's vast oil and natural gas reserves, their drilling and exportation to the EU countries. It is an alternative energy field and source to the Middle Eastern oil exporters, particularly to Iran. Secondly, Nigeria is the leader country of the ECOWAS and also the main contributor of peace and security in West Africa. For these reasons, Nigeria is indispensable to the EU. Nigeria and the EU hold regular 'Nigeria and European Union Ministerial Meetings'. That is an indicator of how much Nigeria is indispensable for the EU. Thus the joint ministerial level meetings attach great importance to the peace and security of Nigeria. According to the public declaration announced after the third bilateral meetings in 20012, both sides flickered that they were resolute on the extremist group Boko

Haram, they would cooperate to counter the terrorist group in the north and work on the elimination of the preliminary causes of terrorism. The communiqué stressed that both parties meet on the 'open society, adherence to the rule of law, respect for the fundamental freedoms and human rights' common grounds. Therefore, EU is committed to eliminate the causes behind the security issues in the country.¹¹ In the fourth ministerial level meeting communiqué, EU strongly rejects the terrorist activities in the north, in addition to Nigeria, and reiterates that the mutual dialogue is compulsory if Boko Haram is intended to be eradicated. It is also stressed that the common values which the EU and Nigeria mutually bare are the solution to the terrorism in Nigeria.¹² Boko Haram has its own place on the bilateral ministerial level meeting agenda. That is an indication that Boko Haram is an influential part of the foreign policy between Nigeria and the EU. The EU commenced the EU Sahel Strategy in 2011 in order to help herself maintain her interests in the Sahel region of Africa. However, the EU focuses on the preservation of its influence and economic interests. Boko Haram has the capacity to affect the Nigeria-EU relations. It enforces Nigeria to construct bilateral security agreements or allies. Both the EU and Nigeria agreed upon a plan to deploy security specialists in order to quell the insurgency and threat posed by Boko Haram (Ojeme 2012). Nigeria's pivotal role has increased since 2009 when the three countries Nigeria, Niger and Algeria signed an agreement on the construction of Trans-Saharan gas pipeline (NIGAL pipeline). It is planned to be ended in 2015 and it is planned to carry '20.000 and 30.000 million cubic meters of natural gas every year, corre-

11 Joint Communiqué, Third Nigeria-European Union Ministerial Meeting Nigeria, 8 February 2012, 1.

12 Joint Communiqué, Fourth Nigeria-European Union Ministerial Meeting Brussels, 16 May 2013, 4.

sponding to 25% of the needs of gas for the European Union'. The pipeline will carry the natural gas through these three countries to Spain and, ultimately, to Europe (Calleja 2013). Thus, Nigeria as a whole must be secure and stabilized of any threat alongside Niger and Algeria. Nigeria is well aware of the fact that the EU needs a more secure and stabilized Nigeria for the future energy exports of it; thus, Nigeria uses this energy privilege to counter the insurgency by Boko Haram by forging bonds with the EU states.

Even though EU has a Sahel Strategy, it includes only Niger, Mali and Mauritania. The objective of the project is the security and development of the area and in order to realize security and development of the area, the EU has to build close relations with the countries in the Sahel region.¹³ Despite the fact that the strategy's objective is to develop and secure the region, it does not include Nigeria as a risky country and Boko Haram as a security threat. Yet, the Federal Republic of Nigeria now succeeded the EU to accept Boko Haram as a security threat to Nigeria's stability and EU interests. This could be regarded as a foreign policy profit of Nigeria.

Boko Haram and Nigeria's Relations with her Neighbours: Niger, Chad and Cameroon.

Since 2011, after the Abuja bomb blasts at the UN headquarters, Boko Haram succeeded itself to be added on the global agenda and, gradually, it began to be an inter-state phenomenon in the Sahel region. Now it spilled over into the territories

of the neighbouring countries, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Now the Boko Haram insurgency has to be tackled not only by the Nigerian government, but also the neighbouring states whose territories are used as spring board to attack on Nigeria and a safe environment to harbour after either cross-border or intra-country attacks. This is largely because of the population inhabiting the land where four states meet share Islamic values as well as 'poverty, government corruption, political instability and underdevelopment' (McGregor 2012) in their own countries. As an indication that Boko Haram is now an inter-national insurgency, according to the police report after the 2009 Maiduguri upheaval, the papers found on the dead militants verified that most of them came from Niger and Chad (McGregor 2012). Since they are the descendants of the Kanuri people, the old Bornu Empire, they have both the religious and ethnic affinity. The need that Boko Haram has to be tackled by a joint effort has been comprehended by the president of Chad, Idris Dèby, and he called for a joint force made up of Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and the Central African Republic to counter Boko Haram activities in the Chad basin.

Nigeria has a border length of 1,690 kilometres with Cameroon in the east, 1,497 kilometres with Niger in the north and 87 kilometres with Chad in the northeast (Onuoha 2013). Here, Nigeria is aware of its porous borders that facilitate the violent attacks of Boko Haram extremists using the Niger, Chad and Cameroon territories as headquarters. Nigeria attempts to succeed in making its north-east borders more secure. since it pursues a good neighbourliness policy towards its neighbours (Adams 2012), it cannot crack down on the borders with Niger, Cameroon and Chad since people living in the Lake Chad basin have close ethnic, religious, linguistic and trade relations. This

13 "European Union External Action Service Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel", http://www.eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf, accessed November 15, 2013.

porosity of the borders in the north-east assists the arms smugglers to move in and out freely since they know the land better than the security forces which, in return, help Boko Haram boost its violent attacks on Nigeria. Thus, Adams proposes that the operations performed must be mutually attended by both Nigeria and her neighbours so that both the air and land operations be collided (Adams 2012), in order for Boko Haram to be countered. After the Baga massacre by Boko Haram in Borno State in 2013, the president Goodluck of the Federal Government of Nigeria began to crack down on Boko Haram by declaring a state of emergency in three north-east states, Yobe, Adamawa and Borno and the neighbouring countries, Niger, Chad and Cameroon, pleaded for cooperation with Nigeria to arrest the Boko Haram members fleeing into their territories. To preclude the members of the group from fleeing the country, the president Goodluck suspended the borders with Niger, Chad and Cameroon. The president not only forged 'effective networking' but he institutionalized bilateral bonds against Boko Haram through 'diplomatic channels'. The three countries, Nigeria, Chad and Niger, set up the Multinational Joint Task Force in 1998 and revised it in April 2012 to include in the extremist activities in the Lake Chad basin (Adams 2012). Boko Haram is an international, albeit local, problem threatening and involving four states, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria. Based on the admission of prisoner captured by the police forces as a Boko Haram member, the police reports that there are Chadians, Nigeriens and Cameroonians who fight for Boko Haram.¹⁴

14 "Captured Fighters: Extremists from Chad, Niger, Cameroon Fighting in Nigeria's Islamic Uprising", 26 October 2013, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/10/26/captured-fighter-extremists-from-chad-niger-cameroon-fighting-in-nigeria/>,

The border problem is that the borders of the countries in the Sahel region are not demarcated sharply. Thus, Nigeria should commence a border-delineation foreign policy to demarcate the borders well which, ultimately, will assist Nigeria with its fight against Boko Haram.¹⁵ The insurgency of Boko Haram has an undeniable effect on the foreign policy decision-making. It urges Nigeria to construct border-demarcation foreign policy both with Niger and Cameroon. Nigeria has the longest border with Niger in the north. That requires a more secure border. National Boundary Commission of Nigeria declared that Nigeria is going to demarcate the border between Niger and Nigeria. In a similar vein, it will be applied to Nigeria-Cameroon border even though the bilateral relations have been perceived suspiciously by the Cameroon government. It has been declared that 'the required structures have been put on ground to bring both countries closer'.¹⁶ It is lucid enough that the three countries will forge close relations or improve the existing ones by border-foreign policy. In addition to border foreign policy, Boko Haram urges Nigerian government to seek military foreign policy as well. The state minister for the foreign affairs, Nurudeen Muhammed, proclaimed that he conveyed the president's request of military aid against Boko Haram on the border to the president of Niger. A mutual military defence treaty has been signed in October 2012 by both Nigeria and Niger to aid each other on transferring intelligence on the Islamist groups and to carry

accessed November 5, 2013.

15 "Nigeria's Porous Borders and National Security", 13 October 2011, <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/nigeria-s-porous-borders-and-national-security/100412/>, accessed November 5, 2013.

16 "Nigeria demarcates border with Niger, procure vehicles for joint patrol operation", <http://thecitizenng.com/headline-2/nigeria-demarcates-border-with-niger-procure-vehicles-for-joint-patrol-operation/>, accessed November 5, 2013.

out mutual military rehearsals. According to the treaty, it is an imperative that a state cannot deny a military call out by one state and the other has to respond it. According to the analysts, Nigeria's preponderance in West African affairs declines now due to the domestic threat of Boko Haram (Massalatchi 2013). It could be concluded that Boko Haram uprising not only forces Nigeria to pursue a security-based foreign policy with her neighbour to counter it, but Nigeria is not as influential as it used to be in West Africa and her foreign policy toward West Africa. Boko Haram insurgency urges the federal government of Nigeria to sign trans-border security agreements with her neighbours. One of these agreements has been signed between Nigeria and Cameroon upon which both parties "agreed to exchange information, do joint operation; help each other to deport suspected criminals. It is not for terrorism alone but for all other trans-national or trans-border criminal activities.

Refugee Problem

As a natural repercussion of armed confrontation of Boko Haram and Nigerian security forces in the north-east of Nigeria since the mid-May 2013, thousands of civilians dwelling in the north-east of the country have had to flee to the neighbouring countries, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. According to the UNHCR data, 6,000 people fled their county into Niger¹⁷ as a result of the latest clash between military forces and Boko Haram. The Federal Government declared a state of emergency in three adjacent states, Yobe, Borno and Adamawa and initiated a military incursion on May 14th. The

local residents are as much scared of the military forces as they fear of Boko Haram. The military keeps accusing the local civilians of assisting and hiding the Boko Haram members and destructs homes of the locals on account of assisting the group members. The military arrives in the villages with a list of names of alleged members of Boko Haram, which might have been given to the security forces on purpose by some due to political or economic reasons, and do not give the alleged members a chance to defend themselves. The security forces immediately begin slaughtering the alleged members.¹⁸ Thus, people flee their dwellings into the adjacent states on foot and through rural villages on the borders (Essa 2013). The Cameroonian government wanted to move the refugees from Nigeria to refugee camps and if they decline it, they would be affiliated with the Boko Haram sect. While the Cameroonian officers were moving a group of 100 refugees back to Nigeria, thought to be Boko Haram members, the Nigerian forces opened fire on the group without any fair hearing or approval of their being members of Boko Haram, on the Nigeria-Cameroon border, leaving 15 of them dead and 7 severely wounded. The rest was able to flee from Banki. Therefore, the UN Refugee Agency blamed Cameroon of dispatching people back to an insecure environment. Weird enough, the UN Refugee Agency did not touch on Nigeria's opening fire on her own refugees, nor did Nigeria utter a word on that.¹⁹ The UNHCR spokesman Dan McNorton advised that "borders

17 "Nigeria's crisis sees more than 6,000 people displaced into neighbouring countries", <http://www.unhcr.org/51b6fe189.html>, accessed December 13, 2013.

18 "Boko Haram: Over 20,000 Gwoza Residents Flee Nigeria Over JTF Attacks", 02 July 2013, <http://www.thenigerianvoice.com/nvnews/118011/1/boko-haram-over-20000-gwoza-residents-flee-nigeria.html>, accessed November 12, 2013.

19 "Nigerian army shoot own refugees at border, Cameroon blamed", <http://www.cameroononline.org/2013/10/31/nigerian-army-shoot-refugees-border-cameroon-blamed/>, accessed November 13, 2013.

be kept open for Nigerians fleeing the country and who may be in need of international protection".²⁰ Refugees fleeing Nigeria has turned into an international issue. Refugees prompted the UNHCR to be involved in the situation. Boko Haram domestic issue has evolved into an international security trouble. The Boko Haram menace has now spilled over into the neighbouring countries, which is a sign of regional security issue. Now Nigeria has to pursue a more active foreign policy to counter Boko Haram with both her close neighbours, the west African countries and the international community as well.

Boko Haram and Nigeria-African Union Relations

African Union supports the efforts made by the federal government of Nigeria to tackle the armed group of Boko Haram even though the African Union does not have a sound resolution or sanction against it. The AU Chairman, Dr. Jean Ping, declared that "I take this opportunity to reiterate the strong condemnation by the AU of the criminal attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram and other terrorist groups and reiterate our support for the efforts of the government of Nigeria".²¹ Additionally, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union rejects the bloody attacks by Boko Haram and calls the international society to assist Nigeria on combating against terrorism.²²

It indicates that African Union lacks the capability to take decisions against concrete terrorist activities, nor military capacity to assist Nigerian government. It calls for the international society to take joint action against Boko Haram. Both AU and the UN released their remarks on the fight against Boko Haram and reiterated their support to the federal government while condemning the activities by it (Usigbe 2012). The African body, AU, is seriously concerned of Boko Haram's spilling over into the adjacent territories and turn into a regional security issue. Francisco Caetano José Maderia, the top person of AU on the combat against terrorism, declared that Boko Haram is likely to "extend its activities to neighbouring countries and into the Central African region".²³ The Peace and Security Council of the African Union promulgates that Boko Haram is not only a security threat to Nigeria, but also to the region and international peace; thus, the collaboration of the international society is needed.²⁴ Boko Haram is now also able to affect the decision-making process of the bodies other than Nigeria. The insecurity posed by the Boko Haram sect prevented the Jonathan Goodluck from being elected to the chairmanship position of the AU (Agba 2012). When studied if Boko Haram has any impact on Nigeria-African Union (AU) relations, it is evident that Boko Haram menace did not have a huge impact on African Union-Nigeria relations. The terrorist attacks by Boko Haram strengthened the existing

20 "UNHCR urges against forced returns to Nigeria amid rising violence in the North", 29 October 2013, <http://www.unhcr.org/526fde3c9.html>, accessed November 13, 2013.

21 "UN, AU, endorse FG's onslaught against Boko Haram", 30 August 2012, <http://world.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201201/80706.php>, November 14, 2013.

22 "AU condemns Boko Haram, urges international action", 15 July 2012, <http://www.punchng.com/news/au-condemns-boko-haram-urges-international-action/>, accessed December 13, 2013.

23 "The African Union feared an expansion of the Islamist group Boko Haram", 25 January 2012, http://www.africandiplomacy.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1059%3athe-african-union-feared-an-expansion-of-the-islamist-group-boko-haram&catid=65%3aafrican-union&Itemid=79&lang=en, accessed November 15, 2013.

24 "AU condemns Boko Haram, urges international action", 15 July 2012, <http://www.punchng.com/news/au-condemns-boko-haram-urges-international-action/>, accessed December 13, 2013.

African Union-Nigeria relations, albeit small in scale. It also proved that AU lacks the capability of commencing a joint military incursion against Boko Haram.

Boko Haram and Nigeria-ECOWAS relations

When studied carefully if there is any impact of Boko Haram on Nigeria-ECOWAS relations, it could be upheld that Boko Haram insurgency has made no positive or negative changes on the Nigeria-ECOWAS relations. ECOWAS behaves sluggishly upon taking any resolution or sound sanctions against Boko Haram and neither does it support the Nigerian government militarily. The only act that ECOWAS could do is to condemn the terrorist activities by Boko Haram. Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, Director of Research at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), is quite annoyed with ECOWAS and he says that “sadly ECOWAS is a joke. Its response to political crisis in West Africa is awful, our sub-regional leaders are quick to sign conventions and pass resolution but inept in implementation.”²⁵ He further blames ECOWAS for not taking any actions against Boko Haram even though article 25 of ECOWAS charter gives legitimacy to intervene “in cases of aggression or conflict in any member state or threat thereof, in case of internal conflict that threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster or that poses a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region the Mediation and Security Council shall intervene.”²⁶

25 “Boko Haram is threat to ECOWAS sub-regional security”, 25 January 2012, <http://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2012/01/25/boko-haram-is-threat-to-ecowas-sub-regional-security-dr-aning/#sthash.szjI9GUu.dpuf>, accessed November 17, 2013.

26 “Boko Haram is threat to ECOWAS sub-regional security”, 25 January 2012, [http://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2012/01/25/boko-haram-is-threat-](http://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2012/01/25/boko-haram-is-threat-to-ecowas-sub-regional-security-dr-aning/#sthash.szjI9GUu.dpuf)

At the 41st Ordinary Summit of ECOWAS, ECOWAS called on both the member states and the international society to act against Boko Haram in Nigeria.²⁷ ECOWAS is inept passing a resolution against Boko Haram and taking sound actions and assisting Nigeria militarily, socially and economically to tackle the insurgency in the north-east of the country.

Conclusion

The aim of this study is to show the effect of ethno-religious conflict on Nigerian foreign policy thorough Boko Haram case. Now Boko Haram is a stakeholder of the foreign policy making since it urges Nigeria to forge allies with both her neighbours and the major powers as the US and the EU on countering the Boko Haram insurgency. Boko Haram has the capacity to cause diversion and revision of foreign policy of Nigeria now.

Nigeria is the anchor of the USA in Africa, which renders Nigeria an indispensable country for the USA. Even though Boko Haram is not a direct threat to the US strategic interests in Nigeria, it takes its place on the US foreign policy agenda as well since it is likely to forge bonds with the al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) as the modus operandi of the group has changed. Despite having had a local discourse, in 2011 with the bombing of the UN headquarter in Abuja; the group suddenly took its place on global security agenda. Even though the US Senate pressured the US government to declare

to-ecowas-sub-regional-security-dr-aning/#sthash.szjI9GUu.dpuf, accessed November 17, 2013.

27 “ECOWAS seeks assistance for Nigeria in fight against Boko Haram”, <http://www.panapress.com/ECOWAS-seeks-assistance-for-Nigeria-in-fight-against-Boko-Haram---12-833890-100-lang2-index.html>, accessed November 17, 2013.

Boko Haram as an FTO, the Nigerian federal government pressurized the US government vigorously so as not the US government to take such a decision, for fear that it would affect both innocent Nigerians and Nigerian economy alike. The Nigerian government feared that the foreign investors would be spooked away by such decision and the other major powers would follow the same fashion.

Boko Haram forces the federal government of Nigeria to forge close ties with the USA, causes security proportion to go up on the foreign policy agenda of Nigeria. Nigeria asks for more foreign financial aid from the US to counter Boko Haram insurgency effectively despite its vast mineral resources and revenues. However, on December 13, 2013, the US government designated Boko Haram as one of the FTOs on the grounds that the USA wanted to protect the Nigerian civilians, human rights and Boko Haram's forging allies with AQIM, and it became the ninth international terrorist group. However, though surprising, the federal government welcomed the US designation hoping that it would not affect the innocent Nigerians legitimate travel to US. Nigeria hopes that USA will assist better to Nigeria on fight against Boko Haram.

Nigeria is also a pivotal country for the EU for it is an alternative energy field to Middle East, particularly Iran. The EU started the Sahel Strategy in 2011 in order to secure the Sahel region excluding Nigeria. Thus, the three countries, Niger, Nigeria and Algeria, signed an agreement on the construction of Trans-Saharan gas pipeline (NIGAL pipeline). It is planned to be ended in 2015 and it is planned to carry 20.000 and 30.000 million cubic meters of natural gas every year, corresponding to 25% of the needs of gas for the European Union. Thus, Nigeria as a whole must be secure and stabilized of any

threat alongside Niger and Algeria. Nigeria is well aware of the fact that the EU needs a more secure and stabilized Nigeria for the future energy exports of it; thus, Nigeria uses this energy privilege to counter the insurgency by Boko Haram by forging bonds with the EU states. Despite the fact that the objective of the Sahel Strategy is to develop and secure the region, it did not include Nigeria as a risky country and Boko Haram as a security threat. Yet, the Federal Republic of Nigeria has now succeeded the EU to accept Boko Haram as a security threat to Nigeria's stability and EU interests. This could be regarded as a foreign policy profit of Nigeria. It shows that Boko Haram has the capacity to affect Nigerian foreign policy.

Another foreign policy area that Boko Haram could affect is the foreign policy pursued towards the neighbours of Nigeria: Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Boko Haram pushes Nigeria to pursue a triple-layered foreign policy with its neighbours: the border demarcation and surveillance foreign policy, signing security agreements with its neighbour and handling the refugees in Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Since Boko Haram spilled over into the neighbouring territories, Nigeria needs her neighbours' assistance as well to counter terrorism efficiently. The first phase of fighting the insurgency effectively is demarcation of the borders with its neighbours clearly and ensuring the security of the borders with Niger, Chad and Cameroon. National Boundary Commission of Nigeria declared that Nigeria is going to demarcate the border between Niger and Nigeria. In a similar vein, it will be applied to Nigeria-Cameroon border. The second layer of foreign policy is to sign bilateral security agreements with its neighbours. A mutual military defence treaty has been signed in October 2012 by both Nigeria and Niger to aid each other on transferring intelligence on the Islamist groups and to carry out mu-

tual military rehearsals. According to the treaty, it is an imperative that a state cannot deny a military call out by one state and the other has to respond it. Another agreement has been signed between Nigeria and Cameroon upon which both parties “agreed to exchange information, do joint operation; help each other to deport suspected criminals (Taiwo-Obalonye 2013). In addition to security agreements against Boko Haram insurgency, the three countries, Nigeria, Chad and Niger, set up the Multinational Joint Task Force in 1998 and revised it in April 2012 to include in the extremist activities in the Lake Chad basin.

As for Nigerians fleeing from Nigeria into Niger, Chad and Cameroon posed by Boko Haram insurgency, it has become an international problem including four states and UNHCR. It is an indication that Boko Haram armed menace has an international aspect now. It is not only a security issue of Nigeria, but it is an international security issue as well.

Even though Boko Haram insurgency has made no negative impact on African Union-Nigeria and ECOWAS-Nigeria relations, it strengthened the bonds between Nigeria and the African bodies. Both AU and ECOWAS showed their decisiveness of support to the federal government of Nigeria. Even though both the AU and ECOWAS regard Boko Haram insurgency as a threat to a member country and a threat to the security to the West African region, both of them are inept of passing any sound resolution or taking any concrete action against Boko Haram. Both bodies call on the member states and the international community to assist tackling the security issue in Nigeria, yet do nothing tangible against the acts of the violent group.

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Comparative Discourse Analysis of the Turkish Media on the Foreign Policy of Justice and Development Party in the Context of Arab Uprisings

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Abstract

The foreign policy of the Justice and development Party (JDP) government towards the Arab uprisings in 2011 and 2012 have been narrated through divergent and even confronting views in the Turkish media. These different narratives demonstrated that foreign policy could also be a matter of internal political fault lines, and the narratives in the media can be constructed to reflect ideological or power position of a particular media organ vis-à-vis with the government. These socially constructed different ideas, identities and interests based on the same material inputs constitute an example of Constructivism which envisages that material assets are meaningless without mental element. This article aims to reveal how mental elements, - ideas, identities and interests, on the foreign policy of JDP in the context of Arab Uprisings have been socially constructed in the selected newspapers.

Keywords

Constructivism, Arab Spring, Arab Awakening, Arab Uprisings, Turkish Media, Discourse Analysis, Turkish Foreign Policy, Middle East, JDP.

Introduction

The common causes of the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region were dictatorships, human rights violations, government corruptions, extreme poverty and unemployment. These uprisings emerged in the form of sectarian conflict in some countries such as in Lebanon, Bahrain and Syria. They all came to the agenda of the international community in different ways. NATO acted quickly and intervened in Libya. The coup d'état in Egypt divided the international community over the concept of democracy. There is no reconciliation at the UN regarding the destiny of Syria.

The repercussions of these developments on Turkey were also immense since they led to a change in the traditional Turkish foreign policy paradigms and Turkey's relations with the Arab countries.

In this article, I will present a comparative discourse analysis of the foreign policy of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) in the context of Arab Uprisings narrated in the four Turkish newspapers selected from different locations of the media spectrum.

Zaman newspaper, which is the first in the circulation rate, is known as the media organ of Fethullah Gülen movement which has had important contribution for the coming into power of JDP. In the fourth rank, there is Sabah newspaper which acts as mouthpiece of the Erdoğan government. Sözcü newspaper comes fifth in the rank as the defender of Kemalism with its inherent anti-JDP (Justice and development Party) attitude. The last newspaper is Taraf, although it ranks in the 18th place it is an influential newspaper with its liberal orientations. The below Table reflects the circulation rates of these newspapers. The following figures reflects the daily average sales in

November 2012, in Istanbul. It reflects more or less Turkey average. These figures have been used due to its more reliable source, Media Advertising Agency.

