



**NILE UNIVERSITY  
OF NIGERIA**

HONORIS UNITED UNIVERSITIES

# 3RD INAUGURAL LECTURE

Modern Trends and  
Issues in African  
Revolution: **A New  
Perspective in  
African Politics**

Delivered by

**Professor Chigozie  
ENWERE**

Professor of International Relations  
and Strategic Studies





THIRD (3RD) INAUGURAL LECTURE

**MODERN TRENDS AND ISSUES  
IN AFRICAN REVOLUTION:  
A NEW PERSPECTIVE IN  
AFRICAN POLITICS**

By

**Professor Chigozie Enwere**

Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies

*B.Sc (Hons) (ABSU), M.sc (ABSU), Ph.D (UniAbuja)*

January 2025



*...Beyond Degrees...*

**Vision:**

Nile University of Nigeria visualizes itself as becoming a vanguard university that gains the respect of the world through academic excellence by providing the highest quality university education for students from around the globe.

**Mission:**

To provide students with opportunities of quality university education that will bring out the best in them to make them stand tall through time and ready to face the challenges of a globalized world.

## NATIONAL ANTHEM

Nigeria we hail thee  
Our own dear native land,  
Though tribe and tongue may differ,  
In brotherhood, we stand,  
Nigerians all, and proud to serve  
Our sovereign Motherland.

Our flag shall be a symbol  
That truth and justice reign,  
In peace or battle honour'd,  
And this we count as gain,  
To hand on to our children  
A banner without stain.

O God of all creation,  
Grant this our one request,  
Help us to build a nation  
Where no man is oppressed,  
And so with peace and plenty  
Nigeria may be blessed.

# DEDICATION

In the beginning was the word and the word was with God and the word was God”, this inaugural lecture is dedicated to the Almighty God

# PROTOCOL

Chairman of Council & Pro-Chancellor  
Members of the Governing Council  
The Vice Chancellor  
Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Academics)  
Deputy Vice Chancellor (Central Administration)  
The University Registrar  
The Chief Financial Officer  
The Chief Peoples' Operating Officer  
The Chief Marketing Officer  
The Bursar  
The University Librarian  
Provost, College of Health Sciences  
Dean, School of Postgraduate Studies  
Deans of Faculties  
Professors and other Members of the Senate  
Dean of Students Affairs  
Directors  
Heads of Departments  
Academic Staff  
Members of Congregation  
My Family Members  
Great Students of Nile University of Nigeria  
Members of Alumni  
My Lords, Spiritual and Temporal  
Esteemed Guests and Friends  
Gentlemen of the Press  
Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen

# CONTENTS

<b>PREAMBLE</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>CONCEPTUALIZATION OF REVOLUTION</b>	<b>4</b>
Historical Background of the Study of Political Revolution	4
Conceptualization of Political Revolution	7
Classical Theory of Revolution	12
Modern Theories of Political Revolution	17
Stages of Political Revolution	22
<b>PHILOSOPHY OF AFRICAN REVOLUTION</b>	<b>25</b>
Frantz Fanon Thought of African Revolution	25
Amilcar Cabral Perspective of African Revolution	29
<b>REVOLUTION IN AFRICA DURING THE COLONIAL ERA</b>	<b>35</b>
The Egyptian Revolution of 1952	35
The Causes of the 1952 Revolution	36
The 1954 Algerian Revolution	38
The Strategic Payoff of the 1952 Revolution	41
<b>REVOLUTION IN MODERN AFRICA</b>	<b>43</b>
The International Contexts of Revolution in Africa	43
The Tunisia Revolution	45
The Success Story of Ben Ali's Regime before the Revolution	46
The Rise of Autocracy	47
The Tunisian Revolution Catalysts	49
Crescendos of Tunisian Revolution	51
<b>LIBYAN REVOLUTION AND THE FALL OF MUAMMAR GADFAFI</b>	<b>53</b>
Understanding Libyan Political System	53
Inert Causes of the 2011 Revolution	55
The Starring Role of United Nations in Libyan Revolution	57
Libyan Revolution and the Perceptions of International Actors	59
Libyan Revolution and its Implications on National Security of Nations in Sahel Region	61
<b>CONCLUSION</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>RECOMMENDATIONS</b>	<b>66</b>
<b>MY STEWARDSHIP IN THE ACADEMIA</b>	<b>67</b>
<b>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</b>	<b>68</b>
<b>REFERENCES</b>	<b>70</b>

# PREAMBLE

Vice Chancellor Sir,

I give all glory and honour to the Almighty God, the source of wisdom for this privilege He has given me to deliver the 3rd Inaugural Lecture of this great University. I also like to thank the Vice Chancellor, Professor Dilli Dogo, with whose permission I stand here today before the distinguished audience.

Mr Vice Chancellor Sir, the inaugural lecture of today is the first in the Faculty of Social Sciences and the first in the Department of Political Science and International Relations. However, strategic studies and African politics were made fascinating to me by Professor Aja Akpuru-Aja of Abia State University who supervised my Masters Degree Dissertation and Professor Mohammadu Wada of University of Abuja who supervised my Ph.D. Thesis. They encouraged me to study Africa political thought and philosophy, which stirred in me the passion to carry out an investigation on the new concept of African revolution. My years of research on this subject area motivated me to write a book titled "Issues in Africa Politics". This book was published by Galda Verlag, Germany and are in many libraries in Europe, Asia and United States of America including German National Library Leipzig, Freie University, Berlin and Harvard University, USA to mention but a few.

Moreover, this study on African Revolution has sharpened academic orientations to reveal that African revolution is more than a political struggle but an act of emancipation aimed at eliminating foreign domination of African politics and economy as well as a revolt against colonialism, neo-colonialism and the infiltration of Africa by neo-liberal ideologies. Therefore, African revolution is driven not particularly by Marxist ideologies but by the philosophies and political thoughts of Frantz Fanon; who was a French Afro-Caribbean psychiatrist, political philosopher and Amilcar Cabral; who was a revolutionary leader and theorist from Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. It is designed to correct the negative perceptions of revolution in Africa.

African revolution has been misinterpreted by scholars in Europe, Asia and USA. Their deleterious insight of revolution in Africa has resulted in labelling African revolution as Arab Spring or coup d'état thereby limiting revolution as an estimable political act seen only in the political evolution of Western Europe and United States of America. When revolutions occur in Africa, its meaning and scope is limited to acts of terrorism or insurgency, therefore, this study attempts to conceptualize the basic issues in African revolution. I stand here today to present and share this research work that has received international attention and readership before my learned colleagues and distinguished audience. Mr Vice Chancellor Sir, I am deeply honoured and humbled by the presence of everyone and I treasure this privilege to deliver this inaugural lecture titled: *Modern Trends and Issues in African Revolution: A New Perspective in African Politics*.

**Professor Chigozie ENWERE BS.c (Hons), M.Sc, Ph.D**

*Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies*

January 2025

# INTRODUCTION

This inaugural lecture provides a comprehensive overview for the understanding of revolution in African politics. It is designed to correct the negative perceptions of revolution in Africa. This deleterious insight has resulted in labelling the African revolution as Arab Spring or coup d'état thereby limiting revolution as an estimable political act seen only in the political evolution of Western Europe and the United States of America. When revolution occurs in Africa its meaning and scope are limited to acts of terrorism or insurgency, therefore, this inaugural lecture attempts to conceptualize the basic issues in the African revolution. African students learn more about revolutions in Europe because of a paucity of literature on the African revolution. To most African scholars the revolution in Africa is a myth or abstract concept which does not correlate with existing realities in African politics and society. Therefore, this lecture is designed to meet the needs of African scholars and students, particularly those taking courses in Security Studies and International Relations as well as policymakers with an interest in the subject.

Revolution has been understood differently, as any action or event that results in a fundamental change in the form of government. Often it is accompanied by violence and social upheaval. Many revolutions in Europe have been violent but in Africa, most revolutions have been remarkably peaceful like in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Egyptian revolution of 1952 and 2011 as well as the Tunisian revolution of 2011 were remarkably peaceful. But the Algerian revolution of 1954 and the Libyan revolution of 2011 were violent because of the infusion of Western political values into African politics and revolution. These two revolutions resulted in wars similar to the American and French revolutions.

African revolution is driven not particularly by Marxist ideologies but by the philosophies and political thoughts of Frantz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral. Lenin set the tone for most successful revolutions in the twentieth century when he altered traditional Marxism to suit the conditions of Russia; Mao Tse-tung followed Lenin's example when he adjusted Marxism to Chinese political environment. It seems to follow that issues in African revolution are not mere imitations of previous revolutions in Europe but tailored to fit specific conditions and circumstances of Africa as revealed by Fanon and Cabral. On the nature of the African revolution, Fanon and Cabral were in general agreement, differing only over emphasis and detail. For Fanon revolution is a process of regeneration of man and society, of self-liberation and rebirth while Cabral sees revolution as the transformation of life in the direction of progress. This forms the premise of African revolution, which is discussed in detail in this lecture.

African revolution is more than a political struggle but an act of emancipation aimed at eliminating foreign domination of African politics and economy as well as a revolt against colonialism, neo-colonialism and the infiltration of Africa by neo-liberal ideologies.

The Egyptian revolution of 1952 and the Algerian revolution were aimed at eliminating colonialism and imperialism in Africa while the Egyptian revolution and the Tunisian revolution of 2011 were inertly caused by the application of neo-liberal ideologies in Africa resulting in mass unemployment, poverty and alienation of the citizens from political process and participation. Hence African revolution is the liberation of Africans to regain their historical personality in order to eliminate all foreign domination that comes in form of colonialism and neo-colonialism. The essence is to free the process of development of the national productive forces to create new trajectories of development in Africa. Therefore, the study of African revolution is fundamental to the understanding of African states, political structure and human nature.

The lecture is organized around five sections. Section one gives a cursory look at the conceptualization of revolution. The section examines the major theories of revolution, while the second section of the lecture provides a critical analysis of the philosophy and ideas of African revolution. The third section of the lecture looks at the revolution in Africa During the Colonial era. The fourth section devoted to modern revolutions in Africa with reference to the Tunisian revolution. Finally, the fifth section is devoted to Libyan revolution and the fall of Muammar Gadhafi. We hope that the varieties of ideas discussed in this lecture will help students to understand the dynamics of revolution in human society.

# CONCEPTUALIZATION OF REVOLUTION

Revolution has been an integral force in the formation and reconfiguration of modern political systems and ideologies. The concept of revolution creates inspiring images of the birth of new nations, political ideologies, and culture as well as the destruction of old regimes, political values, and class structure. In the pursuit of the principles of liberty, justice, and equality, revolution either provides the centrifugal forces that stimulate innate values of nation-building and cohesion or sometimes brings in emotive centripetal forces for further balkanization of the political system. Such a dialectical role of revolution gives rise to greater feelings of fear and exhilaration.