Newspaper Average Daily Circulation Rates¹

RANK	NEWSPAPER	SALES
1.	ZAMAN	872.858
4.	SABAH	311.047
5.	SÖZCÜ	302.702
18.	TARAF	51.827

This analysis comprises first page headlines and articles of the editorial writers or chief editors of these newspapers regarding their construction of the foreign policy of JDP in the context of Arab uprisings. I selected almost all relevant articles of Mehmet Barlas, Editorial Writer of Sabah; Emin Çölaşan Editorial Writer of Sözcü; Ahmet Altan, Editorial Writer of Taraf; and Ekrem Dumanlı, Chief Editor of Zaman. I have used eight headlines from each newspaper and eight articles from each columnist concerning the context of this study.

The research will comprise the time period beginning with the first protests occurred in Tunisia on the 18th of December, 2010; and 30 June 2012, the end of the Egyptian elections. However, certain headlines and articles until 30 November 2012 have also been used due to their contextual importance.

As a method of this study, the first section will be a theoretical framework and a literature review, and the second section will

1 Media Advertising Agency. 2014. "Istanbul, Kasım 2012 Tiraj Raporu." Accessed August 20. <http://www.bik.gov.tr/istanbul/kasim-2012-tiraj-raporu/>

comprise the headlines, articles and their analysis separately for each newspaper.

I will build my general framing of the analysis on the fault lines which have been reflected through the construction of the news and comments. I will try to concentrate on what these headlines and comments tell us and how we can relate them to the general framing of the ideological and power positions of the newspapers. Denotations and connotations of the headlines will also be a subject of the discourse analysis.

Disregarding the time coincidence among the headlines and the comments, a positional relation will be sought to establish the ideological integrity of newspapers. Finally, an analysis will be made regarding the ideological or the power position of the newspapers in the media spectrum.

Theoretical Framework and Literature Review on the Discourse of the selected Newspapers on the Foreign Policy of the JDP in the Context of the Arab Uprisings

The uprisings in each Arab country have some common and some private characteristics or some different ends, which makes it difficult to generalize or to identify a common name for these uprisings. As of August 15, 2004, Encyclopedia Britannica stated in its website under the title of Arab Uprisings that instead of steady progress toward dismantling authoritarian structures, we witnessed to political gridlock and increased polarization, political violence and fierce repression, and, in the cases of Yemen and Libya, the possibility of state disintegration. In this study, therefore, I will avoid the use of the term “Arab Spring” or “Arab Awaken-

ing”, which were supposed to produce desired democratic and transparent rules and a chain of more optimistic developments, but instead, I will prefer to use the term “Arab Uprisings”.

Constructivist theory envisages that the most important dimension of international relations is not the material dimension but socially constructed mental reality. The theory argues that the perception of the actors and the formation of their thoughts and beliefs are important to understand political developments. For instance, international security does not have objective reality out of social world but it has reality in the inter-subjective area. The material assets are meaningless without mental element. Culture, identity, common understandings, discourse and meanings are important elements in the formation of mental factor (Sönmezoğlu 2011, 47-48). Change in the international relations area can be explained by the change in ideas, norms and common values (Sönmezoğlu 2011, 48).

Ideas are mental constructs held by individuals, set of distinctive beliefs, principles and attitudes that provide broad orientations for behaviour and policy (Tannenwald 2005, 15). Ideas define the meaning of material power (Tannenwald 2005, 19). Nina Tannenwald identifies four major types of ideas: Ideologies or shared belief systems are a systematic set of doctrines or beliefs that reflect the social needs and aspirations of a group, class, culture or state. Normative beliefs are beliefs about right or wrong. Causal beliefs are beliefs about cause-effect, or means-end relationships. Policy prescriptions are the specific programmatic ideas that facilitates policy making by specifying how to solve particular policy problems (Tannenwald 2005, 15-16).

The social constructivist claim is not that

ideas are more important than power and interest or that they are autonomous from power and interest. Power and interests have the effects they do in virtue of the ideas that make them up (Wendt 1999, 135).

The meanings in terms of which action is organized arise out of interaction (Wendt 1992, 403). People act toward objects on the basis of meanings that the objects have for them (Wendt 1992, 396). The process of signalling, interpreting and responding completes a social act and begins the process of creating inter-subjective meanings. If repeated long enough, these reciprocal typifications will create relatively stable concepts of self and other (Wendt 1992, 405).

The distribution of power may always affect state's calculations, but how it does so depend on the inter-subjective understandings and expectations, on the distribution of knowledge that constitute their conceptions of self and other. It is collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions (Wendt 1992, 397). Actors acquire identities – relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self – by participating in such collective meanings. Identities are inherently relational. They are the basis of interests. (Wendt 1992, 397).

Actors do not have a portfolio of interests; they define their interests in the process of defining situations. Sometimes situations are unprecedented in our experience and in these cases we have to construct their meanings, and thus our interests, by analogy or invent them *de novo* (Wendt 1992, 398).

Far from being exogenously given, the inter-subjective knowledge that constitutes competitive identities and interests is constructed everyday by processes of social will formation (Wendt 1992, 410). Process

is a cognitive, inter-subjective concept, in which identities and interests are endogenous to interaction (Wendt 1992, 394). The social process is one of constructing and reconstructing self and social relationships (Wendt 1992, 407).

Each actor's conception of self (interest and identity) is a product of the others (Copeland 2000, 188). Global politics are guided by the inter-subjectively shared ideas, norms and values. Shared ideas as an ideational structure constrain and shape behaviour. The ideational structure has a constitutive effect on actors. The structure leads actors to redefine their interests and identities in the process of interacting. Constructivism considers how ideational structures shape the way actors define themselves. Ideational structures and actors co-constitute and co-determine each other (Copeland 2000, 189-190). Constructivist theory argues that identities, perceptions and interests are the results of socially constructed ideas and they do not exist in the nature (Wendt 1999, 1).

Turkey's foreign policy towards the developments during the Arab uprisings in the MENA region in 2011 and 2012 have been narrated to Turkish public opinion by various media organs from divergent and even confronting views. These divergent and confronting views demonstrate that foreign policy can be a matter of domestic politics and reflect the internal fault lines, and the media organs can narrate the political developments according to their ideological and power positions. This socially constructions of different mental realities based on same material factors regarding Arab uprisings constitute an example of constructivism. In this article, I will try to demonstrate how mental realities have been socially constructed in Turkish media and why material assets are meaningless without mental ele-

ment.

The relations between Turkey and the MENA countries can be described by misconceptions, contradictions and suspicions since 1918. Turkey followed a politically and culturally different politics from most of the Middle Eastern countries. All Turkish governments between 1923 and 2002 oriented to West. Turkey's new republican elites regarded themselves as part of the Western World (Yılmaz 2012, 350).

Widespread discontent at economic hardships, decades of autocratic rule and corruption erupted into mass demonstrations in December 2010 after a young, unemployed man, Mohamed Bouazizi, set fire to himself after officials stopped him selling vegetables in Sidi Bouzid, in Tunisia. It expanded successively like a domino to other Arab countries. The political uprisings in the Arab World in 2011 have irrevocably transformed the Middle East (Dalacoura 2012, 63). The dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen have been overthrown. In Bahrain, the uprising of Shiite majority has been suppressed with the intervention of the Saudi Arabian forces. In Morocco and Jordan, ruling monarchs diffused pressures by announcing reform measures (Dalacoura 2012, 66).

As a result of Arab Uprisings, a new security environment and a new realignment have occurred in the Middle East (Cagaptay 2012, 9). Syria has been dragged into a civil war due to the inaction of the United Nations Security Council caused by irreconcilable interests of particularly USA and RF.

The policy of JDP government's "*Zero Problem*" with the neighbours has been left for a coherent response to Arab uprisings (Dalacoura 2012, 76). Turkey's traditional "non-interference to the domestic affairs" and "not to become a party to the regional

problems" principles have been left aside during the JDP government (Kösebalaban 2011, 112).

Öniş argues that Turkey can take action in close alignments with the US and EU in the Middle East rather than self-attributed pro-activism (Öniş 2012, 45). Turkey has followed four stages in its foreign policy towards Arab Uprisings: cautious unilateralism, reluctant participation, unilateral pro-activism, and lastly, more cautious approach and reluctant multilateralism (Öniş 2012, 51). He points out that Turkey's over-engagement and over-assertiveness can further destabilize the region. This will decrease its ability to play a constructive stabilizing and reformist role. The Syrian crisis has demonstrated Turkey's limit of diplomatic and economic soft-power resources (Öniş 2012, 56-58).

Turkey, the Syrian opposition, the Iraqi Kurds and the Syrian Kurds are on one side; Assad, Iran and PKK are on the other side. Turkey, Iraqi Sunnis and Iraqi Kurds are opposing Shia, Iran and PKK. Either Tehran or Ankara will emerge as victorious from the proxy war between them (Cagaptay 2012, 9).

Turkey's liberal democratic system and economic success, coupled with its stance against Israel, have created important appeal in the Arab world (Kösebalaban 2011, 112). Kireççi argues that features of the Turkish model include parliamentary democracy, open market economy, and a turn from French style secularism to more inclusive secular model (Kireççi, 111). However, there is no scholarly consensus regarding the aspects of Turkish model (Kireççi 2012, 119)

Balcer argues that the most important lesson learned from Arab uprisings is the bankruptcy of authoritarian modernization (Balcer 2012, 370). Turkish experience

is unique and difficult to apply elsewhere. There are deep divisions between Turks and Arabs regarding secular reforms (Balcer 2012, 373). Turkish experience of economic transformations is valuable prior to democratization and soft secularization (Balcer 2012, 375).

Turkey has two comparative advantages regarding its presentation as a role model. These are Turkey's unique position at the western institutions such as NATO, Council of Europe and EU as an only Muslim country and its democratic and laic identity (Akbaş 2012, 70).

Analysis of the Discourse of the selected newspapers on the Foreign Policy of the JDP in the Context of the Arab Uprisings

Except the headlines of Sozcu newspaper, all the headlines of other selected newspapers do not carry any comment or argument and cannot be deemed as a confrontation with or defence of the ruling party since they are simply quoted from official circles or foreign media organs. No matter how harsh is the headline of Sozcu, it bears direct message to the government, whereas, Sabah is the only newspaper that uses connotations of the messages, for instance, while giving the foreign message aims to create a domestic side meaning, such as "do not resist to change". Therefore, construction of the main fault lines in the selected newspapers have been based primarily on the headlines in Sozcu, but, primarily in the articles of the editorial writers in other newspapers. The contradiction or coherence have been sought to find out between the headlines and the articles. Time coincidence of the headlines and the articles have been disregarded since

the comments from earlier or future dates might correspond to real world events of any different date.

1. Discourse of Sabah Newspaper

Sabah newspaper is at the fourth rank of newspaper circulation rates table with its 311.047 average sales in Istanbul. It can be said that it is an ardent supporter or mouthpiece of the JDP government. One cannot find any dissident sentence in the headlines. While narrating messages of Erdogan, it often applies to its connotations aiming domestic message. The headlines such as "not to resist against change" and "power with the tanks to a certain point" send populist messages to the people and warnings to the established order in Turkey. The comments by Mehmet Barlas usually clarifies, explains and supports the headlines. He even tries to minimise the indignation of Turkish public opinion on the repercussion of Syrian crisis on the Kurdish problem saying simply 'Kurdistan problem is an American problem'. There is a semantic integrity of the headlines and the articles in Sabah.

Main arguments of Mehmet Barlas are: (a) International relations are bi-directional and Turkey also did not act like a real partner to US, (b) There is a Sunnite-Shiite balance in the Middle East, (c) The affection towards Erdoğan in the Middle East is tangible proof of the beginning of a new era for Turkey, (d) Kurdistan is a problem of the US, not of Turkey, for now, (e) Arab Phobia of Turkish foreign policy has been destructed by Erdogan and the Turks see the ideology of the regime which denies the necessity of change as a barrier in front of development.

It seems that Barlas shares the view that Turkey has been left alone during the Syria crisis. He argues that global calculations as much as national interests prevail while for-

foreign policy strategy is formed in some countries. The alliances and the friendships of the non-super powers with the superpowers are full of disappointments, reproaches and “we have been left alone again” sentiments. On the other hand, one should not forget that all the relations are bi-directional. Turkey lived the first shock with the Johnson letter sent for Cyprus crisis. Since Turkey’s national interests did not conform to the US’ global calculations during the Iraqi invasion, it did not behave like a real strategic partner like England and it did not stand by the US that time (11.10.2012).

Barlas argues that it is quite natural that the developments in Syria is seen as a domestic issue by the JDP with regards to realities of the new world order which stipulates that the problem of any country is the problem of all other countries in the world (28.07.2012). Erdoğan told that the day that they will pray in the Umayyad mosque and read Fatiha Sura at the tomb of Salahaddin Eyyubi is too close. Sabah uses this headline: “*We may go to Damascus soon again*” (06.09.2012). Contrary to these statements, Barlas argues that Turkey is not the responsible for the crisis in Syria, but the government’s self-confidence coming from its important successes causes making very bold decisions (09.10.2012). He adds that there is nobody in Turkey desiring to be the conqueror of Damascus. The government tries to keep the implications of the Syrian civil war into Turkey at minimum levels and Turkey’s contribution to the ill-fated Syrian people at maximum levels (15.10.2012). It seems that Barlas has assumed the job that he tries to soften belligerent explanations of Erdogan towards public opinion. Sabah argues that Turkey is resolute to give support for all kinds of activities which would accelerate the fall of the Assad regime in revenge for the shooting of its Phantom jet fighter by Syria: “*The account will not be*

closed until Assad go” (25.06.2012) Erdoğan told that anybody who would like to test the greatness of Turkey will be corrected, by identifying Assad regime as a bandit state. Sabah narrates this explanation in the headline as: “*The great powers would have enemies*” (28.06.2012). As Colasan and Altan asked there is no explanation why Assad became the enemy of Turkey.

Erdoğan made historical call to Mubarek at the parliamentary group meeting of the Justice and Development Party which Al Jazeera lively broadcasted: “*Do not resist changing*” (02.02.2011). Barlas reveals that the demonstration of the affection towards Erdoğan during his visit to Egypt is tangible proof of the beginning of a new era for Turkey in the Middle East (14.09.2011). Speaking at the African Muslim religious leaders Summit, Erdoğan called Assad to go to elections and warned him saying that “*power with the tanks is to a certain point*” which was also bearing a domestic message (22.11.2011). Seventy thousand people marched with the Erdoğan slogans during the visit of the Arab League observers to Humus which is under the siege of the Assad forces. Sabah narrated this event: “*The ‘Great Erdoğan’ slogans in Humus*” (28.12.2011). With reference to NATO College report and the New York Times analysis which have suggested that Turkey should be a role model for Egypt, Sabah used the following headline for this diagnosis: “*The name of the solution is Turkey model*” (07.02.2011).

Barlas asserts that great Kurdistan problem is an American problem. The US has supported the Kurdish formation in Northern Iraq and it has prepared the cadres of this semi state organization. The US will also determine the course of the developments if Syria is divided following the end of the Assad regime. Whether the Iraqi Kurds and the Syrian Kurds come together to establish

a great Kurdistan is an important question. There is no Soviet-American balance in the Middle East anymore; however, there is a Sunnite-Shiite balance, in other words, there is an Iranian factor. The percentage of the Shiites in Iraq is roughly 60-65 per cent. The population percentage of the Kurds in Iraq is approximately 15-17 per cent. Thus, if the Iraqi Kurds proclaims independent Kurdistan, the Shiite sect will overwhelmingly prevail in the Iraqi identity. This situation is unacceptable for the US at the moment. In other words, great Kurdistan is not a problem of Turkey but of the US "for now". There is one more possibility that it is also the problem of Israel which sees the existence of Iran as a threat (28.07.2012). Erdoğan tells the sectarian feature of the civil war in Syria mentioning what happened in Kerbela 1332 years ago is happening today in Syria. Sabah uses this headline: "Yesterday Karbala, today Syria" (08.09.2012).

Barlas asserts that Prime Minister Erdoğan's Middle East policy has destructed "Arab Phobia" which is expressed by "Neither Damascus' candy nor Arab's face" statement and constituted one of the main pillars of the Republic's official ideology (14.09.2011). Barlas argues that Turks do not see the US as the main barrier in front of progress, instead, the ideology of the regime which denies the necessity of change. The prime minister calls the Middle East countries to be self-confident as a reflection of this social state of mind (15.09.2011).

2. Discourse of Sözcü Newspaper

Sözcü newspaper is at the fifth rank of newspaper circulation rates with average 302.702 sales in Istanbul. It is the leading opposition media organ in line with its Kemalist and secular character against the ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP) in

Turkey. Its columnists too, comment in conformity with the editorial policies opposing JDP's non-traditional and sectarian foreign policies during Arab Spring. The headlines of Sözcü directly aims at JDP government and do not carry any concern for connotations. A holistic structure, the integrity of the comments and headlines adds a total dissident character to Sözcü newspaper. Sözcü assess all the foreign policy actions of the JDP as the violation of the Turkish national interests and a damage to its credibility. Not only acts but also attitudes and manner, in other words personalities of Davutoğlu and Erdoğan are a source of critics for Sözcü and Çölaşan.

Sözcü criticizes JDP government's every foreign policy action through its headlines. Editorial writer Emin Çölaşan also comments in line with these headlines. Main arguments which have been put forward in the newspaper headlines and supported in the articles of Çölaşan regarding the Arab Spring are that (a) JDP is serving to the interests of the US and the West, and Turkey is being trapped in Syria; (b) JDP government has inserted sectarianism into Turkish Foreign Policy for the first time during Republican period, (c) Erdoğan and Davutoğlu's ignorance in diplomacy and world affairs, controversial speeches and bully words decreases Turkey's credibility and dignity d) JDP serves to the establishment of a Kurdish State in Syria.

Sözcü warns the public opinion arguing that the United States and England are trying to drift Turkey into a war with Syria through its headline: "they will instigate Tayyip and set Turkey against Syria." The US and England used Tayyip as a cat's paw and they will throw Turkey into the fire for their own interests" (11.08.2011). "Obama trapped Tayyip, he did everything to drift Turkey to the Syrian swamp. We are in a trouble, whole

world see this but ours does not” was another headline pointing out the US trap over Turkey” (28.08.2012). Emin Çölaşan supports these arguments expressing that Erdoğan serves to the interest of the United States and the West, and therefore, Turkey follows a hostile attitude against Syria although Assad did not act unfriendly against Turkey (05.10.2012). Collapse of Assad regime has been decided by the US, and Erdoğan is implementing Obama’s orders (22.11.2012). Sözcü allocated almost all its front page to the Syrian crisis on the 25th of June, 2012. It refers to the coup d’etat cases at the courts and pays attention to a danger of entering a war with Syria: “*We are in the eve of a war but 68 generals are in prison. If Tayyip executes what Obama inspires, Turkey is divided.*” Çölaşan criticizes Erdoğan for his addressing Assad as his “brother”, and asks what has been changed in three years following this enthusiasm. He constantly asks why Erdoğan and Davutoğlu suddenly proclaimed Assad as an enemy (22.11.2012).

Sözcü discloses an imminent threat: “*PKK establishes a state in Syria thanks to Tayyip*”. It asserts that the dream of taking over Assad brought forth a new issue for Turkey (26.07.2012).

Çölaşan argues that Erdoğan became adversary of Assad due to his sectarian understanding (12.10.2012). Syrian crisis is a scourge caused by the JDP government. Erdoğan and Davutoğlu have inserted sectarianism into Turkish foreign policy for the first time in the republican period (13.11.2012).

Sözcü mocks with Erdoğan with the following headline: “*Hello to Tayyip, continue to massacre*”. Sözcü argues that Turkey is pride of Assad’s obeying to Erdoğan and withdrawing his tanks, whereas, Syria withdrew its tanks only from one town and the massacre continues in other towns of Syria

(12.08.2011). The following headline pays attention to the usual inconsistent manner of Erdoğan: “*Tayyip blustered again, but he did what NATO told.*” Turkey did not take part in the bombing of Libya; however, it could not reject the arms embargo observation mission in Libya. Our ships are under the command of NATO (24.03.2011). Sözcü reminded its readers the controversial speeches of Erdoğan and Davutoğlu with the following headlines: “*Tayyip: NATO does not have any business in Libya. Davutoğlu: We will not take place in the crusades.*” Sözcü argued that whatever they told, they did the opposite, and therefore, the government’s inconsistent statements weaken Turkey’s hand and shadows its diplomatic credibility (26.03.2011). Five days following the shooting down of the Turkish jet fighter, Sözcü challenged the explanations of Erdoğan with reference to the opposition leaders with the following headline: “*Come off it, Foreign policy does not work with the bluff*” (27.06.2012). Çölaşan insults Davutoğlu alleging that the culprit of all these events is Davutoğlu who is at the lowest level among Turkey’s foreign ministers since the Ottoman period (05.10.2012). Davutoğlu does not have any knowledge about the world; he is dealing with foolish things such as playing to the world leadership (13.11.2012). Erdoğan and Davutoğlu have now understood Russian Federation and China are backing Assad and they do not have any intention to sacrifice him and leave the region under the authority of the US. As a matter of fact, the Kurds, PKK, Barzani and Islamists filled the vacuum of Assad 15.07.2012. Their disappointment is not important but they have humiliated Turkey (13.11.2012). Erdoğan and Davutoğlu destroyed state’s dignity with bully words against Syria (12.10.2012). Turkish jet fighters had intercepted a Syrian civil aircraft taken off from Russia and heading to Syria and forced it to land in Ankara on the

suspicion that it carried weapons and ammunition to Syria. However, it was clarified following the explanation of Russia that the equipment in the aircraft was not weapon or ammunition and also Turkish authorities could not claim the reverse. Çölaşan argues that if weapons had been found in the aircraft, Erdoğan would exhibit his latest show with the Kalashnikovs, machine guns and bombs in front of him. However, Erdoğan and Davutoğlu were not brave enough to explain that they could not find any weapon in the aircraft and we were disgraced and ruined before everyone one more time (14.10.2012). Çölaşan argued that Erdoğan assumed the subcontractorship of the US and dared to topple Syrian regime. The money, denied from our people in Van earthquake, was granted monthly to Syrians. However, these Syrians lowered our flag in their refugee camps and captured our police together with their arms. A new Kurdish entity is being established next to our borders. Erdoğan and his Ottoman foreign minister Davutoğlu drifted Turkey into trouble (25.07.2012).

Çölaşan criticizes the headlines of the newspapers, e.g. "*The English envied the hundred years` evacuation: Turkey rescued, we only watched*", made during the evacuation operation in Libya saying that a lickspittle shameless media has been formed in our country so that any event as far as it benefits to JDP is narrated with praises and make a mountain out of a molehill (26.02.2011).

3. Discourse of Taraf Newspaper

Taraf newspaper is very modest in the newspaper circulation rates table with average 51.827 sales corresponding to the 18th rank in Istanbul. Its headlines seems neutral and objective. Taraf base its headlines on the verifiable foreign sources and factual events. Therefore, the headlines does not

carry and negative or positive connotations for or against the JDP government. Altan interprets these headlines as the basis of his anti-JDP arguments. We cannot talk about any semantic totality between the headlines and the articles. On the other hand, editorial writer Ahmet Altan is harshly critical to JDP government`s foreign policies.

Main arguments of Ahmet Altan in line with the headlines fall into following categories: (a) Turkey is being trapped in Syria; (b) Turkey`s Sunnite alliance want to destroy Shiite Assad rule, (c) Erdoğan and Davutoğlu`s misperception of real life events and their authoritarian and belligerent intervention to the Middle East, (d) Altan criticizes Turkey`s Kurdish policy.

Ahmet Altan argues that all the countries have withdrawn suddenly and Turkey has fallen into a trap in Syria. Turkey has been left head to head with a civil war in which Turkey has become a party by giving shelter to the opponents of Syrian regime in the Turkish soil (01.09.2012). Altan`s arguments are not seem unfounded when the real world events cited from foreign sources are examined. At the beginning of the uprisings foreign media informed that many important roles has been expected from Turkey. Citing the Guardian`s announcement of Erdoğan`s Middle East campaign, Taraf used the following headline: "*The age of Turkey in the Middle East*" (14.9.2011). Taraf used the EU Commission`s political consultant Isabelle Ioannides` words that Turkey is the reference point of the transformation: "*Turkey is a great player, [act] accordingly*" (03.10.2011). Taraf, with reference to the Wikileaks documents, informs that the US followed Turkey-Syrian rapprochement in 2009 with concern. According to US diplomats, Damascus` politics threaten Turkey but JDP does not understand this: "*Turks do not understand Syria`s threat*" (28.04.2011).

With reference to New York Times, Taraf informs that CIA supply arms to Syrian opponents in southern Turkey: “CIA has been deployed against Bassar in Turkey” (22.06.2012).