Therefore, revolution is so tinged with emotions and instinctive abstractions that it lacks precision in its definition and conceptualization. The dialectical perception that societies move from one historical stage to the next strengthens the conceptualization of revolution as a universal and inevitable process in world history and politics. This section seeks to examine the historical background of revolution which provides the analytical framework for its conceptualization and definitions. Drawing inference from such analytical insight, more emphasis will be focused on identifying the underlying causes of revolution in modern societies from its classical and African standpoints. We will also discuss the various types of revolution and its stages of occurrence.

## HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY OF POLITICAL REVOLUTION

The concept of revolution has had a long history dating back to the slave revolts of antiquity particularly during times of strong population expansion, rapid political repressions and economic change (Goldstone, 1993:320). In many Greek city states in the seventh and sixth century BCE significant political revolutions took place. Following the defeat of Athens by Sparta in the Peloponnesian war, a revolution took place which overthrew the democracy in Athens and replaced it by a new regime of the Thirty that soon became tyrannical and resulted to a counter revolution characterized by violence and execution of political elites and philosophers including Socrates.

According to Plato, moral and social disorder as well as the institutionalization of systems of government where men are ruled by caprice and not true knowledge created the political catalyst that triggered of revolution in Athens (Remi and Francis, 2008:62). The Athenian revolution provided the philosophical foundation for which seekers of justice and equality rationalize their innate agitation for regime change resulting in the revolutions in Rome, in the Islamic political systems in eighth century CE and in Europe from 1500 to 1650.

The concept of revolution first entered the English language in the seventeenth century, primarily referred to as the mechanism for the restoration of an old order. But in the eighteenth century, revolution came to be seen as a concerted political struggle to fundamentally transform the existing political order and systems of government as well as the social and economic structures of the society. For this reason, revolution began to

possess a distinctive conceptual attribute as an instrument of power used by the people not only to destroy the prevailing social order but also to create a new and different socio-political order in which the traditional form of oppression did not exist. To this extent revolution is usually characterized by a set of emotion laden utopian ideas that promotes the innate perception that the society is marching towards profound transformation of values, structures and personal behaviour of its people (James and Robert, 1990: 321).

The philosophical definition of revolution as a tool for transforming societies created profound desires which resulted in the two great revolutions of the eighteenth century, the American and the French revolutions of 1776 and 1789 respectively. These two revolutions were aimed at establishing a new and just socio-political order in the society and also provided a model for the study of modern revolutions. Both revolutions dramatically influenced the conceptualization of revolution and generate visions of a new kind of political order with significant changes in governmental structures.

The successful outcome of the two great revolutions shows that revolution has been central to the formation of modern societies. After the French revolution disposed the monarchy and attempted to restructure the socio-political systems, revolution has become synonymous with radical and violent regime change. Therefore, many social scientists posit that modernity could only be achieved through violent transformation of the political order in order to demystify the leviathan status of the state and its absolute monopoly of violence used to command obedience of the citizens to the demands of the government.

In the twentieth century, revolutions occurred more frequently than ever before. Revolution became part of a surge in national violence that marked most of the century and shaped the history of world politics. The inspiration for much twentieth century revolution was the Russian Revolution of 1917 led by Vladimir Lenin and inspired by the ideas of Karl Marx communism. Marx believed that revolution was necessary to move societies from one historical stage to the next and his postulations strengthened the conceptualization of revolution as a universal and inevitable process of change and conflict. For this reason, the Russian Revolution provided revolutionaries in Asia, Latin America and Africa with theoretical model and ideologies for political revolution and socio-economic transformation. The Marxist concept of revolution was inspirational to China's Mao Tse Tung and Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh anti-colonial and nationalist revolutionary struggles (Ukielski, 2024).

However, both Russian and Chinese revolutions were paradoxically rooted in Marxist ideology and their success led to geometric eruptions of revolution in the 1900s. According to Peter Calvert there were an annual mean of 5.56 forcible changes in governments or processes of government in the twentieth century in Asia, Latin America, Communist Europe and Africa (Peter, 1967:1). The twentieth century could be referred to as the age of revolution in Asia. The pressure of Euro-American imperialism was the factor that promoted radical political struggles and revolution in Asia. The Asian experience of imperialism and revolution was as varied as the socio-political and cultural composition of Asian states.

China although humiliated in the Opium Wars of the mid nineteenth century, was never colonized but lost substantial economic and political sovereignty as European nations and United States of America established treaty ports and spheres of influence in the country, factors which prompted the Chinese revolution of 1949 being the first revolution in Asia in the twentieth century (Reid, 2025).

The excruciating experience of imperialism helped spark many of the revolutions in Asia, Middle East and Africa. From Ho Chi Minh and Mao Tse Tung to Mohandas Gandhi, many Asian revolutions sought not only to achieve independent nationhood but also to transform the politico-economic structures of the society. Many Asian scholars and practitioners of politics believed that the process of modernization required the elimination of Euro-American imperialism, old political order and institutions so as to create new social and political relations. In India and according to Mohandas Gandhi this meant the rejection of Western inspired civilization and a return to traditional Indian values. In China, the nucleus of revolution was to initiate new socio-economic and political reforms to replace old Confucian customs and hierarchies. In both China and India, internal transformation was considered necessary components of revolution.

In the Middle East, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 provides another model of revolution, known as the Islamic revolution. This model of revolution sought the radical and often violent transformation of a state and society. It tends to overthrow the imposition and institutionalization of Western values and culture and destruction of all political culture of secularism. The Iranian revolution placed high values on the institutionalization of Islamic ideals in systems of government and socio-economic structures of the society. However, unlike the conceptual precision of Euro-American and Asian revolutions, the concept of revolution in Africa is divisively misrepresented as terrorism, civil insurgency, mutiny, Arab Spring and regime change making it more complex to classify African revolution.

Obviously, regime change or acts of terrorism from the perspective of Western inspired meaning cannot be the same as revolution. Therefore, African revolutions have been restricted to the few classic cases of the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 (Robert and Michael, 1971:348). The reason for this conceptual limitation of African revolution according to Walter Rodney is because Africa has less turmoil, less violence and slower rate of social transformation than Asia and Latin America and these are the elements normally associated with revolution.

In the mid twentieth century and early twenty first century, internal contradictions of colonialism and pseudo-capitalism as well as the external forces of neo-colonialism influences African revolutionary character to use violence and conflict as instruments of revolution. Kwame Nkrumah fostered this distinction that neo-colonialism is incompatible with political independence and tends to consolidate the structures of colonial state under the guise of independent African government. Therefore, Jack Woddis in his book *Africa, the Roots of Revolution* argues that modern African society shows remarkable traces of

Euro-American imperialism. Such awareness inspired Frantz Fanon to advocate the tacit use of violence in carrying out revolutions in Africa.

Modern African revolutions draw their inspirations from the writings of Frantz Fanon aimed at the destructions of imperialist socio-economic and political structures in Africa. There is wide spread understanding of colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism as situations of dehumanization caused by Euro-centricity and its negation of African civilization and value systems. Unlike European model of revolution that only focuses on changes in forms of government, African revolution model insists on changing the imperialist structures of African state and society. In this sense, Fanon wrote *Black Skin, White Masks* in 1952 and *The Wretched of the Earth* in 1961.

According to Fanon, *White Masks* denote an insidious oneness between the colonizer and the colonized. Whiteness becomes a symbol of prestige and domination, a situation that cannot be terminated except through a revolution that is based on absolute violence. This implies that African revolution aims at cleansing the socio-economic and political systems from the vestiges of internal collaborators of neo-colonialism and its replacement with viable Afro-centric political elites. Therefore, the concept of modern African revolution dismissed the philosophy of non-violence and look upon the transition from neo-colonial state to a new state of humanity and freedom. These conceptual postulations inspired the revolutions in Algeria in the twentieth century and in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt in the contemporary twenty-first century (Doxiadis, 2024).

These diverse experiences and understandings of revolution streamline the importance of political revolution in restructuring the values and ideals of modern society. In recent years, with the dismantling of revolutionary regimes in the Soviet Union and the transformation of China towards a market economy, the meaning and concept of revolution takes new dimensions and approaches. The revolutions that occurred in Africa after World War II transforming African societies from perennial colonialism to a new era of political independence as well as in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the late 1990s presented a non-violent approach in the study of revolution. This approach has brought about a profound political and economic transformation far more beneficial to societies in which they have occurred than most of the bloody revolutions in Europe.

## **CONCEPTUALIZATION OF POLITICAL REVOLUTION**

Revolutions have occurred through human history and vary widely in terms of methods, duration and motivating ideology making the concept of political revolution a more complex phenomenon because prior usage of the term has been somewhat ambiguous. The concept of political revolution has changed in meaning several times in line with prevailing socio-economic and political values and institutions of each historical epoch. During the period of industrial revolution in the seventeenth century Europe, political revolution was traditionally referred to as the restoration of an old order. As the European society progressed, progressive assumptions became widely accepted and the term lost its meaning

of reaction and became associated with progress and change. With the introduction of globalization ideals, it has a wide range in popular usage and a narrower meaning in social science. It is used more loosely to describe internal dissent, civil insurgency and full-scale wars making its conceptualization more complex and vaguer (Robert and Michael, 1971:347).

Also, in an attempt to conceptualize political revolution, scholars have defined it relative to its method of occurrence and the prevailing political culture and experiences of each society. In France it is used loosely to refer to the extensive societal change and the vicious destruction of repressive dictatorial regimes. In Latin America, Africa and Asia, it has a more restricted connotation. It often used to refer to military insurrections, mutiny, coups d' état, decolonization process, rebellion against imperialism and other violent forms of behaviour associated with internal or civil wars. Such conceptual frame of analysis according to Robert and Michael (1971:347) influenced historians to give a restricted definition of the concept.

To the historians, political revolution should only be used to describe the Euro-American revolutions. This suggests that only such great revolutions as that which occurred in England in the 1640s, America in 1776, and France in 1789 and Russia in 1917 is creditable to be referred to as political revolution (Campbell, Linton, and Kaiser, 2024). The inherent analytical flaw in such conceptualization is that it limits the meaning of political revolution and negates the great number of revolutions in Africa, Latin America and Asia because of its ethnocentric perspective.