In Altan’s opinion, three Sunnite countries, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar want to destroy Shiite Assad rule. The Westerns think that the intention of these three countries is not to bring democracy but to expand Sunnite sect. They evaluate the expansion of radical sectarianism more dangerous than the Assad rule. However, West wants the globalization of the Middle East, but the expansion of the Sunnite sect is seen as the separation of the Middle East deeply from the world. For this reason, West moves slowly even though they want the collapse of the Assad regime. Neither West nor the Shiite belt composed of Iran, Iraq and Syria, and also Russia want to see a Sunnite Turkey (19.07.2012). Altan argues that in case of a change of Syrian regime, Iran would lose its important ally in the region and become isolated. Iran should seize the leadership of the Shiites in the region in order to be saved from this isolation. Iran is currently engaging in this operation. Although Iran is gaining power, it is also becoming the second target of the war simultaneously. The main reason of the war seems as the change in the world; however, its visible face is sectarian. The chaotic results of the sectarian wars are explicitly seen in the history (11.04.2012).

Foreign Minister Davutoğlu explained that they have a philosophy for the Middle East and they would make the Middle East a peace basin. Altan criticized this sentence that it was much more authoritarian and that nobody would allow making this speech. Anybody in today’s world cannot claim leadership in the Middle East, neither the US, Russia, Israel, nor Turkey (26.06.2012). Erdoğan and Davutoğlu have believed that powerful Turkey’s neighbours will not ob-

ject to its words, and obey its orders; then, there would be “zero problem”. This strategy has collapsed when Israel attacked to Turkey’s ship, Syria shot down its jet and, both Iran and Iraq started to threaten Turkey. Therefore, we have found ourselves isolated in the middle of a scourge. Altan then asked whether Erdoğan and Davutoğlu would perceive the real life and apprehend the realities (01.09.2012). Altan argues that seeking the settlement of the domestic disputes abroad always brings great scourges. The greatest service for Turkey would be to challenge against the crazed government’s foreign policy in order to prevent a war. He reminds how Turkey tumbled in a difficult position to protect itself following Davutoğlu’s speech about the Ottoman Empire and planning of the future of Syria. Altan thinks that it is very difficult to understand the politics of Erdoğan-Davutoğlu twin with political criteria and suggests finding the causes of what they have done rather by looking at the heroes of the psychological novels (01.09.2012). Altan is of the opinion that it seems impossible to explain Turkey’s belligerent attitude towards Syria with its aspiration of the democratization of Syria. There must be a hidden rationale behind this act. This hidden rationale lastly caused interception of an aircraft flying from Moscow to Damascus and created tension also with the Russian Federation (12.10.2012).

Erdoğan told that the Syrian crisis would be dealt in detail and result oriented at the Istanbul Summit on 2 April in which the UN and the Arab League would take part: “*Syria’s destiny will be drawn in April*” (17.03.2012). Erdoğan warned Damascus that Turkey would retaliate against border violations. Syria should not force Turkey to do what it does not want to think: “*If Assad forces us, we go there*” (11.04.2012). “*Somebody is betraying the world*” is the headline regarding the shooting down of the Turkish jet-fighter.

Taraf reveals the controversial explanations: “*Damascus: We shot the reconnaissance aircraft in our airspace. Ankara: It has been shot during test flight in the international airspace*” (26.06.2012).

Altan argues that Assad has attempted together with Iran and Iraq to destabilize Turkey, and Turkey, which could not consolidate its democracy and resolve the Kurdish issue, will face difficulties to prevent this threat (01.09.2012). Altan claims that if Turkey could not propose more to the Kurds living in Turkey then the Kurds living in Kurdistan, Turkey Kurds would find the idea of separation more attractive. If Turkey does not change Kurdish policy, the life would force it to change (25.07.2012). Taraf informs the visit of woman politicians of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Workers Party (IP) and Labour Party (EMEP): “*Kemalists love Baas*” (01.11.2011)

Altan criticizes Erdoğan commenting that if you cannot establish peace in the country, if you do not acknowledge the rights of Kurdish citizens, if you do not amend the fascist laws, if you crawl the children due to their unfurling a banner, if you are trying to interfere the lives of all of the peoples of the country since they are not alike to you, if you do not accept the rights of the Alewites, than you cannot be a candidate to regulate the Middle East (27.06.2012). Altan argues that Erdoğan is blatantly dealing to fire a writer without refraining and shaming. Everybody except nationalist Sunnite conservatives are being ostracized. The state is intervening to personal life of all. Taking into consideration the adding of a war on this oppressive understanding, Turkey can enter into a path where it cannot be recovered. Erdoğan seems broke his connection with the realities and I do not think that he can perceive what is happening (16.08.2012).

4. Discourse of Zaman Newspaper

Zaman newspaper is the first at the rank of newspaper circulation rates table with average 872.858 sales in Istanbul. It is the leading proponent media organ of Justice and Development Party and a virtual opponent of Republican Peoples Party. It voices the statements of Erdoğan through its headlines and there is a semantic integrity between the headlines and the articles of Ekrem Dumanli. Overall ideological orientation of Zaman is in line with the JDP policies, and Ekrem Dumanli comments in favour of JDP’s Middle East policy and comments in line with the headlines. However, it does not seem that Zaman use connotations in the headlines aiming to construct side meanings as Sabah does.

Main arguments of Ekrem Dumanli are (a) Turkey deserves assuming a vital role in world affairs and world balances has to be rethought. Turkey’s being Western proxy arguments are not true, (b) Turkey approaches to Syrian crisis is in terms of humanitarian perspective, (c) Erdoğan’s critics targeting Israel and his supports for the uprisings at the very beginning made him legendary among Arabs. (d) He confirms the Great Kurdistan scenarios and disintegration of Syria, (e) Internal democratic developments in Turkey makes it an important role model, (f) He comments in line with the headlines pointing out anti-Republican People’s Party attitude.

Ekrem Dumanli summarizes the general outlook of Turkey: Turkish democracy has reached to a certain degree of maturity. Coup d’état attempts are giving account before the tribunals, the bureaucratic oligarchy is crackling, democratic preferences are replacing the military tutelage, and all these developments are making Turkey as an im-

portant role model (28.02.2011).

He argues that Turkey deserves assuming a vital role in the world affairs. Turkey should take the advantage of its history, culture, political experience and its geographical location. Turkey wishes to use these advantages for ten years. Turkey has to rethink world balances reasonably and logically. Turkey, rescued from its chains, is a hope not only for the people living in this country, but also for the world as well (26.09.2011). This comment support Zaman's headlines voicing Erdogan's interventionist policies towards Middle East. Erdoğan called out to Arabic World: "Do not postpone reforms" (14.09.2011). Dumanli asserts that Turkey, integrated with the world, can assume important duties in the democratization process of the Middle East countries (28.02.2011). Turkey's responsibility is increasing in the world affairs. The world media shows special interest to Turkey. The most spoken country in the world is Turkey (14.09.2011).

Turkey warned Syria to execute political reform demands by peaceful means. Zaman's headline is the following: "Turkey's last warning to Syria. Tomorrow may be too late for the reforms" (17.06.2011). Dumanli reveals that Turkey wants to take place in the decision mechanism of the Middle East. This is its right. Its historical rights and prestige in the region give this right (19.09.2011). Davutoğlu's calling Assad to stop civilian massacre confirms Dumanli's comment: "First security later reform is not acceptable" (10.08.2011). Erdoğan has demonstrated multi-coloured Turkey as a model in all of his meetings with political figures and religious group leaders in Cairo. The following was the headline used by Zaman to tell his meetings: "Erdoğan demonstrated Turkey model through his demarches" (15.09.2011). Dumanli expresses that Turkey's democracy

experience and economic leaps are making its voice stronger. Turkey has to manage this process seriously in order not to be exposed to any unconscious axis shift. The Middle East geography is very important, however, focusing all the relations to that geography may cause erroneous results (19.09.2011).

Speaking at the conference titled "Arab Awakening and Peace in the Middle East – Muslim and Christian Perspectives", Erdoğan told that Assad tortured his own people with heavy weapons and some circles remained silent due to sectarian bigotry. The headline used for the speech of Erdoğan is the following: "The second Karbala is happening in Syria" (08.09.2012).

Dumanlı asks why the westerns, who always announce "humanitarian aid" and "democratization" words for some oil rich countries such as Libya, take a tame position in oil poor countries (02.04.2012). He argues that there is a public opinion perception in Turkey as if the US and the West are pressing Turkey to interfere to Syria. He contends that this is not true. It is very difficult to find a country like Turkey evaluating the crisis from the humanitarian perspectives (02.04.2012). However, he acknowledges that Turkey has been isolated in the Syrian crisis. West has closed its ears to the massacres in Syria and the Arab world is at odds with its own shadow. Some circles concern from Turkey's seeking initiative in international issues (25.06.2012). Following the shooting of Turkish jet fighter, Erdoğan addressed to the world public opinion: "Syria will be replied without entrapped to the war instigators" (27.06.2012). "Operational Planning against Syria launched" (12.08.2012).

Socialist International at its meeting in Cape Town in South African Republic underlined the civilian massacre in Syria exhibiting the opposite view of the Republican Peoples

Party (RPP) which took part at the meeting under the leadership of Kılıçdaroğlu. The following was the headline for this meeting: “Shock to the RPP from Socialist International. Assad regime lost its legality” (05.09.2012). Dumanli shares the anti-RPP attitude of the headlines commenting that multi-colour nationalist discourse in Turkey supports Syria but they keep quiet regarding the massacres (28.03.2012).

Dumanlı informs that Egyptians do not forget Erdoğan’s support since the very first day of the uprisings. Erdoğan’s critics targeting Israel made him legendary among the Arabian peoples. The basis of enthusiasm for Erdoğan depends on these two factors. Turkey’s developed democracy contributes to this admiration another dimension (14.09.2011).

Dumanlı mentions that the areas evacuated by the Assad forces have been filled by the PKK’s twin brother in Syria. He informs that the region has been captured by the Kurdish administration of Iraq and PKK deployed troops there. These developments confirm “Great Kurdistan” scenarios. Assad will withdraw to a narrow region and concede to a little Nusayri state following a possible defeat. In this case, Assad will deploy Kurdish militia to the evacuated regions and deal new cards (30.07.2012).

Conclusion

It would be logical to draw a horizontal line and locate the extreme opponent on the left edge and extreme proponent on the right edge consecutively Sözcü, Taraf, Zaman and Sabah newspapers reflecting the proximity or remoteness of the newspapers towards the policies of the ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP). This line reflects the construction of ideas regarding how JDP’s

policies in general, its foreign policy towards Arab uprisings in particular, are narrated to Turkish public opinion.

As regards to the articles of the editorial writers, we can group (Group A) opponents namely Altan and Çölaşan in one group, and proponents namely Barlas and Dumanli in other group (Group B).

There are mainly four fault lines concerning the discussion of the foreign policy actions of the JDP in the context of Arab Uprisings. The first one is whether JDP serves to the interest of the West and Turkey is trapped in Syria. Group A consistently argues that Turkey was trapped in Syria, however, although group B accepts that Turkey was left alone in Syria, Barlas argues that this sentiment emanates from the nature of the relations between a super-power and a non-super power which is always full of disillusion. On the other hand, Dumanli contends that the West does not move in Syria since there is no oil.

The second fault line is that Group A contends that Turkey has entered into a Sunnite alliance aiming to destroy Shiite Syria, however, Group B thinks from a different perspective. While Barlas argues that Turkey is not the responsible from the crisis in Syria, and Dumanli argues that Turkey approaches the Syrian crisis from humanitarian perspective.

The third fault line is about the personalities of Erdogan and Davutoğlu. While Group A insults them contending that they damage the credibility and the dignity of Turkey with their, authoritarian, belligerent and ignorance which misperceived the real life events; Group B reflects them as legendary in the Arab World and there is a great affection towards them which is emanating from Erdogan’s Israel critics and his support for Arab uprisings at the very beginning.

The fourth fault line is about the Kurdish issue. While Çölaşan accusing Erdogan as the culprit of the establishment of the great Kurdistan; Barlas contends that Kurdistan issue is not a Turkey's issue but it is the issue of US for now. While Altan argues that Turkey should propose more to the Kurds in Turkey than in North Iraq, Dumanli only confirms that the developments confirm Kurdistan scenarios. Barlas and Dumanli do not proclaim the culprit in this fault line.

Foreign policy of a country is usually contemplated behind the closed doors and the analysts try to predict the essence of a certain policy action through the discourse of the policy makers, official statements and the outcomes of particular events. However, these sources of information can be so implicit or irrelevant so that the analysts seek to find out the hidden rationale behind a certain foreign policy action in vain.

The overall struggle of the columnists in the selected media organs reflects this situation. Neither Çölaşan nor Altan have succeeded to find out the hidden rationale behind the hostile change in the foreign policy actions of JDP towards Syria. Neither Dumanli nor Barlas could succeed to explain the rationale of this change. Ideological opposition, power relations or nationalist sentiments without any doubt construct an idea regarding a certain policy action but these constructions become far from analytical examination of the case.

In an environment where lack of information prevails, comments on a particular policy changes can be tried to interpret from the perspective of the general ideological or power position of a certain media organ.

Above mentioned newspapers all constructs JDP's Arab uprisings policy through a pre-determined window in line with their well-known proximity or remoteness to JDP.

It is another discovery of this study that except a direct ideological and power confrontation in the case of Sözcü, neither media organ make its headlines explicitly criticizing or defending the government. Headlines usual reflects the virtual world events even they carry some connotations. The columnist are freer to criticize or defend the government in this respect.

This study has time limit which reflects the particular power position of a particular media organ in a particular time frame. A change in the power position of a particular media organ is out of the context of this study.

The following quotation well frames how narratives are constructed in Turkish media: "500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the Unites States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons because the British are friends and the North Koreans are not" (Wendt 1995, 73).

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In Search of the Arab Uprisings: Social Movement, Revolution, or Democratization?

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Abstract

Do the Arab uprisings represent a social movement, or are they efforts to bring about reform, revolution, or democratization? I conceptualize the Arab uprisings from these four interrelated perspectives to clarify the uprisings reality. I will show that the Arab uprisings are a process that began with the first step, collective action, and ended with the final phase, democratization.

Keywords

The Arab uprisings, Social Movement, Revolution, and Democratization.

Introduction

The year 2010 was a lively one for the Arab World. The people, who had long lived under dictatorial regimes, began to demand the formation of democratic states. They wanted more than just cosmetic changes to their governments, and demanded substantive transformations. Before one can identify the causes of the Arab uprisings; one must first understand the meaning behind the resistances.

In this paper, I will conceptualize the Arab uprisings from four perspectives: social movement, reform, revolution, and democratization. I will begin by explaining how the uprisings were, in fact, social movements that occurred from the bottom. In addition, the people initiated a grassroots effort because they wanted to make changes in the social structure of society. I will follow this discussion with explanation of how the social movements brought about by the Arab uprisings led to reform and revolution. I will explore how the social movements in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya led to political revolution, while other uprisings in states like Algeria, Morocco, and Yemen evolved into reformative social movements. Lastly, I will show the relationship between democratization and revolution, and will examine the extent to which revolution can lead to the democratization of an anti-democratic state?

A Social Movement or a Large, Angry Crowd?

Collective action is a requisite precursor to social movements. If the members of a resistance do not work together with a specified goal against a determined target, an uprising simply becomes a large, angry crowd instead of a substantive movement. According to Tilly (1978), collective action

“consists of people’s acting together in pursuit of common interests” (p. 7). The reasons to common action and collective interests vary. Tilly (1978) clarified that the combination of interest, organization, mobilization and opportunity give rise to collective action. Conversely, Mill (1869) contended that an exchange system involved the process. He explained that a “desirable response will create mutual interest” (p. 49). Weber presented an alternate view, and argued that a threat system means that “non-cooperation will be costly for irresponsible;” leads to common action. Marx, on the other hand, believed that threat, exchange, and integration between classes was necessary to achieve an such a cooperative effective action (Tilly, 1978, p. 49).

In short, collective action is the foundation of a social movement. According to Della Porta and Diani (2006), “A social movement process is in place only when collective identities develop, which go beyond specific events and initiatives” (p. 21). Collective behaviour and collective action are the dominant forms of social movement, since shared interests direct people moving together toward shared goals. This shared goal helps to minimize the differences between the different segments of society and strengthen the relationships between members of various groups and factions

It is important to remember, however, that collective action does not always lead to a social movement. Collective actions might also result in outbursts, such as mass panic, from individuals that do not have a goal of modifying, restructuring, or redefining the norms and values of society (Killian, 1963). In the case of the Arab uprisings, collective action resulted in social movement because the uprisings developed into more than a simple protest or the amassing of angry or violent crowds.

The main reason for the emergence of social movement is general dissatisfaction within a specific class or classes. During the Arab uprisings, true social movements emerged because of a general dissatisfaction among specific class or classes. Aberle's (1982) relative deprivation theory provides four criteria that aid in measuring the sources of discontent: possessions, status, behaviour, and worth (p.326). The exclusion of these four factors creates frustration among the people that they tend to focus toward their rulers.

The rise of social movements in a society is a symptom of discontent with the existing social order. They arise therefore among people who are dissatisfied with the order that is in operation. (Heberle, 1995)

By no means not all dissatisfactions lead to social movement. According to Cameron (1966), unsatisfied people first must recognize and share their dissatisfaction. They must also develop an awareness of their ability to change the offending circumstance, and conditions must be appropriate for the people to come together (Cameron, 1966). In other words, people must be able to access and communicate with each other in order to be organized.

In the historical context of social movements, the traditional approach, resource mobilization theory, political opportunity theory, and the French school provide valuable insight. Theorists who adopt the traditional approach focus on grievances and strains in society, and see social movement as the spontaneous action of society (Hannigan, 1985). Blumer (1998) argued that a social movement is "amorphous, poorly organized and without form," and characterized by collective behaviour "on the primitive level" (Hannigan, 1985, p. 438).

In contrast, resource mobilization theorists perceive social movement as intended and planned action that relies upon resource availability and opportunities rather than only grievances factor (Hannigan, 1985). As Jenkins (1983) stated, "The major factor for resource mobilization theory is the availability of resources" (p. 530). Also, resource mobilization theorists pay more attention to the role of leadership and organisation in social movements (Rootes, 1990, p. 7).

Like resource mobilization theory, political opportunity theory also highlights the importance of opportunities for social mobilization. This theory also stresses the importance of factions and alignment among elite groups. According to Tarrow (1994), "The major power of movement is exerted when opportunities are widening, elites are divided and realignments are occurring" (p. 150).

Finally, the French school of thought falls somewhere between the traditional approach and resource mobilization theory. According to this view, "social movement is spontaneous but not amorphous, moral and rational but not institutional" (Hannigan, 1985, pp. 438-439).

While these approaches provide useful perspectives, they do not cover all sides of the social movement concept, and they each have their own flaws. The French school of thought, for example, undermines the significance of organizational structure within social movements. Resource mobilization theory focuses on the question of how social movements occur rather than why they occur. As Rootes (1990) stated, resource mobilization theory "underlies how movements organized, succeeded or failed rather than why they exist at all" (p. 7). Similarly, political opportunity theory overlooks the role of desire and presupposes that opportunities

for social movement will occur regardless of the extent to which people are willing to get involved. Kriesi (1995) argued this point, and stated, “Opportunities shape desires or vice versa” (p. 246). By the same token, Hannigan (1985) explained, the traditional approach examines the question of why social movements take place, but neglects to explain how they emerge (pp. 446-448).

Wilkinson (1971), one of the most prominent contributors to the study of social movement, stated, “Social movement is a series of actions and endeavours of a body of persons for a special object” (p. 12). Even the term social movement is culturally interchangeable; it shapes the process of moving independently from government to a self-generated, self-confident, untamed, surging crowd (Wilkinson, 1971). Wilkinson further explained that to call an action of the people a social movement, the effort must demonstrate a number of characteristics:

- A social movement is a deliberate, collective endeavour to promote change in any direction and by any means, not excluding violence, illegality, revolution, or withdrawal into a utopian community;

- A social movement must evince a minimal degree of organization, though this order may range from a loose, informal, or partial level of organization to a highly-institutionalized and bureaucratized movement;

- A social movement’s commitment to change and the *raison d’être* of its organization must draw from a conscious volition, a normative commitment to the movement’s aims or beliefs, and the active participation of the movement’s followers or members (pp. 26-27).

Like Wilkinson, Tilly (2004) defends sustained and organized public efforts, along

with the “creation of special-purpose associations and coalitions” for the advent of social movements (pp. 3-4). The difference between Tilly and Wilkinson is that Tilly placed more emphasis on the importance of a movement’s participants. According to Tilly, the worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment of the participants (WUNC) are essential to the success of a social movement (pp. 3-4). Both Wilkinson’s and Tilly’s definitions shed light on the correlation between social movement and the Arab uprisings. The established purpose of changing dictatorial regimes, an adequate degree of organization, and active participation amidst demonstrators was present in the Arab uprisings as well, but to different extents in different states.

Typologies are also important for defining social movements. In contrast to Marx’s class-based social movement theory, Brinton (1965) provided different typologies of social movements. From a Marxist perspective, “every social movement is defined in terms of the prevailing method and social relations of production: every movement is seen as a class movement and as an expression of class interest and class conflict” (Wilkinson, 1971, p. 46). The main flaw in this approach is that it becomes inadequate during explanations of religious, gender, or ethnic-based social movements. It is obvious, however, that Islam, as a religion, and Arabism, as an ethnic issue, played very important roles in the Arab uprisings. The misinterpretation of Islam—including a common movement from the sake of God to the sake of rulers—and Arab nationalism, which led to a “rally around the flag” effect, strengthened autocratic leaders’ positions and led to the Arab societies slow progress toward democratic development.

Aberle (1982) suggested that one examines the social movement from two dimen-

sions: “the locus of the change sought and the amount of change sought” (p.316). From these perspectives, transformative [revolutionary], reformative, redemptive, and alter-

ative movements emerge. As Table 1 shows revolutionary movements are the most comprehensive because they bring radical changes for everyone.

Table I: Typology of Social Movements

Amount of Change		
Locus of Change	Partial	Total
<i>Individual</i>	Alterative Social Movements	Redemptive Social Movements
<i>Supra-individual [Society]</i>	Reformative Social Movements	Transformative [Revolutionary Social Movements]

Source: Aberle (1982)

Della Porta and Diani (2006) provided the following categorization of social movements: “[They are] involved in conflictual relations with clearly identified opponents; are linked by dense informal networks; and they share a distinct collective identity” (p. 20). This classification provides insight into the definition of a social movement, but what types of efforts do not constitute a social movement? It is important to have a more precise framework and a clearer definition of social movement to avoid confusing a mere crowd or protest with a true social movement.

Aberle (1982) proclaimed that social movement differs from an individual effort because “it is an organized effort by a group of human beings” (p. 315). Moreover, a social movement is not a specific event, campaign, or coalition dynamic (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). A social movement takes longer and involves more deliberate action than any of the aforementioned alternatives, and is not spontaneous or temporary (Cameron, 1966). Efforts that are not social movements do not have a strong identity and have fleeting effects (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). An event, campaign, or coalition might be part

of a social movement, without being a social movement in and of itself.

Della Porta and Diani (2006) also were careful to note that unlike organizations, social movements have voluntary participants instead of members. Moreover, they distinguished between parties and social movements, and noted that parties represent specific interests, while social movements demand rights on behalf of a society (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). Social movements also differ from voluntary associations because “voluntary associations do not involve in a commitment to change, nor do they call for a necessary minimal degree of normative commitment to change or participation on the part of members” (Wilkinson, 1971, pp. 30-31). According to Cameron (1996), the primary defining feature of a social movement is that “it seeks to change the culture or change the social structure or redistribute the power of control within a society” (pp. 8-9).

Bayat (1998) also distinguished between social movements and insurrectionary or protest movements. According to Bayat, “social movements tend to construct alternative institutions and value systems...

[They] also attempt to establish alternative institutions and value systems before a total change”, but insurrectionary and protest movements do not have always an alternative agenda (p. 139).

According to these explanations, one could contend that the Arab uprisings were a social movement because they involved deliberate action with specific and expressed goals. The principals of a dissatisfied group of Arabs in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) came to life in the form of the Arab uprisings, because the demonstrators recognized and shared a common frustration with repressive regimes through communication and organization for a collective purpose. The individuals involved in the uprisings sought the redistribution of power controls within the social structure, and they offered viable alternatives, democracy, to the current anti-democratic regimes. More importantly, the effects of the uprisings continue throughout the region and within the states, with different dimensions at different levels.

The other part of a social movement that is worth examining is its decline. Because when a social movement fails to decline, it can result in new constitutions. According to Miller (1999), social movement declines because of

- Repression;
- Co-optation;
- Failure; and
- Success.

Miller argued that when a social movement becomes successful, it also declines. However, not all successful social movements disappear, and some of them develop into a new type of movement: reform or revolution. In the case of the Arab uprisings,

social movements in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia evolved into revolutionary social movements; while those in Algeria, Morocco, and Yemen became reformative social movements. In each of these cases, a social movement led to revolution or reform.

Change: Reform and Revolution

The basic difference between reform and revolution is that reform deals with limited changes. As Blumer (1995) stated, “A revolutionary movement has a broader aim [than reform], it seeks to reconstruct the entire society; reform movement accepts the existing orders, but revolutionary movement always challenges the existing rules” (p. 74).

According to Huntington (1968), “changes limited in scope and moderate in speed in leadership, policy, and political institutions may, in turn, be classed as reforms” (p. 344). Huntington examined reforms from two dimensions, and concluded that a reform could be either a catalyst or a substitute for a revolution. He explained that once a reform led to concessions and grants by a government, it could encourage the people to push for a revolution within the society (Huntington, 1968). The French Revolution provides a salient example. Huntington (1968) rightly cites from Tocqueville (1866) “Reforms in France prepared the ground for the revolution not so much because they removed obstacles in its way but far more because they taught the nation how to set about it” (p. 363). On the other hand, if governmental reforms make changes that satisfy reformists demands, leaders can decrease the likelihood that a revolution will take place (Huntington, 1968).

Huntington (1968) claimed that urban middle-class intelligentsia and the peasantry were key actors in a reform effort, and

noted that urban middle-class intelligentsia are more likely to drive a reform toward a revolution. A reform can be a catalyst for a revolution once urban middle-class intelligentsia pioneer it not rural parts of society.

In the case of the Arab uprisings, the resistances in Morocco, Algeria, and Yemen could fall under the category of reformative social movements, because uprisings in these states brought only limited and superficial changes within the oppressive regimes. At present, the despotic systems still exist with only limited and surface-level changes.

A true revolution involved substantive and systemic change. The following discussion of this concept will draw from the work of two prominent scholars in this field: Theda Skocpol and Samuel P. Huntington. According to Skocpol (1979), "Social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below" (p. 4). It is extremely important to note that social revolution is different from political revolutions. While political revolutions only bring about change to political structures, social revolutions lead to changes in all structures of society (Skocpol, 1979, pp. 4-5).

Skocpol (1979) employed a non-voluntarist, structural perspective when defining social revolution, and grounded her categorization in the comparative analysis of three great revolutions: France, China, and Russia. However, she neglected to consider the impact of ideology in a revolution, and in this sense she quoted Wendell Philip's statement, "Revolutions are not made; they come" (Skocpol, 1979, p. 17). After the Iranian revolution of 1979, Skocpol (1982) augmented her definition to include the notion of ideology. She later stated, "Revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of

a country's state and class structures, *and of its dominant ideology*" (Skocpol, 1982, p. 265). The dominant ideology obviously was Shi'a Islam.

Huntington (1968) also made a very important contribution to the study of revolution. According to Huntington, "A revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies" (p. 264). Unlike Skocpol, Huntington undervalued the impact of international geopolitics and instead emphasized the values and norms of a society for a revolution. In stark contrast to Skocpol's claims, Huntington argued that revolutions are made (pp. 274-275). More importantly, whereas Skocpol only counted the relationships between the dominant class and the government in her study of revolution, Huntington also considered other parts of society. As Huntington (1968) stated, "One social group can be responsible for a coup, a riot, or a revolt, but only a combination of groups can produce a revolution" (p. 277).

In a different approach, Parsa (2000) explained revolution based upon the type of state intervention. Parsa identified three primary types of state interventions: regulative, administrative, and hyperactive. Regulative state interventions involve minimal involvement in the collection and distribution of economic matters, while administrative state moderately but hyperactive state mediations entail extensive involvement, respectively (Parsa, 2000). During crises, "states that intervene to a great extent in the economy render themselves more vulnerable to challenge and attack" (Parsa, 2000, p. 14). By contrast, a lower level of state intervention increases the likelihood of class conflict, but reduces the probability

of revolution (Parsa, 2000). The Shah's hyperactive governmental model in Iran is a great example of how a state grew vulnerable and, ultimately, became the direct target of revolts.

Parsa (2000) also emphasized the impact of military force during a revolution. Professional armies become less susceptible to revolution while conscripts become more vulnerable. The latter group has a deeper relationship with members of the society, which increases the likelihood that they will sympathize with the demands of the revolutionaries (Parsa, 2000). Russell (1974) measured the army's impact on revolution using three components: "the degree of disloyalty (D), the timing of disloyalty (T), and the proportion of the armed forces which were disloyal (P)" (p. 74). A incidences of all three factors (D*T*P) increase the chances that a revolution will take place (Russell, 1974).

Considering these explanations, the uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia fall into the category of political revolutions, because the political structures of the hyperactive states changed through pro-democratic revolutionary social movements. After the revolutions, one can see the change in the location of political sovereignty in these states from undemocratically elected rulers to (relatively) democratically elected rulers. These uprisings did not result in social revolution because revolutionary changes within the economic and social structures have yet to occur.

Repressive, corrupt, and unjust rulers played an important role in the revolutions in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia because the long-term cruelty and pressure created a culture of resistance within the populace. The democratization of communication and the establishment of a greater connection with the rest of the world intensified the senti-

ment.

Types of Revolutions

Huntington (1968) placed revolutions into two basic categories—Eastern and Western—based on the type of society in which the revolution took place. There are several key differences between the two categories. The Eastern revolution appears before the collapse of the old regime, while the Western revolution occurs after the breakdown of the old regime (Huntington, 1968). In addition, the Eastern revolution spreads from countryside to capital, while the Western revolution spreads vice versa (Huntington, 1968). Lastly, the struggle in the Eastern revolutions happens between revolutionaries and government, while in the West, the fight occurs between revolutionaries, such as moderate, conservative, and radical insurgents (Huntington, 1968).

Moore (1967) conceptualized revolutions by their source: peasants, bourgeoisie, or top-class. He emphasized the importance of the bourgeoisie's involvement if a revolution was to lead to a Western-type democracy. Moore classified the French and American Revolutions as bourgeois, as both led to a democratic society. For the sake of simplicity, Moore argued that there were, "bourgeois revolutions culminating in the Western form of democracy, conservative revolutions from above ending in fascism, and peasant revolutions leading to communism" (p. 413). In a contradiction of Marxist argument, Moore summed up his argument in four words, "no bourgeoisie, no democracy" (p. 418). Even though Skocpol (1994) agreed that by stating, "rising bourgeoisie is the prime power," she criticized Moore's approach. According to Skocpol, Moore undervalued state organizations and the elite's independent role in a revolution, and believed that Moore's approach "focuse[d] on exclu-

sively intrasocietal modernizing processes” (p. 45).

The pro-democratic political revolutions in the Arab uprisings could fall into the category of Eastern revolutions because the revolts occurred before the governments had collapsed, yet it is not easy to make a clear-cut categorization. An ongoing fight still rages between conservatives, moderates, and liberals in the post-revolutionary states, which makes them relatively Western revolutions. The revolutions also spread from the capital and big cities to the countryside, like Western revolutions.

During this examination of the varied definitions of revolution, it is important to ask what a revolution is not. Huntington's (1968) offers a comprehensive categorization that distinguishes between revolution and other types of social action.

Revolutions are thus to be distinguished from insurrections, rebellions, revolts, coups, and wars of independence. A coup d'état in itself changes only leadership and perhaps policies; a rebellion or insurrection may change policies, leadership, and political institutions, but not social structure and values; a war of independence is a struggle of one community against rule by an alien community and does not necessarily involve changes in the social structure of either community. (p. 264)

As stated previously, a revolution is a radical and profound change of system. The revolutionary change might serve to pave the way towards democracy, or it may lead to the destruction of all viable paths towards a democratic system.

The Young Arab Man's Burden: Democratization

Revolution is one way to develop a democratic regime into anti-democratic state. However, by definition, revolution does not always bring democracy to a state. For example, undemocratic leaders like Lenin and Napoleon rose to power following the Bolshevik and French revolutions, respectively. However, democratization might prove to be the best outcome, or at least a more constructive result, for a revolutionary state, at least for pro-democratic revolutions. The 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal is a great example of a revolution that deposed a prolonged dictatorship and generated democratization.

Defining Democratization

Before examining the relationship between revolution and democratization, it is important to understand the definition of democratization and how it can occur. Lipset (1959) argued that a modernist approach that promotes economic development and equality are prerequisites for democratization. Lipset stresses the importance of conflating economic modernity with legitimate governmental structures to promote democratization.

Conversely, Welzel (2006&2009) emphasized the role of mass attitudes in the democratization process. Both the mass attitude approach and the mass mobilization approach argue that the aspiration of majority of society drive the democratization process through civil resistance against anti-democratic governances (Welzel, 2009). Welzel (2009) called this form of democratization “mass responsive democratization.” According to this theory, “emancipative motivational forces” are the lynchpin factors in motivating and organizing the masses

against dictatorial regimes (Welzel 2006).

Dahl (1971) took a different approach, and explained that democracy was “made up of at least two dimensions: public contestation (liberalization) and the right to participate (inclusiveness)” (p. 5). The presence of these two conditions will likely give rise to a fully democratic regime. As Dahl stated, mass mobilization can transform into mass participation with “true political contestation” (p. 6-7). Dahl preferred to use the term polyarchy instead of democracy, and he asserted that there was “no fully democratized state in the world,” as of 1971. Remarkably, Dahl also claimed that stable polyarchies were the result of evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, processes.

Huntington (1991) seemed more optimistic than Dahl, and he arranged the process of democratization into three main categories: transformation, replacement, and transplacement. While transformation occurs when “authoritarian regimes take the lead and play the decisive role in ending that regime and changing it into a democratic system” (Huntington, 1991, p. 124); replacement, inversely, “involves three distinct phases: the struggle to produce the fall [of the authoritarian regime], the fall, and the struggle after the fall” (p. 142). In transplacement, because of the incapability of both sides, “democratization is produced by the combined actions of government and opposition” (Huntington, 1991, p. 151).

Fishman (2011) highlighted the vitality of the legacy of revolution and the post-revolutionary culture that sustains a newly emerged democratic system. In addition, Shin (1994) emphasized the importance of negotiation and pacts among elites in post-revolutionary places, especially if the society is ethnically diverse, when establishing a sustainable democratic regime fol-

lowing the deposition of an authoritarian regime. He detailed the stages of the democratization process:

- a) Decay of authoritarian rule,
- b) Transition,
- c) Consolidation, and
- d) The maturing of democratic political order. Shin, 1994, p. 143)

The mass mobilization approach to democratization seems to be the most appropriate one for explaining the process of the pro-democratic Arab uprisings. A significant number of people within the Arab society believed that they must bring about democratization and bring democratic values to their societies through civil resistance, uprisings, and change of power structures.

In addition, a responsive democratization format appeared in the Arab uprisings. The social equality approach, which contends high levels of economic and social inequality and the exclusion of majority from the political realm lead to mobilization, sheds light on the reasons why mass mobilization or a “communal spirit” emerged in the Arab uprising. Because of the Arab societies’ highly diverse social structure, the agreement between the different segments of society is also necessary for building consolidated democratic states. The legacy of post-revolutionary culture and its continuity are also very important in terms of building legitimate and consolidated democratic structures.

External democracy actors or democracy promoters also play a key role in democratization. Börzel and Risse (2009) framed the external democratization model using four comprehensive modes: coercion, conditionality, persuasion, and socialization. Of the

four modes, persuasion is the most relevant in explaining the Arab uprisings, because it is “based on the idea that values of individuals are heavily influenced by arguments [democratic] and reason” (Börzel&Risse, 2009) (Beichelt, 2012). There is no external or alien force imposing power to influence domestic actors to enforce democratic values in the Arab states where uprisings took place. In fact, domestic actors, such as civil society and elites, play active and volunteer roles in the persuasion mode.

To provide clarity about the definition of democratization, it is helpful to determine the processes that do not constitute democratization. First, as Shin (1994) clarified, democratization is not liberalization:

Whereas liberalization encompasses the more modest goal of merely loosening restrictions and expanding individual and group rights within an authoritarian regime, democratization goes beyond expanded civil and political rights. (p. 142)

It is also important to note that democratization is not an economic model or an administrative form. Democratization only provides the people with methods of providing social and economic virtues through democratic means, but the developments are not prerequisites or indispensable outcomes of democratization. Scmitter (1991) explained the following:

Democratization will not necessarily bring in its wake economic growth, social peace, administrative efficiency, political harmony, free markets, or ‘the end of ideology.’ Unlike authoritarian regimes, democracies have the capacity to modify their rules and institutions consensually in response to changing circumstances. They may not immediately produce

all the goods mentioned above, but they stand a better chance of eventually doing so than do autocracies. (p. 87)

The states involved in the Arab uprising can adopt democratic ideals without becoming full-fledged liberal nations. Moreover, the democratic Arab states would not necessarily become economically wealthier than before. They may increase their economic viability, but there is no link between democracy and economic progress. More importantly, one cannot measure the level of democracy using only economic development. The Gulf States live in wealth and luxury, but they are not democratic states. Conversely, most European states, such as England, France, and Germany, represent both democracy and economic development. In a nutshell, revolution is just one means of building democratization, but there are several ways in which revolution might pave the way toward democratization.

The Arab Uprisings

The most commonly encountered question about the Arab uprising is whether it represents an Islamic awakening. According to Roy (2012), there will be no Islamist revolution in the Arab uprising states, because, first, “demonstrators expressed no wish for the establishment of an Islamic state or the implementation of sharia,” (p. 5) and second, there is no charismatic leader or a single overwhelmingly strong party or organization to build an Islamic state. Roy also claimed that re-Islamization has changed religiosity and made it more compatible with democracy and democratic values like individualization. Therefore, “religion will not dictate what politics should be, but will itself be reduced to politics” (Roy, 2012, p. 17).

Hazran (2012) supported this pro-democratic optimistic perspective of the Arab uprisings by noting that the protests came from the streets, not from mosques. This argument does not mean to imply that the Arab uprising does not have any Islamic roots, or that Islamists will not be a part of the new Arab political scene (Lynch, 2012, p. 211), but the Arab uprising is neither completely based on Islam nor is it grounded in an agenda for building an Islamic state. "Most of the supporters in the Arab world seek to materialize their human dignity, independence and freedom rather than establishment of Islamic rule" (Nasri, 2012, p. 82).

The issue of whether the Arab uprisings will breed Islamic states will be much clearer in the future. For now, one can only watch and see as the agendas of the newly-elected leaders emerge, as the people react to these agendas and demonstrate the extent to which they want to live under a democratic state, and as international actors' reveal their sincerity about their desire to build democratic Arab states. In sum, the post-Arab uprising environment will test the domestic and international actors' democracy-building capability and reliability.

Social Movement, Social Revolution, and Democratization

Based upon the previously discussed concepts of a social movement, revolution, and democratization, the Arab uprisings initially fell into the category of social movements. Later, they became revolutionary, reformatory, and abortive movements. While the deposition of existing leaders and attempts at democratization proved to be the next phases in the revolutionary social movements, some partial changes and the continuity of existing rulers appeared as the subsequent phases in the reformatory social

movements. For abortive social movements, they failed to pass into reformatory or revolutionary phases and they could not carry out any significant alterations in terms of democratization efforts.

Initially, the Arab uprisings served as social movements because they grew from a strong general dissatisfaction amidst the Arab society with long-standing anti-democratic repressive regimes. The people on the street recognized and shared their dissatisfaction, and what eventually ensued was a collective action and common identity against corrupt and despotic regimes. The Arab people sought to put forth the collective interests and public goals of their society, which was deposing the existing rulers and building an alternative system. The people within the Arab uprising states have clearly realized both of these goals. Sarihan (2012) convincingly cited from Korotayev and Zinkina (2011), "economic poverty; government corruption; unemployment; restricted social, political, and economic rights; and a large educated, but dissatisfied, youth population within these regions played a large role in the Arab uprisings" (p.68).

As stated previously, one can classify social movements as reformatory, revolutionary, or abortive based upon their outcomes. In the case of the Arab uprisings, one must consider both the successful and unsuccessful resistances. Initially, one might gauge the success of the movement by whether the government met the demands of the protesters. During the Arab uprisings, protesters wanted to overthrow existing leaders to build a democratic form of government. The success of each movement, then, depends upon the protestors' ability to achieve this aim.

The uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Tu-

nisia constitute successful revolutionary movements since the protestors deposed the existing anti-democratic regimes. However, these revolutions were political, not social, revolutions because there have been only revolutionary changes in political structures. However, the 2013 military coup in Egypt broke up this succession of revolutionary political movements by deposing post-revolutionary president Mohammed Morsi. Even though a significant number of the people asked the Egyptian army to intervene, no one can consider such military coup to be democratic simply because of its popular support, particularly because the coup removed a democratically elected leader. In 2011, a caveat, that same de facto alliance between the pro-democratic protestors and army resulted in the removal of the anti-democratic leader Mubarak. It is obvious the military coup scathed political revolution in Egypt, but once the military backed interim government will be replaced with a democratically elected government, the political revolutionary process would be continued from where it stopped.

In contrast to the events that took place in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, the resistances in Algeria, Morocco, and Yemen emerged as reformative social movements because the protestors did not achieve establishing a democratic government. The unsuccessful Arab uprisings in Jordan, Oman, and Bahrain were simply protest or insurrectionary movements rather than as social movements.

The reformative social movements in Yemen, Algeria, and Morocco could not go further than serving as substitutes for revolution. Once the rulers made some preemptive reforms—Lynch (2012) called such reforms “cosmetic” (pp. 116-117)—within the anti-democratic regimes, the social movements started to decline because, ac-

ording to the majority of the protestors in these states, there was no longer any reason to rebel against their rulers. In addition to the lack of domestic willpower, international actors may not have played as decisive and encouraging a role in these states as they did in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya.

It is important to note that national armies played a key role in shaping the outcomes of the uprisings. The de facto alliance between the demonstrators and army happened in the revolutionary states. The most striking case took place in Tunisia, when the Tunisian army declared its support for the protestors. In Egypt, the army only moved to force Mubarak to leave office when military leaders realized that his fall was an inescapable result. A faction of the Libyan army also played a positive role in the nation’s revolution through its partial support of the demonstrations. However, the rest of the states’ national armies opposed the protests with their support for existing rulers and through their use of heavy-handed military responses in alleviating protests.

Russell’s (1974) concept of the degree of disloyalty, timing, and proportion (D^*T^*P) of the armed forces formula applies well to the cases of the Arab uprisings. The national armies’ strong stance against protests, the existing rulers’ reforms, or international actors’ insufficient support lessened the probability of revolution in the Arab states, with the exception of Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya.

After the Revolution

Revolution can lead to many outcomes, including democratization, fascism, communism, and so on. In addition, there is no singular way to establish democracy, because every nation has its own unique social, cultural, and economic characteristics. As a re-

sult, every nation must develop its own path to democracy (Chertoff & Green, 2012). Several of the Arab uprisings constitute pro-democratic revolutions because they resulted in the replacement of the old dictatorial and corrupt leaders and the installation of democratic leaders through competitive elections. However, to achieve the full-fledged democratization of the states, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia must achieve the several conditions. First, citizens must reach a consensus about democracy. They must change the rally “around the flag” effort to a movement to rally “around the democratic flag” in the Arab states. Antagonism and strain amongst factions impedes common sense within the post-revolutionary states. It breeds separation and polarization, and, more importantly, they pay attention to class conflicts instead of focusing on structuring democratic reform in their states.

Citizens must ground their sentiments of national unity in the development and fair distribution of social, economic, and political rights. At present, there are still high levels of inflation and unemployment in each country, particularly among the young populace. The states’ economies are heavily dependent on foreign aid, but Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and other types of international aid sharply decreased because of the unstable, volatile conditions within these states. More importantly, foreign investors are wary about entering into partnerships with the newly elected leaders.

Regarding the promoting diversity, as Shin (1994) emphasized, to foster a diverse state, there should be negotiation and agreement among the elites that promotes the sustainability of the democratic regime. Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia are religiously and politically diverse states. The nations are home to citizens with radical, moderate, and liberal views, along with both secular, non-

secular Muslims and Christians. Therefore, agreement on ground rules seems vital for the post-revolutionary terms to pave the way toward sustainable democratization in the three states.

The external democratic actors’ role is one of the most important for the future of democratization in these states, and they must employ persuasive means rather than coercion and conditionality. Coercion will lead to situations like the current not favoured outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan. Conditionality can also be detrimental because these conditions will make the states dependent on the supporter or sender. Even if the nations succeed in becoming democratic states, they would not be fully independent. They also take the risk that the external actors would try to promote liberalization and Westernization in addition to democratization. Democratization is much broader than liberalization or Westernization, and neither of the two are prerequisites for democratization.


The Case of Syria

Although Syria might be included in the series of the Arab uprisings, the strong stance of the Assad regime against protestors, and more importantly, key international actors’ tentative involvement in this issue—because of the acute polarization between Western (US, Europe and Turkey) and Eastern (Russia, Iran) powers—has propelled the uprisings into sectarian civil war. As a result, Syria’s resistances have escalated into an all out civil war rather than a revolutionary, reformative, or abortive social movement. Once the Assad maelstrom steps down, this case may serve as an example of how a social movement led to a civil war that effectively deposed a dictatorial leader.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the stages of the democratization process in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) states have developed as follows.

Figure I: The Arab Uprisings Progress



All of these stages have taken place in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, although they are all still in the midst of democratization process. In Egypt, the 2013 military coup disrupted democratic development, but once the military returns to their barracks, the process should continue. If the democratization processes in these states resulted in an anti-democratic government, then fu-

ture research could call them “defeated pro-democratic revolutions.” Morocco, Algeria, and Yemen, for example, stayed at the stage of pro-democratic reformative social movements; while Jordan, Oman, and Bahrain could not even get to this stage. These last three states experienced abortive pro-democratic social movement attempts.

Table II: The Process in the Arab Uprisings

Factors	Process	Outcome
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal challenges; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Social, political and economic weakness • International challenges <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Democratization of communication ■ Convergence of democratic values 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collective behaviour ; and • Social movement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Failure • Reform (change in system) • Political revolution (change of political system) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Progress: Democratization ■ Regress: More central states

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The Dimensions and Challenges of Turkey-Africa Political Relations: A Historical-Analytical Inquiry

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Abstract

The history of Turkey-Africa relations is the history of development and sustenance of human dignity, freedom, equality and mutual coexistence of states free from exploitation, colonialism and stereotype. Therefore, this study attempts a comparative analysis of Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey relations with Africa in order to identify the core values, benefits and challenges inherent in Turkey's dynamic role in African politics. The study adopted a historical-analytical approach in the comparative evaluation of the variables. The major factors limiting the study and scope of Turkey-Africa relations is lack of available data and insufficient research works resulting in misrepresentations of Turkey's interest and policy options in Africa. The presence of Ottoman Empire in Africa kept away European colonialism and provided the platform of secularism and pluralism in African politics which stimulated the African states to accommodate their politico-religious differences through dialogue and good-faith collaboration. Turkey's unique form of democracy affirms that Islam and democracy are not contradictory but complementary for the political development of modern African nation-states. Thus, Turkey's new international identity positions Turkey as a bridge between Christianity and Islam as well as a buffer against Islamic fundamentalism which promotes the values of co-existence needed for the political development of African states. Turkish educational diplomacy is a source of inspiration for increasing literacy rate in Africa. Thus, Turkey-Africa political relations is more of diplomatic gain than a means of acquiring political power but the negative perception of Africa in international media tends to retard mutual collaboration. Therefore, Turkey's diplomatic relations with Africa if strategically managed will increase the power capability of both blocs in diplomatic negotiations and also in influencing global politics to derive the greatest payoff.

Keywords

Africa, Colonization, Education Diplomacy, Turkey.

Introduction

Prior to 2002, Turkey was seen as a country that was a kind of junior partner to the United States of America, a relatively dependable ally of Western Capitalist nations and a country that sees African from the prismatic stereotype of Anglo-American Capitalist perspectives (Schleifer, 2011). From such stereotyped perspectives, Sub-Saharan Africa has always been seen as a distant geographical region, associated with poverty, hunger, epidemics and civil war. This forms the principal component of identification of sub-Saharan Africa in Western society.

However, with the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of Soviet Union into independent nations and the sudden rise of United States as a hegemonic power in World politics, a new form of power configuration in international politics was stirred up. Nations began to adopt new foreign policy strategies that would enable them play active role in world politics. In this context, Turkey restructured its post Cold War foreign policy postures on the legacy and character of the Ottoman Empire, in order to construct a new international identity based on the concept of strategic depth, which according to Ahmet Davutoglu will strengthen Turkey's international standing and security (Davutoglu, 2010:43).