This exercise in the conceptualization of political revolution appears necessary primarily because most social scientists according to Arthur Hatto (1949:495-517) and Sigmund Neumann (1949:335-336) do not only deny that revolution must include change and conflict; they also disagree on practically everything else about it. In its broadest definition, social scientists argue that political revolution should be focused in bringing about changes in social norms, structure or behaviour due to new developments in demography, communication and technology. For this reason, Dale Yoder (1926:441) argues that political revolution is complementary to social change and should involve a non-violent natural change in society.

Political revolution from Dale's analytical perspective is a dependent variable of social change, since social revolution can take place without major political revolution as was identified in the Quebec Revolution in which secular ideas replaced religious values. As a result, he affirms that the success of political revolution depends on changes in social attitudes and values basic to the traditional institutional order. Although political revolution is a form of social change but it is not the same as all social change, therefore, when the concept of political revolution is used in this general context, it cannot be theoretically differentiated from social change (Wells, 2024).

The ambiguity in the definition of political revolution has led to a continuous search for a more scientific approach to give concise academic definition and categorization of the concept. To the Hegelian logicians, political revolution is an idea equated with irresistible change brought about by the manifestation of the world spirit in an increasing quest for innate fulfilment. The Hegelian conception is based on the principle of idealism and the cosmic inclination of humanity to fulfil the virtues of justice brought about by the anti-thesis of natural occurrences which results in new virtues in forms of synthesis. Although Karl Marx opposed the Hegelian concept of idealism in the definition of political revolution and he went further to explain that political revolution being an element of the super structure is determined by occurrences in the economic sub structure of the society.

Therefore, political revolution is a product of irresistible historical forces which culminate in a struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat that will lead to the overthrow of the exploitative capitalist ruling elite and its replacement with new system of government controlled by the working class (Raymond and Manus, 1968:264). And to this effect, Engels gives the splendid and extremely profound definition of political revolution with the utmost lucidity. And from it follows that the “special coercive force” for the suppression of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie, of millions of working people by handful of the rich must be replaced by a “special coercive force” for the suppression of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat known as the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is what is meant by political revolution which is abolition of state as state. It also implies a replacement of one bourgeois special force by another proletariat special force.

Contrary to the Hegelian and Marxist perspectives, Aristotle narrows down the definition of political revolution to events in the political system. The Aristotelian notion sees political revolution as cyclical alterations in the forms of government that brings about fundamental change in power or organizational structures of the political system. Based on this philosophical premise, Aristotle describes political revolution either as a form of complete change from one constitution to another or a style of modification of an existing constitution. Although the Aristotelian notion implies a fundamental departure from Marxist historical pattern, but it tends to limit its meaning to changes in model of constitution while ignoring major changes in the political system.

From the foregoing analysis, scholarly debates about what does and does not constitute a political revolution centre on several issues. Several generations of scholarly thought on revolutions from Aristotle to Marx have generated many competing concepts and contributed much to the current understanding of this complex phenomenon. Early studies on political revolution primarily analyzed events in European history but more modern explanations incorporate concepts from several social science disciplines, particularly sociology and political science. Therefore, political revolution from its modern explanation does not only constitute a disapproving attitude towards the established political order but also involves a holistic change in the economic system, the social structure and the cultural values of the society.

Similarly, Hannah Arendt (1965:34-40) interprets political revolution as an attempt to restore liberties and privileges which were lost as the result of the government's temporary lapse into despotism. Arendt in his definition agrees with the conceptual perspectives of John Milton who believes that political revolution is the right of society to defend itself against abusive tyrants and the creation of a new order that reflect the needs of the people. To Milton, political revolution is the means of accomplishing freedom and the inherent ability of the society to realize its potentials.

Indeed, aspects of English, American, French, Russian revolutions as well as the anti-colonial revolutions in Africa, Asia and Latin America may be amenable to Arendt and Milton's conceptual explanation of political revolution as an attempt to secure freedom from oppressive government. From the analysis, the anti-colonial political struggles in Africa qualify as a form of political revolution because it is a resistance to the colonial elite who have usurped the freedoms which mythically belonged to the people.

Contrasting Arendt's point of views, Tocqueville (1955:8) employed a more empirical approach to the explanation of political revolution. He sees political revolution as a process of overthrowing legally constituted elite through intense social, political and economic change. This implies that political revolution engross sudden and violent transformations that seek not only to establish a new political system but to transform an entire society. Charles Tilly collaborate the views of Tocqueville as he insists that the French revolution of 1789, Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Islamic Revolution of Iran satisfy the ingredients of political revolution because they transformed not only economic and social structures but also political institutions.

Tocqueville's definition focuses attention on the use of extensive violence or the breakdown of order in the society to capture the state apparatus in order to use its massive resources to restructure society. Theorist concerned with this approach to revolution like Jeff Goodwin and Jack Goldstone have sometimes loosened the normal everyday meaning of violence so that it means behaviour towards which it is impossible for individuals to orient themselves (Sheldon, 1963: 15-29).

Goodwin gives a radical definition of political revolution. So, political revolution is any and all instances in which a state or a political regime is overthrown and thereby transformed by a popular movement in an irregular, extra constitutional and violent fashion. Similarly, Goldstone sees it as an effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political authority in society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and violent non-institutionalized actions that undermine political authorities.

The use of violence in political revolution is informative. It reveals that there is stress and grievances in the political system and the willingness of certain groups to break the law in order to bring change. The government insistence on the use of state violence to suppress revolutionary groups increases the degree and velocity of violence to overthrow the regime.

Fred von der Mehden identifies four general types of violence inherent in political revolution (Michael, Robert, James and Walter, 2008:360-364).

**Primordial Violence.** This type of violence is used by an ethnic, religious or national revolutionary group to bring about change in the society when the social, economic and political stratum is dominated by one group. For example, it is used by the Sunni revolutionary forces in Syria in their quest to overthrow the Shia regime of Bashar al-Assad. It was also used in the Quebec revolution, in which secular political ideas replaced religious values.

**Separatist Violence.** Revolutionaries employ Separatist violence primarily to secure political independence and sovereignty. It was adopted by Bosnia and Croatia in order to separate from Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The Ibos used it in their attempted quest to separate from Nigeria. Separatist violence usually takes the form of hot war.

**Revolutionary Violence.** Revolutionary violence is aimed at overthrowing or replacing existing regime. Boko Haram Islamist movement is using this method of political revolution to take over the Nigerian state and make its citizens Islamic fundamentalists. The Iranian revolutionaries used it to overthrow the regime of Shah of Iran in the 1979 revolution. Included under this category is the counter revolutionary violence imbibed in the efforts of conservative groups to resist revolutionary attempts.

**Coups.** Coups are strategic military option aimed at removing from power civilian institutions of government that are generally perceived as weak, corrupt or ineffective. In Egypt this strategy was used in the 1952 political revolution in which Gamal Abdul Nasser toppled the regime of King Farouk that lost the confidence of the Egyptian elite because of corruption. The covert motive for the exercise of strategic violence in political revolution is to ensure quick, dramatic system change that throws out the old system along with its elites. In radical political revolution, the new elite get rid of the old elites by guillotine, firing squad, assassination and exile. In the 1789 French Revolution judicial murders in the city of Nantes were committed so fast that prisoners had to be drowned in the river because the guillotine was too slow (Robert and Michael, 1971:348). Violence, therefore, is an integral component of political revolution. Thomas Magstadt (2009:476) upholds the utilization of violence as he defines political revolution as any action or event that results in a fundamental change in the form of government accompanied by violence and social upheaval.

Similarly, most renowned American scholars define political revolution in terms of violence. Harry Eckstein employs the term internal war because he believes that it is the generic type of which political revolution is only one form. Since political revolution is a form of internal war in his scheme, he still defines it as any resort to violence within a political order to change its constitution, rules and policies (Harry, 1965:133). Drawing from Harry's conceptual explanation, Chalmers Johnson (1966:159) characterizes political revolution as change effected by the use of violence in government, regime or society.

The use of violence can only accomplish its goal of changing the political system only when there is some break down in habits of obedience. If political revolution is intellectualized as this, it implies that all coups, assassinations, disruptive demonstrations and other violent behaviour would be conceptualized as political revolution based on the premise that the primary object of political revolution is to disintegrate and unmask the mythical veil of authority in a state. For this reason, Peter Amman (1962:161) affirms that political revolution is momentary or prolonged breakdown of the state's monopoly of power usually accompanied by a lessening of the habit of obedience.

However, Lawrence Stone (1966:161) identified two implicit models of analysis to determine the consequence and the justification for the use of violence in political revolution. One is the Value Theory which is an equilibrium design based on the acceptance of certain values by society. In this theory the society is depicted as a moral community in which the values held by the citizens gives legitimacy to the socio-economic and political structures of the society, its class stratification and any other form of structural misery or inequality. This model encourages universal consensus of values and social harmony; and sees all forms of violence as anomalies or pathological disorder in society. This is a model which, although it has its uses for analytical purposes, bears little relations to reality and fails to explain why there is need for the deterrent of coercion in all societies.

The second model is the Coercion Theory which characterizes violence and conflict as natural components of human society. The various centrifugal forces of society are held together by their competition with each other and by the fact that the state has the prerogative influence and monopoly of coercion, violence and force in society. In this model, the use of violence in revolution is not seen as a pathological disorder in society but as part of its structure. This model is more in accordance with the general conceptualization of political revolution by modern Euro-American scholars who maintain that political revolution should entail the breakdown of pattern of obedience and the wearing down of state domination of violence and coercive force.

Within the context of the above analysis, political revolution allows the use of non-legal violence as mechanism to breakdown the state monopoly of power to introduce new values in society. Political revolution differs from any other form of revolution based on these three characterizations: violence is considered as integral tool of change; changes in governmental institutions, structures, forms, personnel and behaviour is dominant and its objective is to establish new forms of values, ideologies, attitudes and political culture in society. Finally, for revolution to occur there must be alluring leaders willing to take the noxious risks associated with deposing an established often repressive regime. Revolutionary leaders, therefore, use violence only when the government offends, threaten or undermines the elites especially when it occurs within the armed forces.

## **CLASSICAL THEORY OF REVOLUTION**

The traditional theory of revolution espouses a conservative approach to the study of

revolution. Conservative theoretical explanations are based on the premise that revolution occur when change takes place too rapidly. Traditional theorists hypothesize that change must be managed in such a way that one part or class of society is not abused, maltreated or dominated by another. In an attempt to theorize revolution as an interactive process, traditional theorist explicates how injustice or the perceptions of injustice as well as weaknesses in the economic, social and political systems are rationalize to be responsible for revolution. Such theoretical explanations will be narrowed down to conservative economic, social and political explanations.