The essence of this foreign policy strategy is to integrate Turkey with the neighboring zones in Asia and Africa and to prevent any form of alienation. In particular, the emphasis is to renew the long history of diplomatic and economic relations that existed between Africa and Turkey by the policy makers of new Turkey because of the relative importance that Ataturk attached to promoting substantive diplomatic relations with Africa. Ataturk was aware of Af-

rica's importance that was why he supported Ethiopia against Italy.

However, the history of Africa is characterized by a long history of mutual and diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire was founded in the late 13th Century, with its dynastic state, centered in what is now known as Turkey. At its height in the mid-1500s, the Ottoman Empire controlled a vast area extending from the Balkan Peninsula to the Middle East and Africa. Different regions in Africa were oriented differently to the Ottoman Empire in relation to trade routes and trading partners and these regions developed in markedly different ways.

Ottoman first contact with Africa started after the conquest of Egypt in 1517 by the Ottoman forces, marking the end of the Mamluks regime that had ruled Egypt for three centuries. In the decades following the Ottoman conquest of Egypt, the Ottoman Empire took control of the major ports of the Maghreb which were Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers and Tangier. Inalcik and Donald, 1994: 218-255). This implies that the key factor in African history is the diplomatic expansion of the Ottoman's rule into African politics and economy. From the mid 16th to the 19th Century, the Ottoman Empire integrated Africa into a common political and economic identity and institutional framework with the Balkans and Middle East.

However, the most remarkable feature of Ottoman's political presence in Africa was that its rule and diplomatic relations with Africa were not based on the exploitative values of colonialism but on the values of mutual partnership and coexistence. This was demonstrated in its diplomatic relationship with the Kanem Borno Empire in the Sub-Saharan West Africa and Central Africa in the 19th Century. In this context, the pres-

ence of the Ottoman Empire in the North and South Africa kept European colonialism away from these regions. The Ottoman Empire detested colonialism greatly and for this reason dealt with the heads of various nations rather than with individuals and gave the nations reasonable level of autonomy to manage their political and economic affairs.

Another outstanding feature of the Ottoman rule is the insistence on the ideals of secularism in its political relations with the Balkans, Asia and Africa. It is remarkable to note that population of the Ottoman Empire was mixed linguistically, ethnically, culturally and also by religion. The majority of the populations of the European province were Christians of the orthodox church many of whom accepted the Ottoman rule because of its high value for religious secularism and also because its rule was less burdensome than Roman Catholic domination. In Asia provinces, the majority of the population was Muslim but there were also many Christians in the towns.

Similarly, there were also Greek Christians in Western Anatolia and substantial group of Christians in Syria and Egypt. In order to promote the culture of mutual coexistence, peace and secularism, the Ottoman Empire organized the people in the provinces and grouped them in tribes, villages and guilds and not along religious sects. The heads of the various religious communities in the provinces came together and constituted a class of middle men between the government and the people. Also, landowners and tribal chiefs acted in a similar way and came to be known as notables (a'yan). Based on an exclusive structure of secularism, the Ottoman Empire was prosperous and this prosperity was reflected in political and economic development of its African provinces.

However, the Ottoman Empire remained politically and economically stable throughout the early period of the 17th Century but began to decline in the late part of the century. The decline in the international status of the Ottoman Empire began with the Ottoman repulse at the second siege of Vienna in 1683. The Empire suffered a succession of military defeats at the hands of Austria and subsequently of Russia in the Russo-Turkish wars. Following the devastating impacts of these wars, the Ottoman Empire was weakened both economically and militarily leading to the gradual independence of its provinces. Greece became independent in 1832, Serbia, Romania and Montenegro in 1878. By 1885, the Ottoman territories in Europe were reduced to Macedonia, Albania and Thrace and all these except eastern Thrace were lost as a result of the Balkan Wars of 1912 – 1913.

The Ottoman Empire lost the political and economic control of North Africa; Algiers was taken by France in 1830 and Italy annexed Libya in 1912. Finally, the Ottoman political influence in Africa collapsed and become extinct with the defeat of the central powers and Germany in the World War I. In 1917-1918 when British military offensives began in Iraq and Syria, the Ottoman forces began to decline and by the time of the Armistice of Mdros in 1918 the Ottomans had lost all its territories but Anatolia.

In 1920 the Ottomans were compelled to sign the Treaty of Sevres by which they lost not only the Afro-Arab provinces but were Balkanized into small weak states that depended on the European powers. With the partition of the Balkan territories, the Western powers introduced neo-colonialism as a bulwark against the reunification of the Ottoman territories and provinces, as well as provided the framework for the implementation of modernization reforms

tailored after Western European political culture and values. With the ascendancy of Western values over traditional Ottoman values, the Ottoman dynasty was abolished and the empire came to an end in 1922. A year later the Republic of Turkey was formed to replace the legacies of the Ottoman Empire.

However, based on the above analytical insight, the study will give a historical description of the traditional diplomatic relations between Africa and Turkey using analytical inferences drawn from the Ottoman Empire. It is in this context that the study explores the ideals of Neo-Ottomanism that provides the conceptual frameworks that influences the contemporary international interactions between Turkey and Africa. Accordingly, the study provides a more relevant context for the analysis of Turkey's foreign policy discourses and its relevance to the promotion of new patterns of diplomatic collaboration with Africa as well as the analysis of its political development benefits to both actors in the current globalized world order.

The Historical Analysis of the Diplomatic Relations between Africa and Turkey During the Period of Ottoman Empire and Dynasty.

The historical origin of the empire of Ottoman Turks began as a nomadic movement of a pastoral band of four hundred Turkish families about six centuries ago. These nomadic Turkish bands started their journey from the upper streams of the river Euphrates with an armed force consisted of four hundred and forty-four horsemen and their leader was named Ertoghrlul meaning the "Eight-Hearted Man". Ertoghrlul was a great warrior who according to oriented history chivalrously aids the weaker party against the strong armies in battle fields.

The victories recorded by Ertoghrlul, gave the Turks absolute dominion over other races. This hegemonic military prowess of the Turks provided the structural framework for the establishment of an empire by Ertoghrlul's son Osman Bey or Ottoman. Therefore, this section of the study seeks to identify and explore the basic institutional relations between the Ottoman Empire and the African states in order to understand the political and economic values of the Turks in relation to its traditional ties with Africa.

The Historical Background of the Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire was founded by a band of Turkish tribe under Osman Bey in North-west Anatolia in 1299 at a time when the Seljuk rule in Turkey was coming to an end. By 1400, the Ottomans established their supremacy in Anatolia and even extended to the Byzantine territory in Eastern Europe. In 1402, the Ottomans made an attempt to take over Constantinople which stood as the last bastion of the Byzantine Empire.

Constantinople is a city strategic to the power politics of the Ottoman Empire for two basic reasons. Firstly, the capture of Constantinople would increase the international prestige and power status of the empire. Also, it would give the Ottoman's absolute control of East-West trade and increase its economic power potentials. Despite the high level military resistance put up by the Byzantines, Constantinople was captured by the Othmans in 1453 under the reign of Sultan Mehmed and the city was renamed Istanbul. Istanbul was turned into one of the wealthiest and most cultured city in Turkish history and also became the capital of Ottoman Europe (Salih, 2010: 95-103).

With the conquest of Constantinople, the Ottoman began to expand territorially from 1512 to 1520. The Ottoman Empire expanded under the reign of Sultan Selim I but reached its zenith under his son Sultan Suleyman who built on the conquest of his father. Sultan Suleyman developed great cities, military machines, culture and a famous empire.

However, during the 16th and 17th centuries, the Ottoman Empire was at the height of its power. Under the reign of Sultan Suleyman who passed away in 1566 Ottoman Empire became one of the most powerful states in the world. The empire stretched from southern borders of the Roman Empire on the outskirts of Vienna, Hungary, Slovakia and the Polish Lithuanian in the north to Yemen and Eritrea in the south. Also, it stretched from Algeria in the West to Azerbaijan in the east, controlling much of Southeast Europe, Western Asia and North Africa.

Having given a cursory insight into the history and origin of the Ottoman Empire, this study will now attempt to analyze the political and economic relations that existed between Turkey and Africa during the long era of the Ottoman Empire. The objective of the analysis is to provide the structural framework for the analysis of contemporary Turkey-African economic partnership and diplomatic relations.

Turkey-Africa Political Relations During the Ottoman Era

The political structures, values and institutions of the Ottoman Empire was based on the egalitarian political culture of dignity, fairness, justice, liberty and secularism and these features formed part of the values that guided its affairs with African states.

In its political interaction with Africa, the Ottomans avoided any form of economic, cultural, social and political exploitation of African citizens. They never exploited Africans either in material and non-material ways and that was the reason why Turkish language, culture and religion were not imposed on Africans, unlike the British Empire that changed the language and culture of its subjects through colonialism.

Also, the political culture of justice and egalitarianism enshrined in the belief system of the Ottoman Empire was instrumental to the granting of legal status to slaves. The word "slave" from the perspectives of the Ottomans does not connote exploitation, humiliation and suppression of human dignity as was seen in the domestic and plantation slavery of Western European particularly of the British Empire and Portugal. In Ottoman states slaves including those from Africa were accorded certain rights and privileges.

The uniqueness of Ottoman political culture was seen in the constitution of its political class and structures. The political system structured on the ideals of benevolent monarchism with inbuilt checks and balances to avoid the emergence of exploitative or repressive authoritarian political class or actors. For this reason, the monarchical system was not based on the political values of aristocracy as was seen in the Roman Empire but was run by men of integrity chosen by merit and wholly loyal to the Sultan (Seracetin, 2009: 81-155). To this effect, the central function of the monarch was to guarantee justice directed at the protection of the poor and the helpless from corrupt officials, repressive acts of governance and corrupt magistracy. These unique culture and values of the Ottomans were bureaucratically transferred and encouraged in its African provinces to promote the values of

justice and humanism.

To ensure the effective implementation of these unique values and political culture, the Ottomans established a central bureaucracy led by the Grand Vizier to govern the entire empire. Guided by the values of justice, the absolute powers of the monarch did not put the Sultan above the law but was rather designated as the custodian of a just and lawful government or political order, which the Ottoman Empire represented in its relations with the African provinces.

In this context, the monarch adopted various strategic methods of checking the political excesses of all officials in its provinces to ensure fair rule and good governance. These methods included the Sultan's personal involvement in administrative proceedings either indirectly through the use of spies or directly through the tour of all local governments in disguised personality (Seracettin, 2009: 90-95).

In addition to the above measures, the Ottomans enforced an anti corruption campaign, which involves a set of severe punishment meted out to corrupt officials who abused their political power to repress or exploit the common people. For this reason, the central bureaucracy of the monarch was always accessible to the public to seek redress for grievances against government officials. Therefore, the Ottoman political involvement in the day-to-day administration of its African states, through the central bureaucracy was limited. The states in Africa were given some measure of fiscal autonomy and political independence in the running of their domestic affairs without undue interference from the Ottomans.

Interestingly, the Ottoman political presence and authority in Africa was overwhelming with vast territories spread across Africa, from the confines of Algeria to Soma-

lia and the East African coast down to Tanzania; with all these territories giving political allegiance to the authority of the Sultan in Istanbul who was the Caliph of all Muslims worldwide. The Ottoman controlled African territories that recognized the imperial authority of the Sultan totaled no less than one third of Africa and covered a landmass of about 8 million Km² (Burton, 1984:491). This implies that the Istanbul Sultan was seen as the supreme political and religious authority and the Africans willingly surrendered their political rights and fate to him. In this context, most of the territories in North Africa particularly or completely transferred their political authority to the Ottoman Empire. In 1517, the troops of the sultan took control of Egyptian territories in 1551; Libya became part of the Empire, while in 1574 Tunisia became part of the Caliph's state. However, the sub-Saharan African territories never belonged to the empire in the way the North African states did.

However, along the Mediterranean, the key factor of African politics and history was the Ottoman's imperial political expansion into Egypt and the Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco). The hegemonic influence and control of African politics by the Ottomans altered the power configuration of the Mediterranean politics. In Egypt, the Ottoman defeated the Mamluk's in 1517 and established a direct rule and this changed the patterns of power politics in Egypt. The Mamluks of Egypt were a class of Turkish slaves who had ruled Egypt from 1250 until their defeat by the Ottomans in 1517 and was allowed to continue in power under minimal Ottoman political supervision.

The Ottoman governor in Cairo was given the power to authoritatively allocate resources and collect revenues through the "timar" system introduced by the Ottomans. The governor pays certain percentage of the

total tax revenue to the central treasury in Istanbul and was given the political right to use the rest for development of the province. Though direct rule was introduced, the governor had some measure of political authority in the allocation of state resources.

This implies that the direct Ottoman involvement in the day-to-day administration of the country through state bureaucracy was limited. So, the Ottomans made no attempt to limit the recruitment of new 'Mamluks' and even gave the governors some measure of political privilege to establish Mamluks households. But the existence of the Mamluks posed great challenge to Ottoman imperial rule in Egypt and was one of the key factors that contributed to the demise and collapse of Ottoman rule.

The survival of the Mamluk system created potential opposition to Ottoman political authority in Egypt in two ways. Firstly, the Mamluks who had ruled Egypt before the imperial rule of the Ottomans tacitly created new strategies to oppose the Ottomans, so as to restore their glorious political past and prestige. On the other hand, the Sunni intellectual class, products of the famous Muslim University founded in 970 CE, provided a framework of religious laws that challenged the Islamic laws imposed by the Ottomans as well as the political authority of the Istanbul Sultan. This religious and political opposition resulted in disequilibrium in the balance of power in Cairo creating series of acts of open rebellion against Sultan Mustapha III and the invasion of Syria by Ali's Mamluks in 1771. These revolutionary military activities of the Mamluks culminated in the factors that forestalled the collapse of Ottoman control in Egypt in the second half of 17th century.

In addition to Ottoman political influence in Egypt, the Ottoman Empire ex-

tended its political hegemony to the Maghreb states of Algeria, Tunisia and Libya between 1525 and 1830; the regency of Algeria was the principal center of Ottoman power in the Maghreb. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire established a military base in Algiers with about 2,000 Turkish troops and artillery as a strategic tactic to control the Mediterranean politics and water ways. This was necessary to repel the manifest and latent threats of European hegemonic influence in the region. Thus, Algiers became the base of military operations against Spain, Denmark, France and England. Similarly, in Tunis and Tripoli, the Ottomans established military bases as a strategic defense mechanism to contain the growing powers of the European states whose interest was to colonize these African states in order to increase their political power and economic potentials and prestige necessary for its quest to control world politics and economy.

One remarkable influence of the Ottoman Empire in the advancement of African politics was the consistent military efforts to contain the threats of colonization of African states by the European powers. This was demonstrated in 1525 when with the military assistance of the Ottomans Algeria regained her political autonomy from Spain who attacked and took control of Algeria in 1519.

However, contrary to Ottomans political influence in North Africa, its imperial rule did not extend to Sub-Saharan Africa, but rather had diplomatic relations with Karamoja Empire through the ratification of numerous Treaties. The Karamoja Empire was one of the great empires that existed in West and Central Africa from the 9th to 19th century A.D.

The Karamoja Empire entered into military alliance with the Ottoman Empire. The pur-

pose of this alliance was to increase the military power capability of the Borno Empire. The Borno Empire imported muskets from the Ottomans, which was used to prosecute its wars. According to Ahmad Fartuwa, the Borno army under the command of Idris Alooma used a lot of Turkish musketeers in their most serious battles and their role was instrumental to the capture of the strong fortress of Amsaka situated between Garmarghu and Mandara.

Thus, the diplomatic alliance between the Ottoman Empire and the Borno Empire served two purposes. Firstly, it helped the two empires to guarantee the security of life and property of merchants, pilgrims and other travellers passing through the Saharan trade routes and the alliance resulted in the supply of military aid, troops, war equipments and ammunition to assist the Borno Empire in the Jihad against non-Muslims.

However, one remarkable impact of the Ottoman Empire in Africa was the introduction of the ideals of pluralism into the political culture of African states. Political pluralism is one of the most important features of Ottoman civilization which denote an adequate model of power distribution in all the provinces of the empire pluralism as a guiding principle of the Ottomans permit the peaceful coexistence of different interests, culture, lifestyles and religion in the empire unlike the European model of totalitarianism or particularism.

The Turkish political pluralism acknowledged the universality of interests in Africa and considers it imperative that African states accommodate their differences by engaging in dialogue or good-faith negotiation. In general, the Ottomans in line with its political pluralism allowed the North African states some degree of self government. The Mamluks of Egypt were given

some degree of autonomy in the governance of Egypt (Bernad, 1966: 166-168).

Finally, the hegemony of Ottoman influence and power in African politics began to decline tremendously when Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798; Egypt broke away from Ottoman rule. The Napoleon military attack revealed the military superiority of the Europeans and the potential weakness of the Ottoman military capacity. This led to series of political and military reforms in the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman reform brought an increased measure of centralization. The provinces were no longer feudal grants held by military "Pashas" but administrative districts governed by the central government. The traditional model of Turkish army was abolished and replaced with a new European style military force.

The tensions caused by the "Tanzimat reforms" provoked criticism and the emergence of revolutionary group of young Turks that carried out a military revolt in 1908, which led to the overthrow of Sultan Abdulhamid II and the introduction of a new constitution in Turkey. The military revolutions led to the control of the empire by a group known as the "committee of urban and progress" that began to introduce more radical political reforms that resulted in the collapse of the empire.

The Conceptual Thrust of Turkey-Africa Political Relations in the New World Order.

Prior to 2002, the policy-makers of new modern Turkey promoted a closer integration with Western capitalist states and actors. Turkey was seen as a steadfast ally of the West, a perennial junior partner to the United States and a country that was more or less going to go along with what other ac-

tors tell it to do (Sozen. 2010:103-123). This pro Western approach of Turkish foreign policy shunned the possibility of trusty diplomatic relations with Africa states because Africa fell outside of the Euro-centric imperatives of the policy-makers approach.

However, the Kemalist approach has provoked both concern and interest to Turkish policy makers who sought to assert the country's foreign policy objective from the hegemonic influence of Western actors. It was the 2002 electoral victory of the Justice and Development Party (AdaletveKalkimaPrtsi) that brought about policy assertiveness and diplomatic sovereignty in Turkey's foreign relations with its neighbours and African states. However since the AKP'S rise to power in 2002, Turkey has emerged as a regional great power, a global actor and a new economic player in Africa.

Therefore, this section will analyze the conceptual principles and assumptions that influences or guides Turkey's economic interest and diplomatic relations in Africa. The theoretical essence is to give a discursive insight into Turkey's new international identity and its proactive foreign policy towards Africa. The analysis will focus on Turkey's concept of strategic Depth, the discursive strategies of 'bridge' and 'axis' foreign policy posture and strategic concept of education diplomacy. The focus of this study on these three vital aspects of Turkish foreign policy objective will enable us give a cursory analysis of the changing roles of Turkey in African politics and the wider implications of such models its economic relations with African states in this modern era of globalization. Therefore, the broad principles that shape Turkey's foreign policy threshold and perceptions include the following:

The Concept of Strategic Depth.

The current foreign policy of Turkey is considerably based on the concept of Strategic Depth postulated by Ahmet Davutoglu. This concept emphasizes the need to deepen politico-economic and diplomatic relations with Turkey's neighbours (Lewis, 2012: II). Its conceptual objective is to strengthen Turkey's international identity, diplomatic sovereignty, common understanding and security with the neighbouring zones. This is desirable because it provides a radical departure from the traditional Eurocentric foreign policy thrust of kemalist approach which alienated its neighbours as well as the African states from the core values of Turkish foreign policy.

Therefore, the primary essence of Davutoglu Strategic Depth is to reposition Turkey as a regional great power and a dominant economic actor in the Middle East, the Balkans, and Caucasia and to a larger extent in North, South and sub-Saharan Africa. This approach is used extensively:

To develop Turkey's soft power diplomacy. This provides the structural framework for the enhancement of its diplomatic, economic, cultural and political relations. The soft power diplomacy is strategically framed to secure peaceful relations with its neighbours based on common mutual understanding (Onis, 2011:50).

To reposition Turkey as a normative power with innate ability to spread Turkish values and norms as well as to shape or influence the will and perceptions of other actors in regional and global politics(Whitman, 2011:5).

To promote the strategic tenets of geopolitics. This allows Turkey to construct new forms of international interactions based on the narrative values of geography, history

and culture. Thus, critical geopolitics offers insights into how history and culture shape Turkey's politico-economic relations with African states.

However, the above mentioned core values of Davutoglu Strategic Depth shape Turkey's diplomatic interactions with African states and influences the political boundaries of inclusion and exclusion inherent in foreign policy articulation. Turkey applies the zero-problem aspects of the Strategic Depth in its relations with African states in order to promote regional peace and security as well as to act as a mediator in regional disputes.

In line with the principles of Strategic Depth, Turkey diplomatically responded to the violent political crises in Libya by condemning the Gaddafi regime for its use of maximum force on the protesters. At the same time, Turkey offered to act as a mediator, intending to provide a framework for the peaceful transfer of power without the use of naked force and violence. On this note, Davutoglu affirms that "Turkey as a centre of attention and inspiration in the region with its successful democratic and economic performance and active foreign policy, it would be appropriate for Turkey to play a fundamental role in managing the change and transition winds blowing in North Africa" (Lewis, 2012; 21).

Davutoglu's diplomatic assertions reflect the qualitative shift in Turkey's foreign policy posture towards Africa. Thus, Turkey has become a source of inspiration for democratic change and practices for multi-religious African states. The repositioning of the Egyptian army as 'guardians' of the revolution was reminiscent of the role played by the military in Turkey during the second half of the Twentieth Century and its involvement in Turkish domestic politics.

The essence of adopting such Turkish model was for the military to act as a vanguard to protect democracy from Islamic fundamentalists and secure peaceful and mutual understanding in Africa based on the values of secularism and coexistence.

The Concept of Bridge and Axis Strategic Posture

The advent of AKP marked an explicit expansion in Turkey's foreign policy posture and practice by embarking on a broad programme of strategic proactive engagement with its neighbours in North Africa while maintaining its commitment of cooperation with Western international actors (Lewis, 2012; 15). In this context, two distinct foreign policy discourses define Turkey's external relations with African states, particularly the 'bridge' and 'axis' strategic options.

Yanik (2009;533) argues that the 'bridge' strategic policy option is a cognitive tool that help the reasoning of the rulers and the ruled, which has become the most prevailing image of Turkey's relations with Africa that has been produced and reproduced overtime. The origin of this foreign policy strategy could be traced back to the times of the Ottoman Empire and is still relevant in Turkish-African politico-economic relations in this modern era of globalization. In this context, the Ottoman Empire was construed as a bridge between Africa and the Oriental East. Hence, the 'bridge' option is one of the most relevant legacies of Turkish Ottoman past.

The reintroduction of the 'bridge' strategic policy option in this contemporary era of Turkey-Africa relations emphasizes the cosmopolitan character of the Ottoman Empire that legitimates present and future international engagement with Africa. This has

often been referred to as 'Neo-Ottomanism'. The concept of Neo-Ottomanism re-echoes the importance of shared culture and common history as strategic instruments for promoting diplomatic and trade relations with its African neighbours and other countries in the region. Sozen (2010;108) argues that Neo-Ottomanism is not an imperialistic strategic for domination of African states but a rational foreign policy vision that encompasses a conciliatory turn of African states towards Turkey's cultural and historical heritage which has been ignored by Kemalist approach. This implies that there is something Ottoman about the current friendly and trade relations between Turkey and Africa.

Bowley (2005) insists that the bridge metaphor positions Turkey as an interlocutor and interpreter between Europe and the Arab world. This way, Sozen (2010:110) argues that Turkey has transformed itself from being a wing state during the Cold War to becoming a pivotal state in the post Cold War era. Thus, in its post Cold War relations with Africa, Turkey is gradually positioning itself as a bridge between Christianity and Islam as well as a buffer against Islamic fundamentalism. This role reveals the potentials of Turkey as an international actor in African politics.

In Africa, Turkey seeks to establish mutual and friendly relations between Muslims and Christians by providing institutional structures for dialogue, coexistence and interfaith interactions. These institutions include the Turkish Ufuk Dialogue Foundation, which through conferences, seminars, media panels and visitations encourage and appeal to African Muslims and Christians to recognize right and not force as the foundation of socio-political life. Thus, relationships between the two dominant religions should be based on mutual respect and un-

derstanding instead of hostility, conflict or pursuit of personal and political interest. Therefore, the Turkish bridge metaphor in African interfaith relations provides the institutional mechanism for the establishment of durable peace necessary for the political and economic development of African states.