A traditional political explanation of revolution is based on the hypothesis that injustices perpetrated by governments over a long period of time foster the structural conditions which generates revolution. In line with this theoretical assertion, Aristotle postulates that the administration of unequal justice in any political order ordinarily does turn the spark that ignites competition for honors and wealth, which may give rise to the popular belief that one or both have not been fairly distributed. Revolution may then grow out of the tension created between the numerous democrats (the poor) who want equality and the few oligarchs who wish to preserve their power and domination of the polity (Thomas, 2009:492).

Aristotle's theory of revolution hinged on the perennial conflict between oligarchs and democrats provides the conceptual framework for postulation of revolutionary thoughts for the destruction of the state and its institutions of exploitation. According to Karl Marx, revolution is synonymous with class warfare which invariably stems from pervasive injustice by the state. He conceived government as a tool of class oppression that manipulates all the elements in the society to the advantage of those that control political power. Therefore, revolution is inevitable and needed to overthrow the capitalist political elites. Marx held that desperation caused by poverty and social alienation is the key psychological spur to revolutionary action and his explanation describes the reason individuals disregard the strong social pressure for conformity and participate in a revolutionary movement.

Basically, Mikhail Bakunin expanded Marx's theory of revolution to a more radical extreme. Condemning the state as humankind's greatest obstacle to attaining liberty; Bakunin advocated use of violence, destruction and terrorism in acts of political revolution. Unlike Marx who called for revolution by honest working people, Bakunin insists that a successful revolution will come about by arming vagabonds, pimps, thieves and murderers. He argues that revolution helps to liberate people from societal restraints so as to be able to make their contribution to society as free and willing participants rather than as slaves to the opinion makers of the community.

Similarly, Peter Kropotkin affirms that only revolution would bring about the new world of harmony in the society. He maintains that government tends to divide person against person, class against class, country against country and therefore is instrumental to destruction of human progress. Based on this assumption, he demanded that the state

should be eliminated through a violent revolution. This is because people are essentially social beings but the state tended to make them antisocial.

As can be seen from the above examples of explanations of revolutions, these theorists believe that government's failure to achieve general or specific goals for society as well as its repressive nature in maintaining the status quo serve as the ultimate cause for all revolutions. Their philosophy contended that the only constructive act of change is the resort to revolution in order to destroy corrupt, repressive and exploitative governments that organize political power for purpose of oppressing others. Therefore, the traditional theory of revolution recognizes that the repressive nature of government causes a division between rulers and the ruled which compels governments to accept corrosive demands or ideas of revolutionary groups. This takes place especially when there is a division among the political elites.

Furthermore, the traditional theory of revolution provides social explanations about political revolutions in human societies. These theorists argue that too much social mobility into the elite class of the society may result in corrosive revolutionary behaviours that bring about violent revolutions. Sociologists see the class system as mechanisms that determine an individual's economic status, political power and influence in the society. Therefore, a class system is a social ranking based primarily on economic position in which the achieved characteristics can influence social mobility (Richard, 2012:189). The boundaries between classes are defined and one can move from one stratum or level of society to another and such mobility or patterns of class divisions are marked by unequal distribution of wealth and power and is heavily dependent on family and ascribed factors such as race and ethnicity.

Since ascribed factors such as race and ethnicity influence the velocity of mobility, rapid social mobility into the upper class or upper middle class may either lead to sudden intensification of anomic groups or the appearance of corrosive way of life that causes a breakdown of traditional value systems and moral virtues. Sociologists use the term open stratification system to indicate high velocity of social mobility in a society. An open system implies that the position of each individual is influenced by his or her achieved status and such system encourage competition among members of society.

According to William Kornhauser (1959) rapid movement to the elite upper class makes an individual to be uprooted from traditional patterns of behaviour or value system wherein moral and social values are eroded or abandoned by such individuals. Individuals are disoriented by perceived absence of a social or moral network thereby propping up feelings of alienation that make them most responsive to join or establish mass movements or insurgent groups. These mass movements may also consist of individuals who have been alienated from society because of their rapid movement through the stratification system to the elite upper class thereby losing their social links with their own social class.

The middle class is currently under great deal of social pressure. According to Richard

Schaefer (2012: 191), Close analysis indicates that most of those who lost their middle class standing, about half rose to a higher ranking in the social class system while half dropped to a lower position. This means that countries like United States and Nigeria are moving towards a bipolar income distribution where the middle class is slowly being replaced by two growing groups of rich and poor. The ascendancy of a two class system of poor and rich escalates competition and antagonism between them. The poor through the frequency of ascribed status always push forward to turn into members of the upper class. For this reason, they either set up mass movement or shore up insurgent groups to destabilize the elites and guarantee their rapid movement to the elite stratum. So, too much mobility into the elite class weakens its internal cohesion, leaving the upper class less exclusively based on a particular class stratification consciousness or without any practicable ideology. This weakness of upper class lead to in-fighting within the elite, giving insurgent revolutionary movement high degree of success because of the inability of the political elites to present a viable opposition against possible revolutions.

Having provided operational referents for the traditional theory of political revolution, we may now turn to an examination of possible economic correlates. The task of identifying economic preconditions of revolution has been of long concern to political theorists. Plato in his contribution proposed that differences in economic interests led to fractionalization politics, which contributed immensely to instability of the city state. Plato argues that poverty produces revolution, meanness and bad character while riches produce luxury, idleness and desperado. Aristotle held substantial agreement with this theatrical perspective and maintains that poverty may be a cause of political revolution.

Building on the theoretical assumptions of Plato and Aristotle, Marx tries to identify the sources of poverty in societies and how it would bring about holistic revolution that will change both the mode of production and system of government. According to Marx, since revolution is synonymous with class warfare, therefore, inequality in wealth and pervasive injustice are the ultimate causes of all political revolutions. As the economic disparity between the wealthy capitalists and the impoverished workers increases, so does the possibility of political revolution. Using this type of analysis, Marx argues that in capitalist societies, the members of the bourgeoisie maximize profit in competition with other firms. In the process, they exploit the workers, who must exchange their labour for subsistence wages. In Marx's view, exploitation of the proletariat will inevitably lead to the destruction of the capitalist through a holistic political revolution by the workers. This would be possible because the class-conscious workers realize that all workers are being exploited by the bourgeoisie and have a common stake in revolution (Richard, 2012:192). To make this process more practicable, Lenin insists that a small conspiratorial party is needed to organize the revolution and make it more effective.

Though Marx held that desperation caused by poverty and social alienation is the catalysts for revolution, Alexis de Tocqueville has offered an alternative view. Dissented from this emphasis on poverty, Tocqueville (1955:22-23) suggested that the French peasants prior

to 1789 revolution enjoyed a considerably higher degree of economic independence than did the remainder of the European peasantry. He observed that, "it was precisely in those parts of France where there had been the most improvement that popular discontent ran the highest.

There, economic and social improvement had taken place and political pressure had lessened, but still there existed the greatest amount of unrest" (Tocqueville, 1955:176). Therefore, he concludes that revolution occur when economic conditions are improving. This entails that economic improvement leads to political revolution because once the people see that some improvement is possible, they will inevitably desire for more. So, with improved economic conditions, there would be a proportionate increase in discontentment. Therefore, revolution would occur when people who have had to endure an oppressive rule over a long period discover there is a relaxation in governmental pressure. Rising expectations on the part of a people are then met by a repressive reaction from the government which in turn causes a revolution (Robert and Michael, 1971:355).

However, Crane Brinton draws his analytical insight from Tocqueville theoretical perspective that the political revolutions in England (1640s), America (1776), France (1789) and Russia (1917) occurred when these societies experienced economic improvements. But he identified that in all these four classic revolutions, there existed class antagonism, governmental financial crisis, bitter grievances among intellectuals, and in-fighting within the ruling political elites which provided the catalysts that set off of the revolutions (Robert and Michael, 1971:355).

According to Brinton, French economy prior to 1789 experienced an improvement. From 1783 to 1785, the amount of uncultivated land was reduced from 14500 to 10000 arpents. Rouen in 1787 produced cotton cloth worth 50000 livre, which was double the production of a generation before. Also, the English Revolution of the 17th century and the American Revolution were preceded by similar economic improvement. Brinton maintains that England was notably prosperous as were the American colonies prior to 1775. Similarly, Russia was making significant economic progress prior to the outbreak of World War I (Brinton, 1952:31-32). Table 1 illustrates this growth in the Russian economy.

Table 1:  
Russian Exports and imports per capita: 1895-1913.

Period	Export (in rubles)	Import (in rubles)
1895-99	5.5	4.7
1900-04	6.3	4.6
1905-09	7.4	5.1
1910-13	9.1	7.1

Source: Mazour, 1962, p. 323

Indeed, long term economic depressions were not present prior to the outbreaks of the English, American, French or Russian revolutions. Therefore, after an exhaustive study of these revolutions, Brinton concluded that one similarity in the occurrence of these revolutions was that the societies were all experiencing an upward improvement economically before the outbreak of revolution. From the analysis of Plato, Aristotle, Marx, Tocqueville and Brinton there are three correlates of traditional theory of revolution which include but not limited to poverty, class antagonism and progressive economic improvement. The theories of Plato and Aristotle appear to contradict those of Tocqueville and Brinton. Plato and Aristotle assert that poverty leads to revolution while Tocqueville and Brinton maintains that revolutions are preceded by a significant increase in economic development.

## **MODERN THEORIES OF POLITICAL REVOLUTION**

Modern political theory of revolution espouses a progressive analytical insight in the study of revolutions by advocating a partial synthesis of Marx and Tocqueville approaches in order to provide a more comprehensive explanation of specific causes of the revolution. Through the use of methodical case studies, modern theorists try to identify the exact causes of political revolution and how this process takes place. The theory seeks to examine the types of crises facing pre-revolutionary states, the factors leading to a general loss of confidence in government as well as the hapless responses of besieged governments (Thomas, 2009: 493). In identifying the specific causes of revolution, modern theorists narrow them down to economic, social and political factors.

The progressive type of economic explanation was posited by James Davies who attempted to create a synthesis between Marx's position and Tocqueville approach by studying both the long-term and short-term economic factors and developments that cause pre-revolutionary conditions. He suggested that these two approaches should be juxtaposed since they have both explanatory and predictive values. So, Davies in 1962 carried out a comparative study of Dorr's Rebellion of 1842, the Russian Revolution of 1917, and the Egyptian Revolution of 1952. After making a careful study of these revolutions, he identified that in each case there had been a prolonged period of economic development followed by a short period of sharp economic reversal just before the revolution began (Davies, 1962:6).

This implies that there existed similar patterns of revolutionary developments. He therefore, postulates that improved economic conditions bring about proportionate increase in expectations; and when the sharp reversal takes place the people fear that everything, they have earned over the years may be lost. This innate fear produces tension and aggression that spark off revolutions. He concluded that revolutions are most likely to occur when conditions have been getting better for a prolonged period of time and then suddenly take a sharp turn for the worse.

Elaborating on Davies's theoretical thrust, Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky argue that the rates of economic growth and the speed of economic decline consists the key factors which give rise to revolution. They see duration and violence as a measure of revolutionary

intensity which defines the characteristics of modern political revolutions. Based on this assumption, Tanter and Midlarsky conclude that the higher the growth rate in per capita GNP prior to a revolutionary situation and the sharper the reversal immediately prior to the revolution, therefore, the greater the duration period and the intensity of violence used by the revolutionaries (Tanter and Midlarsky, 1967:272). This, according to Ted Gurr explain why men revolt. That intense discontent bred by the failure to acquire the goods and to experience the conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled induces them to revolt (Gurr, 1970:3-21).

Mancur Olson (1963:234) in his contribution asserts that revolution is a structural substance of developing economies at its take-off point when such societies are experiencing rapid economic growth. He pointed out that in periods of rapid economic growth; destabilizing factors usually appear due to inequality in the distribution of wealth and resources of the state resulting in the emergence of two extreme classes of the rich and the poor. This structural inequality creates novel kind of class warfare between the new wealth and new poverty sections of society.

Therefore, revolution occurs when the government cannot satisfy the new demands and expectations of the people as well as its inability to contain the widening gap between the rich and the poor. However, Marshall McLuhan believes that the degree of occurrences of revolution increase as the level of globalization increases. If the world is now a global village in terms of communication and information, the government may find it difficult to control the rising expectation through planned economic growth, therefore, the intensity of revolutionary conditions becomes more evident in societies.

The same kind of structural conflicts occur in the social explanations of political revolution. Modern progressive theorists postulate that too little social mobility or circulation into the elite social structure result in sudden outbreak of violent revolutions. Several scholars like Mosca and Pareto pointed out that lack of upward mobility creates in the mass high feelings of dissatisfaction. The aggrieved members of the upper middle class supposed to move to the elite class, provides mass movements with the required leadership to carry out revolutionary activities.

Invariably, societies on the verge of revolution face perilous social difficulties that can be particularly debilitating. Demographic factors can exacerbate revolutionary conditions. Rapid population growth can slow or reverse the configuration of social class system and promote inequality. Ethnic and racial tensions can plunge a society into violent political revolution and counter revolutions, especially when one particular group grows or prospers at a faster rate than others (Thomas, 2009:493). Similarly, rapid urbanization usually generates serious social problems that indirectly stimulate aggression instincts among impoverished members of society. Such factor like inadequate housing, poor sanitation and deficiencies in medical and educational services arouses feelings of alienation that produce aggressive behaviors leading to violent revolutionary activities.

However, modern theorists interested in the political causes of revolution argue that revolutions are the fault of government inactivity. The theory ascribes the occurrence of revolution to governments' failure to achieve general or specific goals for society. This happens when government uses coercion or repressive force to maintain status quo thereby causing conflict between the rulers and the ruled. Barry Schutz and Robert Slater (1990:7-9) conceptualize that whenever the people in given society perceive government as highly inept, unable to exercise effective authority, powerless to ensure domestic order and irresolute in the face of external threat, revolution is likely to occur. For this reason, most established governments come to be perceived as illegitimate by nearly everyone including the elite class. Such situation makes government to lose its right to rule.

Also, losing a war is another prelude to political revolution. In a study of 1952 Egyptian Revolution, Robert and Michael noted that the defeat of Egypt by Israel frustrated popular hopes for national glory and even humiliated the army and solidified it against the bureaucracy and the government. This disastrous defeat by a new nation with a fifteenth of Egypt's population marked the beginning of the revolution. The war had struck the peasant at his hearth, when a shortage of wheat and oil for stoves provided a daily reminder of a weak and corrupt government.

Therefore, military defeat is closely associated with severe economic hardships and when the level of suffering becomes intense, government loses its legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Under such circumstance, revolutions or counter revolutionary activities in one state can spill over into and affect vulnerable governments in the vicinity; for example how the revolution in Tunisia spill out to Libya and Egypt.

In sum, modern studies shows that revolution never succeed when the armed forces remain loyal to the government in power, who can readily mobilize and effectively employ them to contain revolutionary incursions. But revolutions succeed only when there is a feeling of mild unhappiness and dissatisfaction in the military or when internal security measures are applied too late, too haphazardly or used as a last resort of a desperate government to hang on to power. Under this situation, the persistent use of repressive force by the government may only heighten the morale of the revolutionary movements. Finally, governments that shrink from the systematic use of physical force in revolutionary situations run the risk of being overthrown.

Having provided the operational referents and classifications for the theory of revolution, we may now turn to an examination of possible correlates. The first correlate of theory of revolution might be the level of educational attainment prior to the outbreak of revolutionary conditions and variables. Seymour Lipset (1959, :73-80) revealed that the occurrence of revolution is associated negatively with the level of educational attainment. According to him states in Latin America that had high incidence of palace revolutions are proportionately lowest on the scale or degree of educational attainment. Supporting Lipset's assertion, Rummel, Sawyer, Tanter and Guetzkow (1967) write that educational

variables are correlated negatively with the occurrence of revolution since revolutions occur more frequently in societies with the lowest levels of educational accomplishment.

This theoretical correlate can be used to explain the high rate of revolutionary activities in Northern Nigeria. At the states and geopolitical zones levels, the data also shows that Lagos State has the highest level of average educational attainment level of 9.14 as against the country's average of 5.08. The state with lowest educational attainment is Zamfara, with average of only 1.30 (Habibu Umar, Russayani Ismail and Roslan Ab dul-Hakim, 2013:425-427). Interestingly, the former belongs to the southern region while the later is of the northern region. It happens that out of the 19 northern states only two states (i.e. Kwara state and Kogi state) have average attainment above the national average while all the southern states are above the national average.

Table 2:

Educational attainment and inequality across geopolitical zones in Nigeria.

Zone	Average Educational Attainment	Theil
South-South	7.40276	0.1564
South-East	6.671605	0.1707
South-West	7.217691	0.1756
North-Central	4.76783	0.3025
North-East	3.34135	0.42063
North-West	2.60702	0.49392

Source: Authors' calculations using World Bank LSMS Data (2010).

Table 1 shows the average educational attainments and Theil Index coefficients for the regions and sectors in the country. It can be seen that the Northern Region has an Average Educational Attainment (Avg Edua At) below the country's average, while the Southern region has an average attainment above the country's average. In terms of educational distribution, the inequality index (Theil Index), which measures the education inequality, is lower for the Southern Region compared to the North. This result partly implies that region with higher educational attainment tends to have more equal distribution of education, while in the North; there exists inequality in distribution of education because of its low educational attainment.

However, from the data it appears that the North East has a very low educational attainment, which accounts for the sudden rise of violent revolutionary incursions by Boko Haram movement whose primary goal is to overthrow the Nigerian state and replace it with an Islamic caliphate. The Boko Haram operations are clearly defined by domestic violence and extreme use of terror power and its members were drawn exclusively from the lower class of illiterate peasants known as "amajiri". Therefore, from the revolutionary incidences in Northern Nigeria, we affirm that the lower the level of educational attainment prior to a

revolution, the greater the duration and degree of violence of the revolution.

The second correlate of political revolution is achievement and aspiration. In more general terms, economic, cultural and political developments might be viewed as a single aspect of a society's achievement. A second concept closely associated with achievement is aspiration which is seen as the results of political, economic and cultural attainment visible to the general populace. It is posited that the rates of change of the achievements and aspirations are correlated. If achievement is increasing at a given rate, then the populace would most likely aspire to the acquisition of social commodities at the same rate as they had been previously acquired.

When the rate of achievement decreases, it gives rise to a new concept known as expectations. Expectations represent a change in outlook caused primarily by an immediate decrease in the production of social commodities. So, the rate of change of expectations is proportional to the decrease in the rate of achievement, because the rates of expectations are affected more by immediate reality than are the rates of aspirations. Aspirations are more in the nature of a hope and an optimism generated by long-term past performance (Raymond and Manus, 1975:270-272). As evidence for the low rate of expectations prior to major revolutions, Davies cites the conditions in Tsarist Russia in 1917.

The Russian condition provides a striking example of a breakdown in the economic system immediately prior to the outbreak of a revolution. Industrial production had declined rapidly while coal mining had fallen to a level that threatened the nation's transportation system. The peasants had grown sick of the war and instead of transporting much needed grain to Russian's urban centers; they were hoarding food in the expectation of future disasters. The economy was in a state of virtual collapse when the revolution broke out (Mazour, 1962:558-555).

However, from the above analysis it shows the existence of so many different types of definitions, theoretical assumptions, models and classifications based on studies in different cultures as well as the lack of acceptable general theory of the state which makes the theorization of revolution a more complex phenomenon. As can be readily seen, there is no single valid theory or even series of accepted theories of revolution. Harry Eckstein identified inherent problems in most of the theories and argues that there is no theoretical foundation for developing a definitive systematic explanation of revolution because of the inability of these theories to delimit variables.

Also, in expanding the tenets of this flaw, Chalmers Johnson maintains that a revolution is a function of positive and conflict factors as well as negative or anti-conflict factors which result in a disequilibrium in the social system. These factors are characterized by power deflation for the reason that during period of change the integration of the system depends on the perpetuation and deployment of force by political authorities which most often is regarded as illegitimate.

## STAGES OF POLITICAL REVOLUTION

The study of political revolution in modern societies does not offer explainable variables in understanding the patterns of revolutionary stages or even the description of the major actors in each stage. This could be seen in the Tunisian Revolution, a product of police brutality against an unemployed graduate that sold groceries along the street. Such brutality led to sudden eruptions of violent protests that culminated in the revolution that ended El Abidine Ben Ali's Regime. This scenario is similar to the 1848 revolution in Germany when a student dropped a cane into the orchestra pit in Munich. These two revolutions demonstrate an impulsive or accidental insight in the study of political revolution which makes the patterns of revolutionary stages complex and vague; posing a serious question, when did these revolutions begin?