Finally, the advent of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) marked an explicit shift in Turkish foreign policy and practice which captures the national interest of African states. Though the AKP embarked on a broad programme of proactive politico-economic engagement with its African neighbours yet it still maintains its collaboration with Western European actors. Despite its cooperation with the West, Zarkol (2011;30) argues that Turkey's strategic engagement with Africa has been fostered by the ontologically insecure relationship of Turkey with Europe and United States of America, which was one of the key ingredients used by Turkey to forge a 'modern sense of self' in its relations with African nations.

The Concept of Education Diplomacy

Education has become a crucial aspect of Turkey soft power politics in Africa. This positions Turkey not only as the centre of academic research but also as a multifaceted hub that holds stake in the knowledge and technology industry of Africa. Hence, Turkey's deepening of educational links in Africa enables Turkey to project its national interest, history, language and culture in Africa which provides the institutional frameworks to promote closer social, cultural, political and economic relations with African states.

However, the introduction of education diplomacy establishes Turkey as the centre of an autonomous axis in Africa and no longer an appendix to the Western axis in its diplomatic relations with African states. It legitimates Turkey's new status as an axis state in African politics as well as a source of inspiration for the construction of new international identity of Africa based on Turkish culture and values. Initially, education was not recognized as an instrument of diplomacy by Turkey. Its foreign mission officials were hesitant to support Turkish international colleges which rely on student school fees as an important source of its financing while its teachers enthusiastically work for small salary (Gulen, 2011:88).

Nonetheless, in this era of globalization, education has provided another vector for channeling Turkey's new international identity in Africa. Turkish political leaders especially Turgut Ozal, Suleyman Demirel, Mustafa Kalemli and Hikmet Cetin have made this strategy so popular as a foreign policy tool for cultural translatability of Turkish values to African scholars, students and institutions. The impact of such popular educational products has come to reinforce the exceptionalism and liminality of Turkey's new international identity in Africa.

The establishment of Turkish schools and educational institutions in Africa has become a key factor that drives Turkey's cultural diplomacy in Africa as well as a tool for that strategically repositions Turkey as "heroes" of knowledge and research. Therefore, the heroic entrance of Turkey into the African educational system is intended to increase the African literacy rate which stood at 62.6% in 2010 against Turkey's literacy rate of 94.1% (UNESCO, 2010). In pursuance of this strategic foreign policy objective, the Turkish government through the instrumentality of Non-governmental

organization established Turkish schools in many African states.

However, this aspect of Turkey's foreign policy is inspired and based on Fethullah Gulen's philosophical thought of using schools as instrument for promoting peace, drive down ignorance and education in the world. Through Fethullah Gulen's Hizmet Movement, Turkey has established over 1000 schools in 140 countries. These Turkish Gulen schools not only contribute to the promotion of regional peace but also serve as a window of opportunity for the flow of Turkish culture, language, investments and values into Africa. Thus, Rizanur Meral affirms that the strategic rationale behind the establishment of Turkish schools in Africa is to raise Turkey's foreign policy prospects, accelerate the volume of Turkish foreign trade and increase economic collaboration with African states.

Therefore, in line with its strategies for foreign policy option for sub Sahara African states, Turkey established Turkish Gulen schools in Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, Benin Republic etc with the sole aim of promoting peaceful coexistence, interfaith relations and high quality education standards necessary for the development of sub Saharan African states. For this reason, the first Turkish university in Africa, known as Nigerian Turkish Nile University was established in 2009 to promote academic excellence, high standard research initiatives and technology transfer. Other schools are also instituted across Africa while constructions of new schools are apparently under way in the few remaining African countries. Finally, to boost the tenets of its educational diplomacy in Africa, Turkey, granted two thousand undergraduate scholarships to Africans to study in Turkish Universities. These scholarships grants are aimed at reducing the illiteracy rate which has been the major source

of underdevelopment and rising poverty in Africa.

The Political Context of Contemporary Turkey-Africa Relations

Turkey's political and diplomatic relations with Africa offers one of the most qualitative transformations in Turkey's international identity under AKP. This new political interaction with Africa serves as an attempt by AKP to redefine the perception that Turkey's place in international politics is to serve as a traditional bridge between Asia and Europe because of its strategic geographical location.

Thus, the geographic, cultural and historic depth of Turkey's international identity justifies its proactive political relations with African states. This new foreign policy thrust projects Turkey as a source of inspiration for the democratization process of the multi-religious political systems in Africa.

On this note, Robert Kaplan maintains that "Turkey is an exemplar of Islamic democracy that can serve as a role model for these newly liberated states, especially as its democracy evolved from a hybrid regime with generals and politicians sharing power" (Kaplan, 2011). This implies that Turkey's secular and democratic form of governance provides the structural dynamics for the political development of African states with diverse religious values and belief system. For this reason, Erdogan affirms that Islam and democratic values are not contradictory variables but complementary variables that provide Islamic African societies with the structural capacity to promote the values of democracy and good governance. Hurriyet Daily News, 15 September 2011).

Turkey's political system provides a unique democratic system that lay emphasis on the importance of blending Islamic political learning with secular democratic model. This synthesis of Islamic and democratic values is a model for African states to emulate in order to stimulate the growth of its political systems. Mamdouh Shaheen in his assessment of the relevance of Turkey's democratic values in the development of African nations points out that "we want a model similar to that found in Turkey. Egypt as a country needs to protect democracy from the Islamists" (Lewis, 2012:20). Drawing inference from Shaheen's comparative assessment, the Turkish Model of democracy has become a proactive political model that has influenced political activities in North Africa, holding down the urge to use violence as an instrument of political change.

Throughout history, Turkey has been a source of inspiration for viable political development for African nations; while Africa had been theatre of colonialism because to its enormous natural resources. But the presence of Ottoman Empire in North and South Africa kept European colonialism away from these African regions. The Ottoman Empire prevented the colonial expansion of Spain in North Africa and the penetration of Portuguese colonialism in East Africa. Following the political consequences of World War II, the Turkish war of independence turned out to be a catalyst that sparked off nationalism and the demand for self determination in Africa especially North Africa. Therefore, Turkey has been supporting African countries which gained independence from Western colonization to strengthen the foundation and values of freedom, dignity and sovereignty.

For the express purpose of increasing in strength the virtues of freedom and the ideals of political sovereignty, Turkey estab-

lished new embassies in Africa in order to quicken the political development of newly independent African countries. Turkey opened its first official mission in Lagos in 1956 and recognized all newly independent African countries. Subsequently, after 2005, Turkey increased its political presence and decided to build up more embassies in Africa. In 2010, Turkey opened new embassies in Cameroon, Mali, Ghana, Uganda, Angola and Madagascar; while in 2011 more embassies were set up in Zambia, Mozambique, Mauritania, Zimbabwe, Somali, Gambia and South Sudan; and in 2012 Turkey established more embassies in Niger, Namibia, Burkina faso and Gabon. With the creation of these new embassies, Turkey has over thirty-four embassies in Africa. Likewise, many African countries are opening up more embassies in Ankara. These African countries include Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Gambia, Ethiopia, Angola, Kenya, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo etc.

With the establishment of these new embassies in Africa, Turkey's political relations with Africa gained new momentums. This stems from Turkey's new international identity as an axis in African politics and as an active player in the resolution of domestic political crisis in Africa. In this context, Turkey contributes immensely to the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa in order to ensure the development of peace and political stability in the region. Turkey provides personnel and funds to six of the existing eight United Nations peacekeeping missions in Africa (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Turkey, 2013).

Turkey and Egypt co-chaired the UN International Donor's Conference for Development and Reconstruction of Darfur in 2010. During the conference, Turkey made a pledge of 70 million US Dollars for the Re-

construction of Sudan. In Somalia, Turkey led an international aid campaign to assist Somalia in the resolution of its political crisis. Turkey drew the world's attention to the deepening political crisis in Somalia by hosting the United Nations Istanbul Somalia Conference in 2010 to solicit international support for the Djibouti Peace Process. The Istanbul Declaration adopted during the conference constitutes a roadmap for the peaceful settlement of the Somalia conflict.

Also, Turkey played a fundamental role in managing the violent political change and transition process in North African during the Arab spring. As part of its Zero-problems policy with neighbours, Turkey offered to act as a mediator in the political uprising in North Africa. In the Libyan political conflict, Turkey responded by condemning Gaddafi's regime for his use of maximum force on the protesters. At the same time Ankara, offered to act as a mediator to offer a framework for the peaceful transfer of power while rejecting the planned airstrikes on Libya by the Allied Forces because of its perceived devastating effects on the civilian (Lewis, 2012:22).

However, because of its perceived interest in the development of peace and political stability in Africa as well as deepening institutional relations, Turkey was confirmed a strategic partner for the African region and in 2005 was accorded an observer status in African Union. Turkey's ambassador to Addis Ababa was accredited to the African Union, also Turkey's embassy in Abuja was accredited to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) while its embassy in Dar-es-salam was accredited to the East African Community (EAC) thereby increasing the velocity of regional integration which is necessary in assisting the African Union in its goal of creating a political union in Africa. This new form of diplomatic collaboration marks a new development in the

history of Turkey-Africa relations.

This new diplomatic advancement reinforces Turkey's foreign policy quest of pursuing a peaceful, realistic and consistent policy in Africa guided by the principle of 'peace at home and peace abroad' postulated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In line with this principle, Turkey conducts its foreign policy in a way to foster the maintenance of security and stability in its region and beyond, based on the tradition of reconciling modernity with cultural identity.

Conclusion

Turkey has a long history of political relations with Africa and consistently opposed the extension of Western European colonialism into Africa, particularly North Africa. Therefore, this study sought out to appraise and examine the political relations that have subsisted in the history of Turkey-Africa interactions from the years of the Ottoman Empire to contemporary period of globalization. In the course of the research, the study undertook an assessment of the challenges, values and benefits of Turkey's interest and involvement in African politics. Similarly, the paper carried out a clear-cut examination of the conceptual thrust of Turkey's foreign policy relations as well as the broadening scope of its educational diplomacy in Africa.

Nevertheless, the study uncovered that the Ottoman Empire had a very affable political contact with Africa. Such relationship was not built on the tenets of colonialism but allowed Africans some measure of freedom and liberty in the use and practice of their indigenous language, customs, values, culture and religion without any form of modification or change. These unique values of Ottoman political patterns produced the Turkish model of pluralism and secularism

which were shared with its African provinces and reinstated in its relations with modern African nation-states. The Ottoman legacy of secularism strengthened Turkey's contemporary international identity and posture as an axis of peace, coexistence and collaboration connecting Christianity and Islam towards mutual political interaction and development of democratic values. Such values help to reinforce the quest for the institutionalization of democratic values and culture in multiethnic cum religious states in Africa which provides the structural platform for the economic and political development of developing countries.

Conversely, the Ottoman Empire fostered migration of professionals and political activities in order to stimulate bilateral treaties and diplomatic exchanges in Africa which became the catalyst that build up modern Turkey-Africa political engagement and collaboration. These political interactions was fortified in the 1998 African Action Plan intended to advance Turkey's diplomatic and cultural relations with Africa and Africans as well as to prop up technology advancement, scientific cooperation and bilateral agreements. But the major factors holding back Turkish diplomatic initiatives in Sub Saharan Africa and other Africa countries is the age long image of poverty, war, terrorism, disease and misery stereotyped by neo-colonialism to weaken the will of Africans to develop as well as a bulwark against potential political collaboration. These scenarios insidiously inhibit the pace of Turkish political relations in Africa. Therefore, from the above analysis, this study inferred that if the Turkey-Africa political relations is strategically and objectively managed, the political power of Turkey and Africa will not only increase but will also reposition them to play active role in world politics.

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Hizmet and the Kurdish Question in Southeastern Turkey and Iraq*

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Abstract

PKK militant activists have made statements against Turkey's Hizmet movement, despite Hizmet's history of extensive humanitarian work in the Kurdish region. While ultra-nationalist Kemalists have excluded Kurds, Armenians and other minorities from their vision of a homogenous Turkey, the Hizmet movement, inspired by the Sufi leader Fethullah Gülen, has practiced dialogue, inclusivity, and peace-building vis-à-vis the Kurdish community, and opened dozens of high quality schools in the disadvantaged southeastern region. While some Kurds have joined Hizmet or benefited from their educational institutions, others in the Kurdish community have deep reservations and distrust of Hizmet's projects. The Kurdish issue is the most serious internal problem Turkey currently faces. During a trip to Turkey in 2012, Turkish newspapers reported new deaths almost on a daily basis, both of PKK (Kurdistan Worker's Party) activists, and Turkey's security forces, in the southeast Kurdish region. The PKK allegedly also burned down schools and kidnapped several students. Since the eighties the PKK has been agitating for an autonomous Kurdistan, and their struggle has left tens of thousands dead in the last few decades, and over a million internally displaced people. Kurds have suffered rampant discrimination as ethnic minorities in Turkey. This paper examines the complex relationships between the larger Kurdish community in Turkey, the PKK, and the Hizmet movement.

Keywords

Hizmet, Gülen, Turkey, Kurds, Turkish minorities, PKK.

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Introduction

“...we should remove all ideas and feelings that pull us apart, and run to embrace one another” (Gülen 2007, 7). –Fethullah Gülen

“A great Kurdish writer in Turkey said if we combine the organizational power of the Turks with the heart of the Kurds we can do anything” (interview, Kurdish university official, Erbil, April 1st 2013).

“Our [Turkish Hizmet] teacher taught us. We couldn’t think past revenge. Now we have learned to achieve our goals” (interview, Kurdish schoolgirl, Erbil, April 1st 2013).

A California-based Turkish scientist from Istanbul told me that if it were not for her participation in Hizmet, a civil society movement inspired by the Turkish Sufi Muslim religious leader, Fethullah Gülen (b. 1941), she would not like or associate with Kurdish people, approximately 18% of the population in Turkey (CIA World Factbook, 2008 est.).¹ Shocked, I asked her how that could be. Did Turkish public schools not teach cultural pluralism and tolerance of minority groups? Was racism not condemned in Turkey? She replied that pluralism was not discussed there until recently, and that even the term “Kurd” was avoided in public discourse. Instead, in her circle—her parents are secular, elite, ultra-nationalist Kemalists—Kurds were thought of as dirty, uneducated, ignorant people, and it was only after joining Hizmet that she began to hear other perspectives, and to meet people of Kurdish descent. Another Hizmet-affiliated acquaintance, a student from central Turkey, told me that she grew up in a liberal, secular household. Her father is ultra-nationalist

and anti-Hizmet, and does not like it that Hizmet’s *Zaman* newspaper publishes pieces written by an Armenian journalist, distrusting any article not written by ethnic Turks. If a Turkish singer performs a single song in Kurdish as part of her evening’s repertoire, her father complains bitterly. His blatant xenophobia reinforces her support of what she considers Hizmet’s humanitarian efforts towards multicultural and interfaith dialogue. Unfortunately, Kurds have suffered oppression all too often: On August 6, 2014, Martin Chulov reported in *The Guardian* that at least 40,000 Yazidi Kurds were stranded without food or water in the Sinjar mountains in Iraq after an attack by ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), which massacred at least 500 Yazidis, considering them heretics.

Other than drought, the Kurdish issue is the most serious internal challenge Turkey currently faces. Since 1984, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) has been agitating for an autonomous Kurdistan and greater rights for the Kurds, leaving over forty thousand dead (Koç 2013a, 66), over two million internally displaced, and approximately two thousand villages destroyed (Öktem). A truce that was called in 1999 with the capture of the notorious PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan (b. 1948), was called off in 2004 when PKK terrorism resumed (Giraldi 2008, 36).

PKK militant activists have made statements against Turkey’s Hizmet movement, despite Hizmet’s extensive history of humanitarian work in the Kurdish region. While ultra-nationalist Kemalists, concentrated in Istanbul and Ankara, have excluded Kurds, Armenians and other minorities from their vision of a homogenous Turkey, the Hizmet movement, in Turkey and abroad, has practiced dialogue and peace-building vis-à-vis the Kurdish community. Hizmet has established hundreds of educa-

1 All names of informants have been changed for their privacy.

tional institutions in the Kurdish region in Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan as part of its focus on providing service through education. Most Kurdish people recognize Hizmet's humanitarian and educational contributions (Koç 2013a, 68, 70), and remember that the philosopher and religious leader Said Nursi (1877-1961), one of the spiritual forefathers of the movement, was himself a Kurd.

Both Hizmet participants (some of whom are Kurds), and the larger Kurdish community in general, share much in common. They have experienced blatant discrimination and repression at the hands of the ultra-nationalist Kemalist elite, in power for decades, and who are still supported by Turkey's military. Both are vulnerable today to secularist Kemalist forces that have represented religious movements as regressive and anti-Turkish, and the Kurds at best as "Mountain Turks," a term coined to deny Kurdish identity, and at worst as a backwards, ignorant, and violent people. Hizmet activists and Kurds are both deemed "the enemy," because they threaten the ultra-nationalist vision of a homogenous "pure" Turkish state which is staunchly secular and repressive of piety (Yavuz 1999, 120). Both have been courted by the AK Party for support—although while Hizmet and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have been warring since the Gezi Park protests and graft scandal, many in the Kurdish community have welcomed reforms (allowing education in Kurdish at private schools, overturning the headscarf ban, and allowing more Kurds to serve on Parliament) announced by Erdoğan in 2013. Yet it is clear that trusting Erdoğan is risky: while his presidential aspirations were likely granted by Kurdish support, his autocratic tendencies speak to his capacity to reverse those reforms on a whim.

However, according to Piotr Zalaweski writing for *Time Magazine* on June 4, 2012,

Kurdish PKK militant activists have identified Hizmet as their number one enemy. A minority of civilian Kurds in Turkey remain hostile to this movement. This appears to be a paradox: It was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938) who imagined Turkey as a homogenous state. The Hizmet movement visibly and consciously includes Kurds as part of its focus on peace-building, and members have organized talks on conflict resolution regarding the Kurdish question, and spent millions on education in the Kurdish regions in Turkey and Iraq. In Southern California, the Hizmet-organized Anatolian Culture and Food Festival (held in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013) included Kurdish songs and folk dances. At this festival, and in Hizmet institutions in Turkey, academic talks have been held on the Kurdish question.² As one journalist interviewed (Istanbul, October 2012) noted, for Hizmet, homogeneity is not a virtue. Yet, Kerem Öktem (2008, 2) refers to Hizmet's outreach as paternalistic "Islamic charity politics" which leave Kurds choosing between inclusion and material gain, and Kurdish nationalism.

This paper examines the complex relationships between the larger Kurdish communities in Turkey and Iraq, the PKK, and the Hizmet movement—the most influential piety-inspired group in Turkey. Some Kurds, especially PKK militants, have a range of motives for criticizing Hizmet's activities in the Kurdish regions. Like the Kemalists, the PKK is exclusivist, and does not want Kurdish youth to embrace commonalities between groups as Hizmet advo-

² *Today's Zaman* reported on July 6th, 2008 that Hizmet's Abant Platform held a meeting: "Kurdish Problem: Seeking Peace and a Future Together." In 2013, Hizmet held lectures on the Armenian and Kurdish issue in Turkey at the Anatolian Cultures and Food Festival in Costa Mesa, California. One held on May 19th by Ömer Taşpınar, was titled "Turkey and the Kurdish Question: A New Beginning."

cates. One journalist interviewed (Istanbul, April 2013) put it: “The PKK is terribly upset because Hizmet is stealing youth from its tentacles.” This is likely—new recruits have dropped dramatically; some have credited Hizmet movement’s educational projects in the Kurdish region (Koç 2013a, 68).

On a short trip to semi-autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan in April, 2013, I found Hizmet activities to be devoid of controversy among Iraqi Kurds, who are relatively wealthy due to oil money—the Iraqi Kurdish region is the only stable region in Iraq and has received substantial US support (Giraldi 2008, 33). Ankara has begun to understand the potential for Kurdistan to play the role of buffer between itself and the growing ISIS problem, and Iraqi Kurds find themselves needing Turkey—not only have Turkish businessmen invested heavily in the region, but Iraqi Kurds faced devastation at the hands of Saddam Hussein and are currently terrorized by ISIS. A Turkish educational director of Hizmet institutions in Iraq stated: “Hizmet schools try to advance the country they are in. If Iraq becomes more modern, the [Hizmet] teachers will be happier. If Iraqi people get richer, Iraq will import more goods from Turkey” (interview, Erbil, April 1st 2013). Iraqi Kurds spoke to me of considering Hizmet schools and universities, funded by these Turkish businessmen, the best educational options available. Some Iraqi Kurds are distrustful of Iraqi Arabs, and have turned towards Turks, enabling Hizmet carry out its activities there. The statement by a Kurdish principal and director in Erbil reflects the prestige Hizmet currently enjoys in this region as one of the active Sufi groups: “Businessmen of a certain cultured and educated level prefer Hizmet to the Naqşbandi or Qadiri orders” (Erbil, April 1, 2013).

Several questions remain to be explored:

What is Hizmet’s impact on the larger Kurdish communities in Turkey and Iraq, and how it is received? Why, given the inclusive nature of Hizmet and its efforts towards conflict-resolution, do some Kurds find it objectionable? I first turn to theoretical concerns, then address my methodology. Next, I offer context to the relationship between the Kurdish people and the Turkish and Iraqi states, and to the rise of the PKK. Finally, I analyze Hizmet’s activities in these regions, Kurdish reactions, and provide concluding suggestions.

Theoretical Questions

Demet Mousseau cites several factors that fuel ethnic strife, including “autocratic and nationalizing policies of the state towards ethnicity, democratization that involves an illiberal character with limits on group rights and politics, and socio-economic regional inequality along ethnic lines” (Mousseau 2012, 45). Those clearly apply—the Turkish state has been autocratic for decades, it promoted a monolithic vision of Turkish identity, until recently constitutional clauses have limited Kurdish political rights and their ability to use Kurdish in public, and the southeastern Kurdish region is poorer than the rest of Turkey (Mousseau 2012, 46, 59). Östen Wahlbeck (1999, 19) notes: “Racism and discrimination are clearly obstacles to both assimilation and integration because of the boundaries and structures of exclusion they create.” Even if the Turkish Republic were pluralistic, this would not likely ease tensions when the Kurdish community is structurally (economically, politically, culturally) at a disadvantage. While those factors certainly offer a recipe for conflict, and have contributed to discrimination and violence on all sides, cultural, ideological, and religious boundary-making processes are also relevant.

Diana Eck (2003, 168, 174, 184) distinguishes between religious inclusivism and exclusivism. Exclusivists are isolationist and believe they alone have the truth, a form of “theological imperialism” which ultimately leads to bigotry. The Kemalist project can be understood in religious terms: Şükrü Hanioglu (2013, 1-4) describes how devotion to Atatürk and the mythologizing of his figure has taken religious forms. Extending this framework to include ideological groups, I apply this to communally held creeds regarding race and culture. The Kemalist project created a legacy of racial and cultural exclusivism, together with form of secular ideological exclusivism that excludes religious practitioners. The socialist PKK also draws its boundaries tightly: as one PKK participant expressed, “A Kurd who joins Hizmet is not a Kurd.” A Kurdish person from Turkey who wishes to participate in Hizmet transgresses several boundaries—that of the secular Kemalists who promote a single Turkish identity, and that of the PKK who believes a “real” Kurd has to engage in armed struggle. If she obtains an education and practices civic pluralistic values, she also transgresses the dominant stereotype of the “Kurd:” someone ignorant and prone to violence.

Kemalist exclusivists realized their goals of supremacy through communal ideology (civil, religious, cultural), propagated as a tool to benefit elites (Gramsci 1999). Atatürk’s state imagined Arabs, Kurds, and other minorities as inferior and lazy, and these views were inculcated using novels and drama. Cenk Saraçoğlu (2011, 21-24) overviews stereotypes Turks have of Kurds, including “ignorant and cultureless,” “benefit scroungers,” “invaders,” and “separatists.” He argues that “anti-Kurdish discourses on the internet and in other media portray the Kurds as culturally inferior, intrinsically incapable of adapting to ‘modern city life’,

naturally criminal, violent and separatist people” (3). “Exclusive recognition” of Kurds by Turks, a process of exclusion through pejorative labels, is not simply a product of state ideology or a reflective of tensions between the state and the PKK alone, but a product of low socioeconomic conditions, inferior education, and substandard housing of those Kurds that migrated from eastern Turkey to urban spaces in western Turkey (2011, 5, 108-109, 183-185).

On the other hand, Hizmet ostensibly works *against* exclusivist boundary-drawing projects that are based on race, religion, or culture, towards pluralism, creating hybrid individuals with flexible identities. Activists consider pluralism as a manifestation of piety. They have launched an educational revolution, which has changed the landscape in Turkey by empowering those at the peripheries. Doğan Koç (2013a, 66) argues that Hizmet effectively plays a role in conflict resolution between the Kurds and the Turkish state. I began this paper with a quote by Gülen: “we should remove all ideas and feelings that pull us apart, and run to embrace one another,” illustrative of the boundary-breaking principle shaping Hizmet’s goals.

The question is whether the panhuman focus of the Hizmet project, and the cultural hybridity of students and teachers in Hizmet educational institutions, serve to reject older “bounded definitions of race, language, and nation” (Haj Yazdiha 2010, 32). The second and third quotes at the beginning of this essay suggest these are effective in breaking down boundaries. In the US context, the term “Oreo” has been used by African Americans to denigrate those in their community who are accused of being “black on the outside but white on the inside,” often because they have achieved a degree of success and thus left the stereotype of “blackness” behind. Similarly, Kurds that

choose to participate in any way in Hizmet's educational projects are deemed "not Kurds" by those threatened by alternative ways to be Kurdish. Yet education itself is neither a benign process nor a panacea—Hizmet's curricular focus on science and technology, does not sufficiently address structural patterns of social inequality. While education can serve to reinforce hegemony (Pandya 2012, 183), Hizmet's model has proved powerful in the development of marginalized groups, but could do more to raise awareness of the political history of the Kurds.

Some have understood Hizmet's tension with Kemalism and the PKK, as the strain between "tradition" and "modernity." Esra Özyürek writes of memory and forgetting in Turkey—while Atatürk attempted to erase memories of the Ottoman past, modernity gave birth to nostalgia (2007, 6). Hizmet takes part in this collective nostalgia for an Ottoman past, imagined or not, where minorities coexisted relatively harmoniously, and Sufism was tolerant and offered solutions to social problems. However, Bacik and Kurt (2011, 22) argue that Hizmet has created an "amodern" sphere which retains those traditional values considered timeless, because their usefulness transcends the pre-modern period. Peter Berger (1999, 2) points out that "modernity" did not lead to true secularism—movements of "counter-secularization" are ubiquitous (Berger 1999, 6). Those involved are protesting the "secular elite," who tend not to be in touch with common people, who are both modern and religious (1999, 10-12); indeed the case with Hizmet—which is both "nostalgic" and progressive.

Methodology

Two trips to Turkey and one to Erbil, Iraq, have informed this project. In the fall

of 2012 I spent five weeks in Istanbul interviewing people from a variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds on their perception of Hizmet. In April 2013, I returned to interview primarily Kurdish people living in Southeast Turkey in the cities of Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, Diyarbakir, and Harran. Part of that trip was spent in Erbil, Iraq as well. I visited Hizmet-run schools and institutions and interviewed over forty people in either Turkish or English, with a translator present when necessary.³ I took notes and recorded all formal interviews.

Who are the Kurds?

The Kurdish people constitute the largest stateless ethnic group, with over half in Turkey (Marcus 2007, 76), and sizable communities in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Europe, and the Balkans. Those areas in the Middle East where Kurds have traditionally lived may be called "Kurdistan," although this is contested vociferously; typically the Kurdish population of each state is deliberately underestimated (Manafy 2005, 1, 5). Kurds speak different dialects of Kurdish (Kurmanji, Sorani, Zaza, and Gorani), a language which has been widely oppressed due to state-building processes in these regions. An ethnic group of Indo-European and/or Medes descent, they are chiefly Sunni Muslims from the Hanafi and Shafi'i madhabs, although there are Shi'is, including Alevis and a small number of Ahl al-Haqq, and Yazidis.⁴ Many Kurds also practice Sufism and belong to the Naqşbandi, Qadiri, Nematollahi and Khaksari orders. There are small numbers of Christian and Jewish Kurds as well.

The Kurds have never constituted one co-

³ My Turkish is rudimentary.

⁴ While Yazidi religion reflects aspects of Islam and Christianity, it is a distinct tradition (Allison 2001, 33-34).

hesive community with a single ideology and agenda. While collectively they are engaged in movements of liberation, there is little consensus as to what that signifies. While Kurds have been recurrently oppressed by the dominant groups that surround them, various factors have weakened their ability to unite in defense, including tribal rivalries. Manafy notes (2005, 43, 96), "The Kurds kill each other more systematically than do their oppressors." Tribalism has hurt Kurds' inability to forge a state (Tahiri 2006, 26; Manafy 2005, 43-44). Additionally, class poses a divisive threat: upper class Kurds have occasionally allied with the dominant group (Manafy 2005, 73). The more a tribal leader distances himself from his Kurdish identity and assimilates with high status Turks, the better he is able to compete with his Kurdish tribal rivals. Isolation and lack of access to education have bolstered tribal dependency (Tahiri 2006, 25, 191).

Kurdish Relationship with the Turkish State

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Atatürk was dismayed with the parceling out of Turkish lands and presented himself as "liberator" of Muslim and Kurdish regions. Kurds, generally, were on board with his plan to keep Turkey free of occupying forces, believing they would be partners in the new Turkish state (Tahiri 2006, 51-52). Atatürk encouraged "the idea of 'equal rights for the Kurds' in the new Turkey" (Baibourtian 1959 and 2013, 281). After 1923, when the Turkish Republic was founded, Atatürk's government began a systematic process of violating Kurdish rights (Manafy 2005, 30-33). While the Kemalists supported Kurdish nationalism in Iran and Iraq, they crushed it in southeast Turkey and also in Western Armenia (Baibourtian 1959 and 2013, 294). Kurdish uprisings against the Turkish Re-

public began as early as 1925 (Efegil 2011, 27). Atatürk embarked on what Manafy (2005) calls "state terrorism," including the burning of villages and assassinations of Kurds.

Those that did not endure forced deportation were subject to assimilation. A major ploy to forcibly assimilate the Kurdish community was through language suppression—the Turkish Constitution's article 42 forbids the teaching of Kurdish (or anything but Turkish) as the primary language of instruction (Mousseau 2012, 54). Tahiri (2006, 65-66) states: "On 3 March 1924, Mustafa Kamal issued a decree prohibiting the use of the Kurdish language, banning education in Kurdish, making all Kurdish publications illegal. Kurdish nationalists reacted by organizing and preparing for a revolt."

What are the modern roots of Turkish xenophobia, couched in nationalism? In 1930, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt (1982-1943), Atatürk's Justice Minister stated, "Those who are not of pure Turkish stock can have only one right in this country, the right to be servants or slaves" (Manafy 2005, 99). The Ottoman Empire was well-known for its religious and ethnic tolerance.⁵ Budding nationalism began with the Young Turk movement; although in the early 1900s, it attempted to create a constitutional parliamentary system which would preserve the ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity of the Ottoman Empire. Atatürk's ultimately racist vision of a homogenous united Turkey soon prevailed, as the Empire transitioned to a single state (Mardin 2006, xiii). Atatürk and the Kemalists who followed him may be credited for this new emphasis on the superiority of Turkishness and suspicion of reli-

5 Hussein Tahiri (2006, 27) notes, however, that the Ottoman Empire was able to control the Kurds through dividing the Kurdish tribes and taking advantage of tribal rivalries.

gion (Posch 2007, 10).

Atatürk undertook a series of social engineering projects, intrigued by ideas which promoted the concept of Turkish superiority. He urged anthropologists to explore theories of the Turkic origin of Europeans, and supported research that Turkic peoples had more developed brains than did other races. Convinced that other major languages were originally derived from Turkic origin, he had several essays translated on this topic. The process of “Turkification” began, which involved purging non-Turkish words from the Turkish language (Hanioglu 2013, 170-176). Paradoxically, Western clothing and the Latin alphabet were adopted. The west was emulated—not because it was considered superior to Turkey but because at the time it was successful economically, militarily and technologically. Graham Fuller (2008, 17) argues that Atatürk gave the region a “cultural lobotomy.”

In 1924, Atatürk brought to an end the institution of the Caliphate. His model was a rejection of Islam, the Middle East, Arabs, and all non-Turks. His anti-religious sentiment heightened tensions with those living in the southeast who tended to be more outwardly observant than those in the west. In 1925 Shaikh Said, a Kurdish member of the Naqshbandi Sufi order, fought against Atatürk’s secular government, wanting to restore shari’a law and the caliphate, in this case perhaps fueled more by religious sentiments than by Kurdish nationalism. He was subsequently hung and the Kurdish community was subject to government retaliation in the form of the burning of Kurdish villages and deaths (Manafy 2005, 96-97).

Kemalism has long been upheld by Turkey’s military, which sees itself as guardian of Atatürk’s vision, carrying out several coups towards that goal (1960, 1971, 1980, 1997,

and attempted coup in 2003). As Mousseau (2012, 54) notes, the armed forces have been given a powerful role by the constitution. After the 1960 military coup, Kurds suffered a new wave of arrests, and the military reemphasized the assimilation of Kurds as Turks (Manafy 2005, 103). As elsewhere, the seventies witnessed a rise of leftist parties that many Kurds joined. A Kurdish acquaintance recounted unspeakable forms of torture committed against community figures and pointed out that anyone would want to take up arms in the mountains if they had family members who died in those ways. Manafy (2005, 110) agrees: “the PKK is the product, not the cause, of Turkey’s intolerable Kurdish policies.”

Kurdish university students, including Öcalan, met in southeast Turkey in 1978 to organize a strategy leading to a more independent Kurdish state (Marcus 2007, 75). This organization became the PKK, which promotes armed struggle against the Turkish military, drawing members chiefly from young, uneducated, rural Kurds (Mousseau 2012, 53). Öcalan’s PKK, inspired by Marxist/Leninism, Stalinism, and Maoism, was initially a synthesis of class struggle and Kurdish nationalism. Ostensibly, it strove for the construction of an independent Kurdistan in Turkey, and the cessation of feudalism, tribalism, and the oppression of women. After the 1980 coup, massive reprisals by the government took place against the opposition, including the Kurds: 650,000 people were detained, 100,000 were sentenced, fifty were hung, 171 were tortured to death, and 30,000 fled the country (Manafy 2005, 107, 111). The military wing of the PKK, the People’s Liberation Army of Kurdistan, began its war against the Turkish government in 1984 (Roth and Sever 2007, 905). Iran, Iraq, and Syria have used the PKK to promote their own respective agendas (Marcus 2007, 75), inspiring the old Kurdish saying,

“No friends but the mountains.”

Detractors of the PKK will point out that it has links with organized crime and behaves like an international criminal organization. With over 40,000 victims since 1984, the PKK was declared a terrorist group by the EU in 2002 and the US in 2004 (Marcus 2007, 75; Roth and Sever 2007, 901-902). It is involved in drug trafficking (including heroin, hashish, amphetamines, opium, cocaine), which it allegedly transits from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran, through Turkey, and sells at a fantastic profit in Europe, in order to fund its political activities. The PKK also engages in human smuggling and money laundering. In Turkey and in various European cities, it extorts money from ordinary Kurdish civilians, who have to choose between personal safety and “donating” to the PKK (Roth and Sever 2007, 902, 907, 911). In many cases they were forced to pick a side or be accused of being sympathetic either to the PKK or the government. Indeed, the PKK is not popular with many Kurds: in 1987 in Pınarcık they killed thirty Kurdish villagers for “collaborating” with the government; similar massacres have taken place in Diyarbakir (Manafy 2005, 109-110). Currently Öcalan controls the PKK from his jail on İmralı Island.

Progress was made in 1991- 1992, when President Turgut Özal (1927-1993) spoke against government policy towards the Kurds and began negotiations to better their conditions, and tried to revoke the official prohibition on the use of the Kurdish language (still banned in public schools and state institutions) (Efegil 2011, 28; Mousseau 2012, 54). Turkey’s quest to join the European Union, which formally began in 1999, has been stymied by the lack of civilian control over the military, and by its treatment of the Kurds (Bilgiç 2009, 803). To join the EU, the Turkish government has

presented itself as modern, democratic, and even European, but its treatment of Kurds is inconsistent with this image (Saraçoğlu 2011, 2).

In 2002, due to Öcalan’s 1999 capture, the ceasefire with the PKK, and pressure from the EU, the Turkish government granted minor concessions to the Kurds, allowing them to read books on Kurdish history, play Kurdish music and hold festivals, and if over 18 years of age to study Kurdish in private institutions (Marcus 2007, 82). Some Kurdish broadcasts on private channels would be permitted, although later regulations stated these broadcasts could be prohibited if they “contradicted the fundamental principles of the Republic” (Bilgiç 2009, 812, 818). Despite the 2002 new Civil Code, according to the European Commission report of 2010, the rights of Kurds to broadcast, publish, and otherwise express themselves remain weak (Mousseau 2012, 58). Erdoğan gave a speech in 2005 in favor of granting more rights to the Kurdish community, although policies towards this goal were not implemented until 2007 (Efegil 2011, 28). More reforms were granted in 2013, and in 2014 he announced a possible amnesty for PKK militants. On August 15, 2014, Öcalan declared the conflict was ending, according to *Firatnews*.

A report by Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2012 Turkey,” notes that “human rights have suffered setbacks at home,” in reference to the hardline approach Erdoğan has taken vis-à-vis the Kurds. The report states: “Turkey’s overbroad definition of terrorism still allows for arbitrary imposition of the harshest terrorism charges against individuals about whom there is little evidence of logistical or material support for terrorism or of involvement in plotting violent activities” (Human Rights Watch 2012). Kurds complain of lacking freedom of

expression, and suffering prosecution even for writing or giving speeches with non-violent content. Human Rights Watch also lists Turkey's use of torture and lethal weapons, its limitations on freedom of expression and the media, curfews, and arbitrary detention (Öktem 2008). Language is still an issue. In 2006 the mayor of (predominantly Kurdish) Diyarbakir, Abdullah Demirbaş, put forth a proposal called "Multilingual Municipality Services," that would allow speakers of Kurdish or Arabic in the region access public services provided in their own language. Despite being unanimously approved by the local council, Demirbaş was dismissed and the project denied as unconstitutional and a challenge to the unity of the Turkish state (Öktem 2008).

The vast majority of Turkish Kurds have nothing to do with the PKK. Most want, other than human rights, and greater regional political power, to be able to use Kurdish in the public sphere, educate their children in Kurdish and Kurdish culture, and carry out Kurdish traditions—not a separate state (Efegil 2011, 30). The Kemalist military has long opposed these steps, instead stubbornly clinging to its outdated model of a monolithic, homogenous, and antireligious Turkey which it alone is worthy of guarding. Erdoğan, while finally granting reforms, is likely motivated more by ambition than by his ideals.

Kurdish Relationship with the Iraqi State

If Atatürk's treatment of Kurds was abysmal, Saddam Hussein's was worse. Saddam Hussein (1937-2006; r. 1979-2003) planned to exterminate them through his genocidal Anfal Campaign. From 1987 to 1988, the Iraqi Kurdish community suffered the "mass summary executions and mass

disappearance of many tens of thousands of non-combatants, including large numbers of women and children, and sometimes the entire population of villages" (Human Rights Watch 1993). In 1988, 478 Kurdish villages were destroyed, 100,000 Kurds were displaced, and the US gave Saddam Hussein chemical weapons, leading to the gassing of thousands at Halabja, a region of Suleymania, Iraq (Manafy 2005, 94). Of the seven Hizmet schools in Suleymania, the one in Halabja offers free tuition—a gift to Kurdish survivors of that massacre.

Iraqi Kurdistan, formed in 2005, is semi-autonomous, with its own flag, army, and parliament, a move that initially terrified neighboring governments of Iran, Turkey, and Syria, and which has energized their Kurds. Iraqi Kurds benefitted greatly from the 2003 US-Iraq war in which the Kurds played role of ally to the US (Marcus 2007, 75-76). The relationship between the US and Iraqi Kurds is not new: the US gave them 16 million between 1972- 1975 to help the US fight the cold war in Iraq (Manafy 2005, 33). For the past few years, billions of dollars have been flowing back and forth between Turkey and oil-rich Iraqi Kurdistan, and Turkish businessmen have been allowed to build malls, banks, restaurants, and other businesses in this region. Along with these business deals, Hizmet schools and Ishik University have opened and are well received. In part, this orientation towards Turkey reflects a rejection of Iraqi Arabs. An older Kurdish woman, whose son was killed by Saddam's regime, gushed: "My father had Ottoman citizenship. He told me that when Turks give their word, they keep it." Her late son's widow added, "We cannot take a promise from an Arab. What have Arabs done? The Turks have done things" (informal interview, Erbil, April 2, 2013).

One Kurdish student at the Nilufer

School in Erbil spoke about Saddam Hussein's 1988 massacre of the Kurds of Halabja (interview, Erbil April 1, 2013):

We cry about these things almost every year. They tortured people in every way. You can't imagine what Saddam Hussein did. He wrote in his notebook that he didn't want Kurds to be on the map. In 1996 we couldn't even talk about Saddam with our friends. I remember my mother telling me: 'Don't say Saddam!' It was a nightmare for everyone. One time he had an 18 year-old boy killed—my mother knew him—and Saddam came and forced his father to dance at his son's funeral.

Human Rights Watch (1993) termed Saddam's treatment of Iraq's Kurds as genocidal. It should be no surprise that many Iraqi Kurds look to Turkey for support, especially in light of current threats posed by ISIS.

Hizmet and its Projects in Southeast Turkey and Erbil, Iraq

Gülen preaches that we now live in a world of conflict and greed, and one should oppose these with education, which offers the clearest path to "serve humanity and to establish a dialogue with other civilizations" (2004, 198). Poverty must be resolved through work, and schisms through dialogue and tolerance of other groups. He (2004, 205-206) writes: "If we fail to educate, we fail our youth, and we can only attain true humanity if we continue to learn and teach." Gülen insists that instead of mere contemplation, action in this world is paramount. Ideal humans should contribute to others through service and "abhor being idle or wasting their lives" (2004, 110). According to Gülen, ideal Muslims are trustworthy and "do not eat; they feed others.

They do not live for themselves; they enable others to live" (2004, 88-89).

Inspired by Gülen's ideas, the movement's goals include a revival of Islam and society through an emphasis on education (especially science), and participation in interfaith and intercultural dialogue and charity—part nostalgia, part revolution. His approach is to adopt positive aspects of modernity while reviving beneficial traditions (Gülen 2011, 22-24, 36, 59-62). He asks participants to actively better their communities, and many do generously donate time and money towards this goal, including founding and running thousands of internationally-acclaimed secular schools, university preparation centers, and tutoring centers in Turkey and abroad. Kimse Yok Mu (Is Anyone There?), Hizmet's charitable program, provides services to those in need in Turkey and internationally, regardless of religious or ethnic background. Proselytizing is not a goal. Hizmet participants believe that it is part of their religious practice to carry out *hizmet* (service) and *hicret* (migration abroad for humanitarian purposes), and thus many have been inspired to work abroad both in developed and underdeveloped countries as teachers, often relinquishing lucrative careers in science and technology. Some leave western Turkey to teach in the Kurdish southeast region where quality education has long been lacking. Functional literacy rates in that region are very low (approximately 40%), compared to the rest of Turkey (90%) (Mousseau 2012, 57), which helps the PKK with recruitment as there are few opportunities for rural, undereducated youth. Youth are drawn to "go to the mountains" because of state repression, meager localized choices, fear and insecurity about the future, and because they believe it provides "forms of empowerment and emancipation" (Abbas and Yigit 2014, 9-12).

I have visited these schools, institutions, and cultural dialogue centers, on trips to Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Taiwan, Turkey, Thailand, Cambodia, and in the US, and they exist in almost every country. They were generally initially funded by pious “export-oriented” Turkish businessmen, many from eastern Turkey, known as the “Anatolian Tigers,” who are associated both with Turkey’s recent economic boom and with Hizmet (although some have recently disassociated after Erdoğan’s rift with Gülen). Hakan Yavuz refers to the Anatolian Tigers as the “counter-elite” as their economic power and religious practice threatens military-supported Kemalists (1999, 118-119). Often the businessmen build these schools as part of larger economic projects.

There are many reasons for which Hizmet’s model is considered a valuable contribution to the Kurdish community by the vast majority of Kurds. The first Hizmet educational institution in southeast Turkey opened in 1988, and by 2009 there were already 289 established (Koç 2013a, 73). These have received support of the local community because their science-focused curriculum is superior to that of alternative local schools. Some Mardinian businessmen supported their establishment because they believed Hizmet schools would help with the region’s low socio-economic status as well as reduce PKK terrorism. At least one high school in Mardin, Atak Koleji, brings together students from Arab, Kurdish and Assyrian backgrounds—groups which did not often mingle there—suggesting that Hizmet schools provide opportunities for multiculturalism. Mehmet Kalynocu (2008, 73-74) observes that in 2007 the school’s students “achieved a 95% success rate in university entrance and placement tests.” Despite this, Erdoğan recently threatened to close Hizmet-inspired educational institu-

tions.

Gülen has expressed compassion for the Kurdish demands. However, his messages regarding the Kurdish question vary depending on context, and are analyzed for political content and subject to a variety of interpretations. Earlier, Gülen appeared to support the government regarding its handling of the Kurdish issue, holding that the state must protect its civilians from PKK militants. One Hizmet informant notes that Hizmet’s attempts to avoid political involvement, especially before 2007, made it appear pro-government regardless of which group was currently in power. After 2007, Hizmet began to play a greater role in politics (interview, Istanbul, October 2012). In a speech given on January 9, 2012, Gülen said in response to the deaths of dozens of security workers in the Kurdish region that military operations should target those in the PKK responsible for terrorist acts. The PKK used Gülen’s statement to spread the notion that he wanted military operations to attack all Kurds, and not just those using violence (“Gülen: PKK employing tactics,” 2012).

However, recently Gülen strongly emphasized that Kurdish should also be taught as part of state curriculum in Turkey and Iraq. *Today’s Zaman* posted an article on June 25th, 2013, about Gülen’s interview for an online newspaper in Erbil:

Gülen insisted that Turkey should not only grant “every right” to its Kurdish citizens, such as recognition of use of Kurdish in education, but should also help Kurds who are suffering in other parts of the world. According to him, Turkey should appear as a representative of Kurds who face legal, political, ethnic and religious difficulties across the world and should de-

fend their rights at the UN and in other international organizations.

Gülen was born in Eastern Turkey in Erzurum, a region that has resisted the secularizing project. Many people in eastern Turkey have joined Hizmet, in part, because it has successfully granted greater economic, political, cultural, and religious influence to that region. Eastern Turkey, especially the southeast Kurdish region, did not benefit proportionately from the economic liberalism of the 1980s, when Turkey's west, in contrast, underwent rapid development (Mousseau 2012, 56). Average income and the number of schools are both lower in the east—likely because the Turkish government has long had stronger personal connections with groups or persons in the west and thus grants them greater opportunities. Mousseau (2012, 57) writes: “The weakness of clientelist ties between the state and Eastern provinces might have played a role in the negligence of the Eastern region.” Certainly TUSKON (Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists), the business association founded in 2005 by the Anatolian Tigers, has benefited from its relationship with Hizmet (Kristianasen 2011). TUSKON's success represents a shift away from the Istanbul-centered elite and the strengthening of central and eastern Turkey (Kaya 2011). In Iraqi Kurdistan, Hizmet's projects have also been accompanied by a slew of development ventures.

Kurdish Opponents

The PKK, together with a small minority of non-militant Kurdish citizens in Turkey, oppose Hizmet's projects on several grounds. Hizmet's educational institutions have raised suspicions that they aim to dilute Kurdishness through constructing a pan-

Muslim and humanitarian identity. Tahiri (2006, 42) notes that mass education has long been considered suspect by the Kurdish leaders “who feared it would undercut their authority.” Others suspect that Hizmet has infiltrated the government and the police, and orchestrates brutality against the Kurds, operating in the Kurdish region only to cleanse it of the PKK and its sympathizers. Some are irritated by the perception that Hizmet is trying to “reteach” Islam, when (most) Kurds are already Muslim; a few told me that Hizmet participants were not adherent enough. I heard almost no criticisms in Erbil, except that some of the more conservative Mullahs (Islamic leaders) were concerned it was actually a front for Christianity. Some Kurds claim Hizmet perpetuates stereotypes about Kurds through the media, and that Turkish members of Hizmet are themselves sometimes either consciously or unwittingly racist. Below are a few vignettes on these issues.