The answer to this question has inspired scholars to identify variables to simplify the categorization of political revolution into various stages and patterns. Crane Brinton recognized two series of events that characterize political revolution. This he referred to as the pre-revolutionary stage, action Stage, and post-revolutionary stage. The pre-revolutionary stage is a combination of social and political tensions caused by an incremental breakdown of social values and political authority as well as the pervasive corruption of political actors. This implies that revolutions are fostered by long-lasting grievances and frustrations caused by unbearable social conditions.

The frustration and grievances are guided by revolutionary leaders and justified by violent actions in order to set the stage for revolution. The revolutionaries employ a variety of tools such as pamphlets, addresses, plays, and pressure group activities to articulate the peoples' grievances and also for attacking the status quo. This strategic form of propaganda breaks down the myths of state authority and encourages disorderly behavior and violent protests in society.

However, the pre-revolutionary years are characterized by a crescendo of political protests against the tyranny of the government, which leads to the desperate use of force by the government to maintain and consolidate power. As the regime increases its coercive powers of suppression, the level of opposition increases and it begins to lose its hold on political power. Therefore, revolutionary groups become a threat to the existing political order and as the protest continues, they combine forces together to overthrow the regime.

The next is the action stage. This stage begins with sporadic outbreaks of violence, demonstrations, strikes, riots, or other forms of violent protests. In most successful revolutions, these violent political protests lead either to rebellion, coups, terrorism, or civil wars which are directed to toppling the old regime. With the overthrow of the old regime, the revolutionaries take absolute control of all structures of political authority and condemn the actors and leaders of the old regime to banishment, prison, or death. For example, in 1959, the new regime of Fidel Castro executed hundreds of former Batista supporters.

In whatever way, the unsettling nature of violence of this period totally destroys the expectations of the people toward the regime and its political actors. Most often violence occurs without planning and results in general breakdown of order. This was seen in the Russian Revolution of 1917, Tunisian Revolution of 2011, Libyan Revolution of 2011 and Egyptian Revolution of 2011 which suddenly begun when street riots and demonstrations broke out. The violence and protests are so sporadic that no event can properly be termed the beginning of these revolutions.

The post-revolutionary stage starts when the existing regime is overthrown. According to Brinton, this period is characterized by optimistic idealism and perfectionist rhetoric. As the challenges of governance become more complex, the revolutionary movement splits into two contending groups of moderates and radicals. The contention ends in the defeat of the moderates, the rise of extremists and eventual transfer of power to them. In their quest to suppress the moderates and at the same time consolidate its political authority, the extremists resort to extensive use of force and coercion to incorporate totalitarian ideals as a basis for change.

Also, force is used as a compliance mechanism to give the appearance of reforming the society to conform to the ideals of the revolutionaries. The new compliance mechanism based on coercive measures usually lead to greater concentration of power in the bureaucracy in order to get the essential services running again and to strive toward maintaining political stability in post-revolutionary society. Brinton affirms that the French and Russian revolutions followed this course of development, as did the Islamic revolution in Iran in the late 20th Century.

However, in a strictly political revolution independent of social transformation, the patterns of occurrence may not follow the above conceptual steps but there are two factors that help in defining the characteristics of revolutionary stages. Duration and domestic violence may be seen as a measure of intensity of these revolutionary stages and events. Domestic protest and violence are present in almost all occurrences or stages of political revolutions. According to Raymond and Manus, if the mass of the people are indifferent to changes in the personnel of governmental elites, then a palace revolution may be initiated by the revolutionaries. They will encounter resistance only from upper class of political elites who benefits from the existing status quo and power configuration. Therefore, mass participation will be at its minimum and without direct involvement in the revolution.

All the same, because of the lack of mass participation and collective conflict behavior, the number of deaths will be at a minimum and the duration of such political revolution will be very diminutive. Many palace coups in Nigeria provide an explicit example of this pattern, because most of such coups were of short duration and the number killed were relatively small. Indeed bloodless coups often occur in which no one is killed but a new set of elites assume the major roles in the political authority structures. Also the 2011 Tunisian revolution followed this circle of occurrence with minimum deaths.

Nevertheless, if the revolutionary actors proclaim the intention to initiate social, ideological and structural changes in the society, public opinion and support will be very low and large segments of the population will be alienated from the insurgent cause and goals. The number of deaths and possibly the duration of the political revolution will increase proportionately to the degree of societal change envisaged by the insurgents. The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria follows this outline because majority of Nigerian Moslems describe Boko Haram ideals and operations as aberration of Islamic values and identity, hence the intensity of domestic violence increased, and the duration become longer. Similarly, the 2011 Egyptian and Libyan revolutions experienced high number of deaths and increased domestic violence for the reason that the revolutionaries increased the intensity of their actions to bring about the desired change.

However, at the present stage of political science theoretical evolution, the conceptualization of political revolution as a distinct field of study is shrouded in controversy and misrepresentation of definitive variables. The use of multi-causal explanations to characterize variable most often lacks precision and conflict or overlap with theoretical generalizations. This is because social science perspective of revolution overrides the orientations of political science assumptions. From social science perspective revolution assumes a broad meaning as a process of change in social norms, structure and behaviour due to new developments in demography, communications and technology. Therefore, an attempt is made at separating political science variables from social science assumptions in the conceptualization of revolution. When revolution is restricted to political sphere, its definitive variables become clearer and makes generalization possible.

The concept of revolution from political science standpoint is seen as a means of capturing state power and influence in order to authoritatively reallocate resources to restructure societies by means of breaking down a regime's monopoly of power and violence through lessening of habits of obedience and the myths of the state. Therefore, political revolution becomes an instrument of change to overthrow exploitative, imperialist and totalitarian regimes to provide more durable structures for the establishment of new political order. Finally, in the quest to change structural deficiencies, inequalities and injustice in societies, political revolutionary movements are held together by perceived frustrations and grievances pervasive in society against the old regime. This frustration is overtly expressed in fanatical conviction in the rightness of their goals or aspirations that often manifest in the willingness to die and the desire to create a new society that will uphold the greatest good, justice and happiness for all.

# PHILOSOPHY OF AFRICAN REVOLUTION

Lenin set in motion the most successful revolutions in the twentieth century Europe by altering the traditional Marxism to suit the conditions of Russia. Likewise, Mao Tse-tung followed Lenin's example when he adjusted Marxism and Leninist perspective to Chinese political values and system. This follows that attempt at revolutions should be narrowed to suit specific condition and environmental variables of a particular political system and not mere imitation of previous revolutions. Therefore, African revolutions were not mere imitations of European or Chinese revolutionary thoughts but were made on the basis of African conditions and values.

But such conditions in African revolutionary thought are not easy to discern or allow scholars to carry out independent analysis of those conditions. But the section seeks to identify these conditions and its philosophical roots by analysing Frantz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral revolutionary thoughts. Their thought provides the conceptual foundation that drives revolutions in Africa. This makes revolution in Africa distinct and different from the theoretical values of European revolutions.

## FRANTZ FANON THOUGHT OF AFRICAN REVOLUTION

Fanon was born in Martinique but his ancestry was African. He studied medicine and specialized in psychiatry. He wrote 'Black Skin, White Masks' in 1952, 'African Revolution' and 'The Wretched of the Earth' in 1961. He moved to Algeria, where he became involved in the Algerian revolution. His thought on revolution was based upon his knowledge of Africa and experience in Algeria. Therefore, the need to revisit Fanon's view has become more expedient in recent times in order to understand the conceptual variables of modern Africa revolutions, so as not to classify such revolutionary occurrences as terrorism or even insurgency. Such errors in classification will undermine the true meaning of African revolution.

Every revolution is aimed at overthrowing an existing structure and its replacement with a new order. The French Revolution of 1789 and the English Glorious Revolution of 1688 were directed at overthrow of feudal society and enthronement of a new capitalist order. In the same vein, African revolution was targeted to overthrow the exploitative structure of colonialism and to ensure the emergence of a new socio-political order in Africa that reflects African values, ethics and culture. The function of African revolution is to create socio-political structures and institutions to serve the needs of African peoples and not to plunge the society into the troubled waters of political instability and chaos.

Giving a cursory insight into the function and nature of the African revolution, Fanon insists that revolution is more than a struggle for independence but more importantly part of the process of the regeneration of man and society, of self-liberation and rebirth. Only through revolution could the oppressed peoples of Africa undo the effects of colonialism. Karl Marx describes European colonialism in Africa as brutal in the sense that colonial powers adopted

barbaric methods to defeat African peoples unwilling to submit themselves to European rule and domination (Schraeder, 2004:328).

Fanon was particularly interested in the psychological effects of colonialism on African peoples and argues that it is only through revolution could true liberation occur. He asserted that independence should be taken by the force of revolution and not merely granted on the whims of the colonizers. That it is only through revolution that liberation and structural change would occur, restoring the integrity and pride of Africans and creating horizons of new order in the future.

Therefore, revolution from African perspective is the total destruction of colonialism and creation of a new political and economic order for the good life of Africans and growth of African states. The new politico-economic order will annihilate the emergence of pseudo-independence framework in which African leaders and bureaucracy will have limited control over African economy and politics. This is because the tacit strategy of colonialists was to replace colonialism with pseudo-independence through the instrument of organised violence with a view to establishing an economy dominated by colonial past.

To this effect, Fanon went beyond hegemony and containment to label colonialism an act of complete violence, an act that can only be confronted with revolutionary and spontaneous violence, the violence of emancipation and liberation and not counter class domination. This implies that the goal of African revolution is not to replace governing elite with a new class but to restructure the society in line with the principles of liberty, justice and equality. Fanon argues that the negation of African soul by the colonialists is not just a material or social act; it is an act of depersonalization that can only be reversed through revolutionary violence (Abdilah, 1985). In his study 'Black Skin, White Mask' Fanon insists that colonialism and racism are inseparable tools for exploitation of Africa and humiliation of African peoples. The Whites in the colonies were invariably rich and in control of the super and infra-structures and dominated the wealth and life of the colonial people. He concluded that the whites were by nature racists and is controlled by subconscious urge to contain and subsume the blacks and their homeland.

According to Fanon, the White Masks represents an insidious oneness or exploitative integration between colonized and colonizer. Whiteness becomes a symbol of exploitation and racism that can only be terminated through absolute violence, through the destruction of the society and state associated with this symbol. This is why Fanon linked revolution with emancipation, with a new humanity or a new order. He vehemently opposed the ideas adopted by the assimilated class in Africa that restructuring of the society should be incremental, taking the form of reforms and gradual change without violence. Fanon like Malcolm X dismissed this idea as a philosophy of fools because African revolution does not mean freedom of the state.

Occurrence of revolutionary violence is stimulated through subconscious urge to arouse, to

anger and to warn against the dangers of exploitation. Fanon expected African revolution to occur through two stages. First, is the period of physical struggle. Revolutionists create and design a national programme that would act as a unifying element to achieve independence of African states. Secondly, after independence, the energies of the revolutionists should be directed into building a socialist state where society will produce enough for all to have enough to satisfy their basic needs. It is foolish to lavish wealth on colonizers while African languished in poverty. For this reason, Fanon did not favour chauvinistic nationalism but necessarily recognised nationalism based on values of Pan Africanism. Nationalism based upon the geniuses and individuality of indigenous culture which provide framework to unite other anti-colonial revolutionists.

The emphasis on building a socialist state does not imply that Fanon's concept of revolution has close affinity with socialist traditions of Karl Marx. He was not doctrinaire about socialism and argues that traditional Marxism-Leninism is not suitable to African revolution. This is because neither Marx nor Lenin considered the vestiges of race in developing idea of socialist revolution. To define the structure of African revolution, Fanon took aspects of race factor and injected it into Marxism-Leninism. Although he did not consider himself a Marxist but he was sympathetic with Marxist approach to revolution. Marx sees social class as an agency for change; Fanon insists that underdevelopment is the catalyst for change (Blackey, 1974). Such change would create a humanistic society independent of capitalism and communism.

Fanon was obsessed by the notion of ending the old system through revolutionary violence to the benefit of oppressed class, the peasantry. Peasants are often retrograde and prone to religious fanaticism and tribal warfare. Under stress or provocation peasants are capable of uncontrollable rage and have blood-thirsty instincts, brutality and violence. Because of these inherent attributes, Fanon concludes that peasants are integral part of African revolution as they are the only true and spontaneous revolutionary force. They have nothing to lose and everything to gain since they think of their liberation only in violent terms. The starving peasant alienated from class system only discovers that violence provides mechanism to express stress, anger and frustration. For the peasants there is no compromise and no coming to terms, all responses are expressed in terms of violence and aggression.

Fanon argues that peasants are important arm of revolution because of their large numbers which provides the strength to bring down the conventional or inherited structures of colonialism and foreign domination. Peasants play key role in African revolution because of the absence of a significant African proletariat. For Fanon, peasants are central and pivotal as the most politically decisive arm of revolution which will make the new order a living reality to all citizens. Because of this pivotal role, revolution would begin in the countryside and then filter into the towns through the lumpen-proletariat.

Fanon describes lumpen-proletariat as that fraction of the peasant population which is blocked on the outer fringe of the urban centres, that faction which has not fully integrated

themselves into the colonial system. They are also horde of starving men, uprooted from their tribe and clan. In the urban centres they are alienated from the social, economic and political processes as well as in the distribution of values. (Woddis, 1972). Through politicisation and socialization process they become the most spontaneous and radically revolutionary forces to spearhead revolution in Africa. This is possible when the unemployed and all hopeless dregs of the society rediscover themselves by understanding that the society lavish wealth on few governing elites while many suffer in squalor and misery. Such consciousness awakens the aggressive impulses to revolt and overthrow the national bourgeoisie and its exploitative system.

The aim of African revolution is to redistribute the productive energies of the nation and not to substitute Black bourgeoisie for White. The bourgeoisie in Africa constitutes of the merchants, businessmen, civil servants, professionals and few agricultural land or factory owners. To Fanon, African bourgeoisie is the most useless, parasitical class and not even a true bourgeoisie but a greedy caste, avid and voracious class (Fanon, 1968). African bourgeoisie is not a replica of Europe's capitalist class but its caricature. Unlike in Europe, the bourgeois phase in the history of Africa is a useless one since it failed to promote an industrial and productive economy of Africa to make socialist revolution possible. Therefore, the bourgeois reveals that it is incapable of bringing national unity into being or builds up the nation on a stable and productive basis. For this reason, its existence and growth need to be decimated through revolution because it has betrayed its classical role in the society. It must be replaced since by exploiting the country, it is endangering the future of African society. (Fanon, 1968).

Another reason for the overthrow of African bourgeois according to Fanon is to create a new humanism in Africa. This new humanism would transcend all national boundaries in order to achieve African unity. The unity of African states can only be achieved through the upward thrust of the people, organised under the leadership of the people, in defiance of the interest of the bourgeoisie (Fanon, 1968). This is because the national bourgeoisie usually put obstacles in the path of African unity so as to dominate their respective states and encourage colonial exploitation of Africa. For this reason, the bourgeoisie would try to use the struggle for its own selfish ends. Hence they are incapable of leading the revolution in Africa.

Therefore, Fanon recognized that the values for carrying out a successful revolution lies not in Lenin's substitution of class for party as the motive force for revolution but in the collective and spontaneous action of peasants under the leadership of revolutionary elites. Such leadership will come when the revolutionary elites intervene at the precise moment when peasant hostility erupts against the colonial force. The essence is to transform the insurrection of the peasants into a revolution. When insurrection occurs, it is the duty of revolutionary leaders to move in and direct the violent actions of peasants to align with thrust of the revolution. This is because the peasants lack adequate intellectual leadership to drive revolution.

However, contrary to Lenin's view, Fanon opposed the theoretical assumption that single party regime is a catalyst that directs revolutionary values and processes. He argues that single party regime is a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and alienated from the peasants. Instead of one party system, he suggested that radical and militant members of national party should join with peasants to form a political organization that would lead the revolution. Although he was not specific regarding the political organization, but he did develop the idea of a minority or illegal party composed of the urban radicals acting as the ideological vanguard with the masses also acting as the numerical base of the revolutionary force.

The revolutionary force organized under the auspices of a political party should be led by nationalists who are opposed to traditional conservative values of national parties. These nationalists should move out of the city to the countryside where they would mobilize the peasants to become crucial members of the revolutionary party. Unlike the urban proletariat, the peasants are not indifferent to political struggle. In this way, the peasants play important roles in every revolution in Africa. Therefore, the revolutionary party becomes a fusion of the peasants, urban revolutionary elite and the galvanized lumpen-proletariat who are later added as the revolution progresses. The combined efforts of these three groups provide the platform for a successful revolution in Africa.

Having discussed the role of political party in revolution, Fanon goes on to explain the nature of decolonization as an integral part of revolutionary process. He sees decolonization as a process of change to produce a new political order based on the values of freedom and strength of violence. This is because the existing order of colonialism is violence in its natural state and will only yield to change when confronted with greater violence. In other words, violence should be applied in African revolution since the very structure of colonialism is fundamentally violent (Fanon, 1968).

However, as scheme in revolution, decolonization involves giving up foreign values to create a new world order through the use of strategic violence. By this, Africans will come to realise that the colonialists are not superior, for their lives and skin are the same. Violence makes it possible for Africans to understand social truths to unmask the myths of European superiority which serve as the strength of colonialism. Therefore, Violence and revolution are inseparable variables that not only make revolution strong but also offer the means to a greater end. On this basis, Fanon concludes that violence is a cleansing force that frees the natives from the despair and exploitation of colonialism and European domination of Africa. So without the use of liberating violence, agents of imperialism and neo-colonialism will continue to dominate African politics and economy. Violence need not be used in a barbaric manner but as a strategy for liberation, justice and freedom.

## **AMILCAR CABRAL PERSPECTIVE OF AFRICAN REVOLUTION**

Lenin set the tone for most successful revolutions in the twentieth century when he altered traditional Marxist ideas to drive the Russian revolution. In a similar way Cabral adjusted Marxism to African revolution with a view to highlight the conditions that are peculiar

to African circumstances. His conceptualization of African revolution stemmed from his experiences as a nationalist. Such experiences influenced his role as organiser and leader of the revolution in Guinea-Bissau, a former Portuguese colony.

In analysing the nature of African revolution, Cabral identified key variables in understanding the conditions required to convert nationalist struggles into revolutionary forces. The variables include but not limited to issues of social structure, party influence, leadership values and the relevance of instrument of violence. Therefore, in converting nationalism into revolution, Cabral argues that strikes, political protest and demonstration are less important political catalysts which may likely prove unsuccessful in restructuring the society. What is needed is a revolution because revolution is more than a struggle for independence. Hence, he made a conceptual clarity between liberation struggle and the notion of African revolution.

According to him, African revolution is the transformation of life in the direction of progress by eliminating all foreign domination and carefully selecting friends and watching enemies to ensure progress and development in Africa. Such progress become feasible only by regaining the historical personality of African peoples and its return to history through the destruction of the imperialist domination to which Africa was subjected to (Andeliman, 1970). Revolution, therefore, provides the leverage for African peoples to free the process of development of the national productive forces. This means that African revolution is not only a struggle against colonialism but also a move to eliminate the pressures and vagaries of neo-colonialism.

Unlike Fanon, Cabral's conceptualization of African revolution consists of a broad spectrum of vision and purpose. To this extent, he argues that revolution is not just a fight for ideas alone but also a strategic fight for material benefits, improved conditions and a better future for peoples of Africa. The fight is not merely for abstract ideology of liberty, justice and independence but for local and pressing grievances and problems. To him, it is useless to liberate and give independence to a region, when the people of the region are left without the elementary necessities of life.

Therefore, revolution is a means to an end by providing the framework to translate liberation struggle into real improvements of the conditions of life for Africans (Rudebeck, 1972). Revolution can only open up the prospects for a better future only when it is focused at resolving and terminating local problems and grievances. Then will the conditions for incorporating abstract ideas of justice, independence and liberty become more outstanding. Cabral in his theoretical assumption did not play down on the importance of liberty and independence as a vital component of revolutionary goals but argues that for revolution to be successful in Africa it must continue on three levels:

The first level is to establish and preserve national unity and cohesion. This is possible by maintaining political work and struggle at all levels of the society.

The second level for successful revolution is to strengthen party organisation and discipline. These ethics should be adjusted and included in revolutionary struggles in order to correct the mistakes of the past and make political leaders to embrace the principles and goals of revolution.

The third level is to strengthen the armed forces and isolate the perceived enemies. This is because the armed forces are the creative forces of revolution. In the process of isolating the enemies, the liberated areas should be defended, kept tranquil and developed for the benefit of the people living there. To defend the liberated territories and strengthen the offensive capacity of the revolutionary army, Cabral argues that more cadres of complete revolutionists should be trained to be able to go out in the countryside and educate the local peasants on the importance, principles and tactics of revolution. In the process, the revolutionists should seek for external allies who according to Cabral should include other African nations, anti-colonialists and anti-imperialist forces anywhere in the world.