Associated with the AKP Party, Infiltrates Government and Judiciary

One prevalent accusation the Hizmet movement faces is that it deliberately places members in high positions to gain influence. Because the majority of participants initially voted for the AKP, some Kurds assumed (erroneously) that Hizmet and Erdoğan had identical agendas. Hizmet has millions of participants, with varying levels of affiliation. While some hold significant positions, there is no evidence that this reflects a Hizmet conspiracy: most movements are composed of participants in a variety of fields. Hizmet has become increasingly critical of Erdoğan's heavy-handedness, even before the graft scandal and Erdoğan's personal attacks against Gülen, whom Erdoğan blamed for exposing his connection to that scandal. Since 2009 several thousand Kurds considered to be allegedly sympathetic or

aiding the PKK and its institutions were jailed, and because Hizmet members are included in the police force and the judiciary in this region, they were deemed responsible for the crackdown. The spread of Hizmet-affiliated institutions led activists in the Kurdish community to believe the underlying reason for this growing presence was to “clean up the area” of Kurdish “terrorists” (Zalaweski 2012). The charge that Hizmet should be more transparent has been made frequently by critics. One Kurdish activist said, “there is a box behind the curtain and we don’t know what’s there,” referring to his belief that Hizmet has a hidden agenda (Diyarbakir, April 5, 2013). In Diyarbakir, an official from the Human Rights Association, established in 1986, showed me a photo of a Kurdish man that had been tortured that day, his back covered with bruises and welts. Warily, he said: “They [Hizmet] are strong in the bureaucratic system and have infiltrated the government. They have schools, power, and lots of institutions all around the world. Mr. Gülen has said he opposes those in the Kurdish rights movement. This man tortured was tortured by the police, and police are affiliated with the Hizmet movement” (April 4, 2013).

Turkification

In Ankara, I spoke to a Kurdish government official who expressed disgust with Hizmet, holding it promotes Turkishness at the expense of other identities (Ankara, October 2012). As a Kurd, he was fed up with Turkish authoritarianism, and said: “If in the future we have a Kurdistan, they [Turks] will want to control it and the Turks will be the chiefs and the Kurds the employees.” Kurdish city officials in Diyarbakir had similar criticisms of Hizmet, which they tended to conflate with policies of the Turkish government. One told me that the imams and religious scholars in the region are appointed

by the government to promote the Turkish nation-state, neglecting Kurdish identity. Kurds and Kurdish religious scholars believe that they should not go to Turkish mosques led by Turkish imams, I was told, because the government wants to Turkify the Kurdish region (April 5, 2013). Another stated if a Kurd did not work for the rights of Kurdish people (in a way acceptable to her) this person was not a *real* Kurd. Acknowledging that some members of the ruling party were Kurdish, she said: “There are Kurds in the AKP but they don’t work for the rights of the Kurdish people. They are not like us. They neglect us. We don’t call these “good Kurds,” Kurds.” Clearly, what a Kurd is and should do is contested. Yet a Kurdish Hizmet teacher, exasperated with the charge of Turkification, said: “If they were trying to erase Kurdish identity, I would not work here” (Diyarbakir, April 4, 2013).

Religion

An older female Qadiri Sufi, half Kurdish, half Turkish woman involved in charitable activism and a member of the AKP, disapproved of Hizmet women, who tend to wear western-style modest clothing, and headscarves. Her comments reflect religious tensions in Turkey, where, as elsewhere, what is considered *true* Islam is disputed. She wore a voluminous black abaya, common for pious women in some of the Sufi orders in Turkey. “I’m sorry that Hizmet women are not properly dressed,” she complained. “The image of women might damage Hizmet. Women in Hizmet should dress more Islamically” (Diyarbakir, April 5, 2013).

A Diyarbakir city official held that Hizmet ignores the Islamic identity of Kurds and they imply that Kurds are really Zoroastrians. Impatient with the idea that Kurds need Hizmet’s religious guidance, he said: “Kurds have been Muslim for centuries. We

have been Muslims without Hizmet. We can read the Qur'an and learn about Islam without religious movements. If their purpose is to serve this region, first peace has to come here. We are already Muslims, we don't need movements. Some people don't have bread, don't even have jobs" (April 5, 2013).

Still Racist

A city official and city council member from Diyarbakir both felt the movement does not do enough politically for the Kurdish issue, and brought up the Roboski massacre, which took place on the border of Kurdistan, Iraq and Turkey, on December 28, 2011. On this day, Turkish jets bombed and killed 35 male, mainly teenagers, who were crossing the border illegally to trade. The official bitterly complained, "The Gülen movement did nothing. We really criticize the Gülen movement and the AKP. When we analyze their discourse we think they are insincere. They don't do enough to solve the problem" (April 5, 2013).

Even Kurdish Hizmet supporters brought up what they considered to be the insensitive ways in which Hizmet still portrays Kurds. A group of Kurds informed the movement about "Tek Turkiye," a show on Hizmet's S TV station, controversial amongst Kurds for its depiction of Kurds as violent. One explained: "Kurds get irritated; they know they are not those people." "Kollama" is another show that some Kurds found offensive for its perpetuation of the "Good Kurd" and "Bad Kurds" stereotype.

In fact, some of my Kurdish friends in the movement have privately told me that at times they too feel the stigma of Kurdishness, even within Hizmet. Reasons for this are complex, and include the fact that despite Hizmet's ideals, participants attended Turkish schools and were shaped by Kemal-

ist state-unifying policies which included propagating a negative image of Kurds, and which did not teach multiculturalism. It will take a great deal of effort to erase that stigma, but while diversity and tolerance are held as Hizmet values, in reality the process of racialization experienced by all in Turkey has left its vestiges, and some participants do not perform all of their movement's principles.

Kurdish Hizmet Supporters in Turkey

Despite these complaints and distrust, most in the Kurdish community welcome Hizmet institutions. The charity Kimse Yok Mu is quite active in southeast Turkey. Eastern Turkey in general tends to be more conservative and traditional than the west, and Kurds in that region appreciate Hizmet's focus on combining traditional piety with modernity. The movement founded a Kurdish TV channel, Dunya TV, which highlights spirituality, Kurdish culture and music, and even has a Kurdish language-instruction program. Koç (2013b, 181) argues that due to the increase in the number of educational institutions in the region, crime rates and PKK activities have dropped, and cultural exchange and integration has increased. Hizmet-affiliated foundations also grant scholarships for students from low-income families from the Kurdish region to attend high-ranking high schools in western Turkey. The short narratives below offer more details.

Rejection of PKK

As Merve Büşra Öztürk notes in *Today's Zaman* on October 18, 2012, Hizmet schools have been bombed, shot at, and vandalized, and although the PKK denied responsibility, it has acknowledged that violence is an ap-

appropriate response given the current policy of denial of Kurdish identity. Two PKK activists allegedly entered a school in the İğdir province and kidnapped six teachers in front of their students. After villagers ran to find their teachers they successfully argued for their release. These attacks have upset civilian Kurds, whose children attend those schools. In Diyarbakir, a Kurdish principal spoke with revulsion (April 4, 2013): “The PKK sees all education as the enemy. Hizmet is the enemy because it provides education. The PKK would like a group of poor, uneducated people who can’t think critically. Educated people won’t join the PKK.”

Another Kurdish school official charged: “The PKK is racist. Since they didn’t attend any meetings with Hizmet they don’t have the right perception about it. They see everyone who doesn’t think like them as an enemy. There are many Kurdish refugees from Syria, and Turkey accepted them when no one else did. Eighty percent of PKK guerrillas are uneducated, ignorant. So it is easy for the PKK to manipulate them” (Diyarbakir, April 4, 2013).

One Turkey with a Balance of Power

While driving through southeast Turkey, it becomes evident that this region is undergoing tremendous development, in part because of TUSKON business ventures. Eastern Turkey still is at a disadvantage—for decades education was inferior in that region and thus leadership roles in a variety of sectors went to western Turkey. Hizmet’s expansion in this region has altered Turkey’s balance of power. A greater number of students from rural Turkey are attending universities than ever before; partly because their families feel safe enough to send them to study in the cities, as long as they stay in a Hizmet-run dormitory. A school official

in Diyarbakir explained (interview, April 4th 2013): “Hizmet schools balance power relations between the two communities.”

A farmer, half Kurdish, half Turkish, made clear: “The West is the center of finance. They had power and could control everything. People in the East are now developing. Hizmet helps” (interview, Urfa, April 6, 2013).

Some Kurds expressed to me that they also feel Turkish, and that their identity is hybrid. For them, Turkish and Kurdish are their two mother tongues. “Kurds don’t want an autonomous state,” I was told by one Kurdish school official (Diyarbakir, April 4, 2013), “We just want to express our own Kurdish identity: one country, one flag. In Istanbul, 40% are Kurdish; Kurdish people live in peace for the main part.”

Kurdish Hizmet Supporters in Iraq

Despite tense relations between Iraq and Turkey, Hizmet schools (in Iraq known as “Fezalar Educational Institutions”) have been warmly welcomed in Iraqi Kurdistan (Bacik and Kurt 2011, 33). The general director of Hizmet schools in Iraq explained (Erbil, April 1, 2013) that Hizmet has built more than 30 schools all over the country, including three in Baghdad, with approximately 12,500 students, and they have received permission to open more schools. The first school, Ishik Secondary School, was founded in 1994 (interview with Ishik University official, Erbil, April 2, 2013). The first eight years the schools were free, but after the Iraqi economy improved the schools became self-sufficient. While most of the schools are in the predominantly Sunni-populated districts, many Shi’i parents send their students as well. The schools were funded by

those Anatolian businessmen benefitting from development contracts in Erbil. More females than males attend the Hizmet-run Ishik University, pointing to women's development in the region. A smaller number of Kurdish students are sent by Hizmet to Turkey to get graduate degrees. According to the director, currently fifteen students from Kurdistan are on a full scholarship and will return when they are done to teach at Hizmet schools. "We want to invest in Kurdish children," he emphasized.

Erbil also hosts a cultural dialogue center, where community outreach takes place. Hizmet activists reached out to the local Mullahs so they would be informed about the religious inspiration behind Hizmet activities, and brought them to the center for dialogue, eventually also taking them on a trip to Turkey. "The Mullahs are very strong, and the government has a close relationship with them," a cultural center director explained (Erbil, April 3, 2013). Some of the Mullahs were suspicious of Gülen's ambitions and had misquoted him saying negative things about Kurdish people, and the director wanted to have an opportunity to repair the misunderstanding.

The main reasons given by those Kurds who appreciated the educational institutions include the following: 1. superior schools and teachers, 2. the schools ease tensions between communities, and finally, 3. they help build a strong Kurdistan and stronger Iraq.

Quality of Hizmet-Run Fezalar Schools

One of the Fezalar educational institutions I visited is Nilufer School, which was built in 1996, and houses a middle school and a high school on its campus. Funded by Hizmet, it focuses on science, math, and technology. The curriculum follows Iraqi Kurdistan's educational program, and in-

cludes courses in physics, chemistry, math, biology, computer science, sports, art, democracy, religion (as mandated by the local Ministry of education), morals and values, and Kurdish and Kurdish literature. Gülen's interpretation of Islam is *not* presented during school hours, but offered as a non-mandatory *sohbet* (informal discussion) after school. Instruction is in English, Kurdish, and Turkish and Arabic, and the students are Sunni, Shi'i, Yazidi, and some Christians, and mainly Kurdish. The teachers are both Kurdish and Turkish, with one Jordanian. One young Kurdish businesswoman and mother who had previously lived in England said: "My daughter is learning three languages. For parents who were abroad, we want these things" (informal interview, restaurant in Erbil, April 2, 2013).

I spoke with a small group of Kurdish teenage girls, who told me that they all intended to go to the university, despite the fact that only half of their mothers had attended. One student said she might attend in Turkey, although Erbil boasts seven universities: one public and seven private. They spoke of working for NASA, becoming a lawyer, architect, dentist, teacher, doctor, or pilot.

The Teachers

A government education official told me that Hizmet's teaching program is the same as public school, but the teachers are more qualified in the Hizmet schools (Erbil, April 2, 2013). The students had many positive things to say about their teachers. One was impressed with their democratic approach: "They teach us critical thinking. They don't teach us anything without having the evidence, and we can say 'you're wrong' to them, and question them, with respect." They told me that in past, no one could question a teacher.

An educational director noted that sometimes Turkish teachers that come to teach in Iraq get depressed because the security issue prevents travel and they are not able to see family as frequently as they would like, except in Kurdistan where people do not even lock their doors. One Kurdish student learned to separate Turkish people from government policies, and expressed appreciation for the sacrifices her Turkish teachers made in coming to Iraq, saying: "Politics in Turkey is not the same thing as people in Turkey. Turkish teachers are really great. We can see Turkish people are good. They can earn a better salary in Turkey, but they came here and sacrificed, and succeeded in changing ideas" (high school student at Nilufer School, Erbil April 1, 2013). The teachers told me they felt appreciated—one shared that her Kurdish neighbors cried when she returned to Turkey for her vacation.

Easing Tensions, Relationship Building

An assertive curly-haired Kurdish high school student told me frankly that her father's motivation to put her in Hizmet schools was so that she could learn about her adversaries. She exclaimed: "My father is racist. Well, he loves everyone, but he hates how Kurds are treated in Turkey. He likes to say, 'Keep your friends close but your enemies closer.' He was arrested in Iraq for being Kurdish and he's really afraid they will arrest him or take him to jail again. My father says 'just wait and see,' when I talk about how nice Turkish people are" (Nilufer School, Erbil Iraq, April 1, 2013). She, nonetheless, loves her school and teachers.

This story reflects changing attitudes between Turks and Kurds in Iraq. Hizmet's efforts on that front in the region prompted this statement by a government official: "When they established schools in Erbil, the relationship between Turkish and Kurdish

leaders become closer. Before, the relationship was bad. Now, we have more progress. Education is very important and can help both nations come together and understand each other more, which is beneficial" (Erbil, April 2, 2013). In order to break down the tension between the Kurdish and Turkish communities, Hizmet schools in Iraq organized trips to Turkey for Kurdish officials and to Kurdistan for Turkish officials—in 2012 approximately 3,000 politicians and businessmen visited Iraq. A project planned for May 2013 involved Turkish teachers bringing their students to their homes in various cities in Turkey for a week, to introduce Kurdish children to Turkish people, connecting the communities (interview with general director of Fezalar Schools, Erbil, April 1, 2013). A Kurdish girl asserted ambitiously that together she and her schoolmates would work to solve the Turkish/Kurdish problem. "We will find a way," she said, "We have to change people's minds. Each group sees the other as criminal" (Nilufer student, Erbil, April 1, 2013).

I asked the educational director whether the schools served to "Turkify" the students, and if one could understand Hizmet's projects as a form of Turkish imperialism. He said he had no idea how Turkification could happen when his own Turkish son was learning Kurdish. The students sing the Kurdish national anthem daily. However, he did point out that "if an Iraqi knows Turkish his salary doubles. English, it triples" (Erbil, April 1, 2013). A Turkish teacher pointed out (Nilufer School, Erbil, April 1, 2013) that being accepted in Kurdistan was a process. She put it: "Some people think wrong things. They think we are trying to spread Turkishness. When they learn we aren't, they start to love Hizmet." I was told that Hizmet organized the Turkish Olympiads, and took a large group of students from Erbil to Turkey, and there they sang in Turkish and Kurdish,

signaling Turkey's softening stance on the Kurdish issue. A teacher reminded me that ten years ago no one could speak Kurdish on the streets in Turkey (Erbil, April 1, 2013).

Building a Strong Kurdistan and a Strong Iraq

"Education plays an important role in the growth of our community. Investing in this sector helps us to invest in the future," stated a government minister (Erbil, April 2, 2013). He went on to note that Kurdistan has suffered tremendously in its past at the hands of the former regime, which he argued was based on hatred and the glorification of the Baath regime at the expense of others. Now they needed partners, without politics or a hidden agenda. After 1991, Kurdistan began to have a relationship with Turkey—the Turkish consulate is based in Erbil—and now currently Erbil hosts over 2,000 Turkish corporations. He added in support of Hizmet, "People need each other. Let's benefit from each other. We want to send a message to Turkey that we are friends; we respect your territorial integrity. This is a win-win for both sides. Animosity brings bloodshed, peace and cordial relations bring prosperity. Today we have three Turkish airlines flying—this means business. Education helps build that bridge" (Erbil, April 2, 2013). One student told me she wanted Kurdistan to be a country, and not just a semi-autonomous region of Iraq: "We do want an independent Kurdistan here. It will be, inşallah [God willing]" (Nilufer School, Erbil, April 2, 2013).

Exclusion and Inclusion, Suspicion and Building Trust

The narratives above reveal the complexity of Hizmet's relationship with the Kurdish communities. Those Kurds concerned that

supporting Hizmet might lead to a loss of Kurdishness have a valid point, if their understanding of what it means to be Kurdish is narrowly defined. Hizmet does promote a globalized, humanitarian, somewhat-hybrid Muslim identity—indeed, one could make the argument that ethnic identities are somewhat deemphasized in order to focus on inclusivity and building ties with other groups. The idea, however, that Kurds are caught between Hizmet and Kurdish nationalism, however, does not take into consideration that in Iraq, Hizmet supports Kurdish nationalism, and that most Turkish Kurds do not want an independent Kurdish state within Turkey. The relationships Hizmet has created between the Kurdish and Turkish communities, inspired by Gülen's interpretation of Sufism, have done much to heal the rift between those groups. Regardless, those rigidly maintaining boundaries, in this case, the exclusivist gatekeepers of "Kurdishness," will likely continue to protest Hizmet's projects, and to disapprove of those Kurds who choose alternative performances of Kurdish identity.

Clearly, the PKK has multiple reasons not to support Hizmet: they draw their boundaries very tightly around their ethnicity, and Hizmet disturbs their recruitment and authority in the Kurdish region. As a Kurdish intellectual stated (interview, Istanbul, October 2012), "The PKK wants to monopolize everything in Southeast Turkey. They want to be the only voice regarding education and politics." Gülen has expressed concern for the Kurdish people's liberation, prosperity, and identity, but offers a different solution than does the PKK—education instead of militancy. His educational revolution has done much to transform class structure in Turkey, tipping the balance of power away from the Kemalist elite in the west, towards the rural poor and middle class in the east.

Trust is a scarce resource in Turkey; many of my Turkish friends have described the rampant paranoia there and the tendency to concoct conspiracy theories. The accusation that Hizmet somehow controls the judiciary, or “has its tentacles everywhere” because some participants are employed in a given field falls flatly into that camp. But if the movement wishes to create greater mutual trust and continue reaching out to Kurdish communities, it would do well to be even more conscious of the history of Kurds. Özyürek writes, “Indeed, the Turkish Republic was originally based on forgetting” (2007, 3). It forgot that the Anatolian region was and is multicultural, that it was a model for accommodating minority groups during the Ottoman Empire, and that the values of Sufi Islam might offer something to modern society. It asked those Kurds who remained in Turkey to forget themselves, and to thank God they were born Turkish every morning in state-run schools. For decades after 1923, Kurds were systematically excluded from power, violently oppressed, discriminated against, and denied the right to speak their language, practice their culture, and even sing their songs, and in Iraq, they also suffered discrimination, Saddam’s genocidal ambitions, and are now threatened with massacre and kidnapping by ISIS.

While Gülen’s theology preaches inclusivity, individual Hizmet participants should be acutely sensitive to their own biases and the ways in which decades of Atatürk’s social policies have shaped everyone in Turkey, including themselves, and sensitive to the history of Kurds and their portrayal of them in Hizmet-run media. Participants might consider teaching not only Kurdish language, songs, and culture, but also the political history of the Kurdish people and other minority groups in a critical and objective way, focusing on structurally-created social inequality, beginning in elementary schools.

Science and technology-focused curriculum should not sacrifice the study of minority peoples: understanding the contributions as well as the socio-economic and political disadvantages of Kurds brings awareness to communal relations, and the Turkish-Kurdish relationship in particular.

Hizmet’s distinct, inclusive action-based form of piety has focused on providing education and services for all in need, has manifested generously in its projects in underdeveloped Kurdish regions of Turkey and Iraq, facilitated materially by religious Anatolian businessmen. Kurdish communal pride can be built in other ways than through martyrdom in the mountains. According to many Kurdish officials with whom I spoke, the movement supports many of the demands of the Kurdish people, such as the right to education in Kurdish, the right to broadcast in Kurdish, and the right to speak Kurdish in courthouses. Hizmet backs the right to change the names of streets and towns that once carried Kurdish appellations but were changed to Turkish, back to Kurdish. It can only do so much towards “solving the Kurdish question,” but its most important contribution, other than performing inclusivity in general, is to provide high quality educational programs in disadvantaged regions so that Kurdish students—if they choose to attend— can flourish in a variety of ways, return to improve their own communities, and create strong forms of Kurdishness of their own free choosing. Any group that has experienced the level of repression as has the Kurds would be wary of others—if Hizmet wants trust, it will have to continue to earn it.

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Editor, translator, or compiler instead of author

Lattimore, Richmond, trans. 1951. *The Iliad of Homer*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Lattimore 1951, 91–92)

Editor, translator, or compiler in addition to author

García Márquez, Gabriel. 1988. *Love in the Time of Cholera*. Translated by Edith Grossman. London: Cape. (García Márquez 1988, 242–55)

Chapter or other part of a book

Kelly, John D. 2010. “Seeing Red: Mao Fetishism, Pax Americana, and the Moral Economy of War.” In *Anthropology and Global Counterinsurgency*, edited by John D. Kelly, Beatrice Jauregui, Sean T. Mitchell, and Jeremy Walton, 67–83. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Kelly 2010, 77)

Chapter of an edited volume originally published elsewhere (as in primary sources)
Cicero, Quintus Tullius. 1986. “Handbook on Canvassing for the Consulship.” In *Rome: Late Republic and Principate*, edited by Walter Emil Kaegi Jr. and Peter White. Vol. 2 of *University of Chicago Readings in Western Civilization*, edited by John Boyer and Julius Kirshner, 33–46. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Originally published in Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, trans., *The Letters of Cicero*, vol. 1 (London: George Bell & Sons, 1908). (Cicero 1986, 35)

Preface, foreword, introduction, or similar part of a book

Rieger, James. 1982. Introduction to *Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus*, by Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley, xi–xxxvii. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Rieger 1982, xx–xxi)

Book published electronically

If a book is available in more than one format, cite the version you consulted. For books consulted online, list a URL; include an access date only if one is required by your publisher or discipline. If no fixed page numbers are available, you can include a section title or a chapter or other number.

Austen, Jane. 2007. *Pride and Prejudice*. New York: Penguin Classics. Kindle edition.
Kurland, Philip B., and Ralph Lerner, eds. 1987. *The Founders' Constitution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. <http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/>.
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Journal article

Article in a print journal

In the text, list the specific page numbers consulted, if any. In the reference list entry, list the page range for the whole article.

Weinstein, Joshua I. 2009. "The Market in Plato's Republic." *Classical Philology* 104:439–58. (Weinstein 2009, 440)

Article in an online journal

Include a DOI (Digital Object Identifier) if the journal lists one. A DOI is a permanent ID that, when appended to <http://dx.doi.org/> in the address bar of an Internet browser, will lead to the source. If no DOI is available, list a URL. Include an access date only if one is required by your publisher or discipline.

Kossinets, Gueorgi, and Duncan J. Watts. 2009. "Origins of Homophily in an Evolving Social Network." *American Journal of Sociology* 115:405–50. Accessed February 28, 2010. doi:10.1086/599247. (Kossinets and Watts 2009, 411)

Article in a newspaper or popular magazine

Newspaper and magazine articles may be cited in running text ("As Sheryl Stolberg and Robert Pear noted in a New York Times article on February 27, 2010, . . ."), and they are commonly omitted from a reference list. The following examples show the more formal versions of the citations. If you consulted the article online, include a URL; include an access date only if your publisher or discipline requires one. If no author is identified, begin the citation with the article title.

Mendelsohn, Daniel. 2010. "But Enough about Me." *New Yorker*, January 25.
Stolberg, Sheryl Gay, and Robert Pear. 2010. "Wary Centrists Posing Challenge in Health Care Vote." *New York Times*, February 27. Accessed February 28, 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/us/politics/28health.html>. (Mendelsohn 2010, 68)(Stolberg and Pear 2010)

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Thesis or dissertation

Choi, Mihwa. 2008. "Contesting Imaginaires in Death Rituals during the Northern Song Dynasty." PhD diss., University of Chicago. (Choi 2008)

Paper presented at a meeting or conference

Adelman, Rachel. 2009. " 'Such Stuff as Dreams Are Made On': God's Footstool in the Aramaic Targumim and Midrashic Tradition." Paper presented at the annual meeting for the Society of Biblical Literature, New Orleans, Louisiana, November 21–24. (Adelman 2009)

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Google. 2009. "Google Privacy Policy." Last modified March 11. <http://www.google.com/intl/en/privacypolicy.html>.

McDonald's Corporation. 2008. "McDonald's Happy Meal Toy Safety Facts." Accessed July 19. <http://www.mcdonalds.com/corp/about/factsheets.html>. (Google 2009)
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