However, these three levels of revolution are not to promote abstract ideas but to link the basic objectives of revolution to satisfy the primary needs of the people. The establishment of correlation between goals and actual need satisfaction makes Cabral's conceptualization of revolution unique and valuable in the study of African revolution. He combined the theory and practice of revolution in his approach because every successful revolution is driven by theories (Rudebeck, 1972). In this light, he expanded and modified the theoretical perspectives of Lenin, Che Guevara and Regis Debray. Just like Lenin and Che Guevara, Cabral expressed the importance of political preparation to African revolution.

Political preparation involves a careful analysis of the society in order to understand the social structures of the cities, the relationship between the tribal chiefs and the peasants, the impact of the levels of exploitation on the everyday life of the population as well as to study the possible outcomes of the intended revolution. It also means the art of listening and talking, structured towards directing and explaining the goals of the revolution to the people and vice versa. This art is very important because it is the catalyst that determines the success and failure of any given revolution in Africa (Chilcote, 1968). It also involves the art of mobilizing the peasants to produce massive rural support before the revolution starts.

However, for this reason, Cabral argues that the small guerrilla band as espoused by Che Guevara and Regis Debray would not be enough to start a revolution in Africa. This is because prior to 1960, there was high illiteracy rate, low number of university graduates and the absence of military academy to teach tactics and strategy. Therefore, a period of preparatory political work was needed. Based on this assumption, a political school was founded in Conakry, in which the first party members received political instructions and were trained to mobilize the masses. Also, peasants and youths, who have been recruited for revolutionary struggle, went to the school, where they embarked on an intensive education programme. After the completion of their training, they return to the countryside to mobilize and convince other peasants to join the revolutionary struggle.

Cabral recognized the importance of peasants as principal force in African revolution because of their large numbers and spread. The essence of using the peasants to train the peasants is to allow the peasants to discover themselves and drive the emotional forces required for a successful revolution. The role of peasants is inestimable because they provide the physical energy and unifying elements as well as constitute the principal force to achieve the goals of revolution in Africa. The peasants play these roles efficaciously because unlike the other groups in the society, they keep their group culture and identity intact (Cabral, 1972).

However, it is challenging to convince African peasants to perform revolutionary roles. This is because the peasants though key player in African revolution but Cabral see them as more of a physical force than a revolutionary force. They do most of the producing and because of their large number in every African society; they directly produce most of the continent's wealth. For this reason, they find it difficult to know when they are exploited and they become passive towards any form of revolt. This inert characteristic differentiates African peasants from Chinese peasants.

Unlike in China, African peasants have no tradition of revolt and therefore do not readily align with revolutionists. So, they are unable to lead a revolution. Because of the passive nature of African peasants, Fanon see them as a spontaneous revolutionary force while Cabral sees them as a vital physical force in revolution. Even though African peasants are difficult to persuade, revolutionists in Africa should initiate strategies to persuade them to be part of the revolution, since they can make or mar revolutionary struggles.

Having identified the peasants as the keystone of African Revolution, Cabral goes on to emphasize the lesser and complementary role played by the proletariat and lumpen-proletariat. Though not a Marxist, Cabral used these words along with 'bourgeoisie' as a symbolic basis for comparison with European revolutionary theory. In his analysis, Cabral defines proletariat as urban wage earners. In Africa there are no traditional proletariat who will drive the revolution of the working class against the bourgeoisie as obtainable in Europe. As African proletariat develop a consciousness of their exploitation, they become more committed and help to make up the backbone of revolution but lack the capacity to lead the revolution against the exploitative class of colonialists (Cabral, 1972).

The question is who will lead the revolution against the colonial imperialists who constitute the bourgeois class in all African colonies. Cabral in providing answers to this question identified a new class he called the 'native petty bourgeoisie' and is the only class that has the capacity to lead the revolution, since the peasants are a non-revolutionary force and the working class or the lumpen proletariat is still in its embryo state. The petty bourgeoisie emerged out of foreign domination and understands the dynamics and strategies of colonial exploitation. This makes them to stand as the middleman between the masses and the local representatives of the foreign ruling class.

However, the role played by the petty bourgeoisie placed them in a dilemma stimulated by centrifugal and centripetal forces of culture conflict and this indirectly shapes their role in the revolution. Even though it is native, the petty bourgeoisie on one hand strives to be like the foreign colonial bourgeoisie and become integrated with them while on the other hand they try to identify with the peasants and urban wage earners. But the exploitative structure of colonial administration made it more challenging for the petty bourgeoisie to be fully integrated with the foreign colonial bourgeoisie. The African petty bourgeoisie did not succeed in overcoming the barriers thrown up by the system to move into the bourgeois class dominated by Europeans. Therefore, they became entangled in the web of social contradictions of culture conflict and were reduced to perform petty role as a marginal class (Cabral, 1972).

These structural contradictions would push the petty bourgeoisie into a class struggle against the European bourgeoisie in Africa. This would create feelings of bitterness and frustration which leads the petty bourgeoisie to question their marginal status. For this reason, they would struggle to rediscover their identity by joining the revolution. The revolutionary petty bourgeoisie would turn to the masses and peasants and completely identify with them. The strategic alliance with the peasants and lumpen proletariat provides the framework towards mobilizing and organising the masses for the struggle that would trigger off revolution. With the success of the revolution the petty bourgeoisie will emerge as the new bourgeois class, after the overthrow of European colonial bourgeoisie.

The moment the petty bourgeoisie takes power away from the colonial bourgeoisie; African society returns to the thesis of history and new internal contradictions will break out again in the form of antithesis. When this happens the petty bourgeoisie is faced with two strategic options by either allying itself with imperialism or ally itself with the workers or peasants. This means that for the petty bourgeoisie to survive and play its role in the revolution, it must be able to commit suicide as a class in order to be reborn by completely identifying with the aspiration of the masses to which they should belong. This, according to Cabral is the dilemma of the petty bourgeoisie in the struggle. It is also the fulcrum upon which turns the success of the revolution (Cabral, 1972). To this end, Cabral affirms that African bourgeois, in sufficient number would join forces with the masses and become reincarnated in the condition of workers and peasants to bring about a successful revolution in Africa.

From the above theoretical assumptions Cabral's theory of revolution differs slightly from Fanon and Karl Marx's theories. Fanon argues that the African bourgeoisie would fail the revolution and try to use the struggle for its own selfish ends. Marx in his theory believes that the revolution would be carried out by the proletariat against the bourgeois in order to give way to the emergence of a communist order. But Cabral theory identifies that in Africa what we have is a class of wage earners and not proletariat.

Therefore, the revolution would be carried out by a group of classes consisting of the peasants, lumpen proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie who will definitely combine forces

to overthrow the European bourgeoisie in Africa. Therefore, from Cabral's perspective, Marxist theory of revolution may not be expressively applied in African political system because of the absence of the proletariat class which is still in the embryo stage and which lacks the capacity to carry out successful revolution. Therefore, the success of revolution in Africa depends on the capacity of the petty bourgeoisie to mobilize the peasants to provide the physical force necessary for a revolution. This is because the peasants are the pillar of African revolution and not the proletariat as Marx envisaged.

However, in discussing the role and use of violence in African revolution, Cabral argues that violence needs to be used not only in response to the violence of imperialism but also to ensure and consolidate a true national independence and sovereignty. So, Cabral's thought on violence is similar to Fanon's proposition that violence should be extensively applied in revolution in Africa because the very structure of European colonialism is fundamentally violent.

Colonialism is violence in its natural state and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence (Fanon, 1968). Both Fanon and Cabral insist that violence in African revolution is a reactive force that should be seen as integral part of natural justice and non-compromise and not an instrument of exploitation and domination as clearly expressed by European imperialists. Therefore, revolution cannot occur in Africa without the use of liberating or reactive violence to answer the criminal violence of agents of imperialism (McColester, 1973).

Cabral goes on to argue that there is no people on earth who are subjected to the yoke of colonialism and neo-colonialism that have ever gained independence without the strategic and extensive use of violence. Therefore, reactive violence becomes a vital instrument in revolution in Africa because the European imperialists only listen to the voice of violence and not to the call of dialogue. Compromise or dialogue with European imperialists and their local agents in Africa does not work but rather produces more vindictive exploitation and exclusion. So, in using reactive violence, Cabral is of the opinion that terrorism should not be employed in Africa revolution but military struggle should be used and promoted with intense dynamism (Blackey, 1974).

# REVOLUTION IN AFRICA DURING THE COLONIAL ERA

Revolutions in Africa during the colonial period were aimed at the destruction of imperialist domination to which Africa was subjected to by Western Europe. It was a national revolutionary struggle to regain the historical personality of African people and to free its productive forces from the exploitative control of the colonial powers. The revolutions were systematically organised to recover national independence of African states, eliminate all forms of foreign domination and establish a new political and economic order in Africa that will enable African states participate in world politics free from imperialist control.

Revolution in colonial Africa political system was a fight not only to promote the ideas of liberty and independence but also a struggle against colonialism, imperialism and exclusion from the material benefits of global capitalism. It was a fight to secure improved conditions and better future for all African peoples as well as to overthrow the exploitative economic and political structures of colonialism. Therefore, this section seeks to examine the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist revolutions in Africa particularly, the Egyptian revolution, Congo revolution and the Algerian revolution.

## THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION OF 1952

The 1952 Egyptian revolution is a revolution targeted at overthrowing the existing political order characterized by tyranny, corruption and outright misuse of power. As peculiar to the tenets of African revolution, the revolution was carried out to contain and decimate imperialism and the hegemonic power of Britain in the domestic affairs of Egypt. Britain had occupied Egypt since 1882 during the Anglo-Egyptian war. At the Convention of Constantinople in 1888, Britain was given the right to protect and control the Suez Canal using the instruments of military force, thereby providing the structural framework to dominate domestic politics in Egypt. After World War I, Britain declared Egypt a protectorate and even after World War II, Britain continued to foster control of the Suez Canal, giving Britain strategic economic advantage not only to control imperial trade but also the economy of Egypt.

Through political struggles and pressures, Egypt became a nation, with the British grant of limited independence. Despite the grant of independence, Britain technically and strategically controlled the economy and politics of Egypt by ensuring that British troops remained in the country to protect not only the Suez Canal but also to prevent foreign aggression and influence. In addition, the presence of foreign troops was seen as a strategy to strengthen the Muhammad Ali Dynasty and the monarchical political system in Egypt. In the perception of the revolutionists, King Farouk regime was corrupt and pro-Western with a lavish lifestyle while the people lived in poverty. Such lavish lifestyle promoted corruption in most of the Egyptian institutions like the police, the palace and even the political parties. These feelings of corruption aroused revolutionary emotions in the periods of 1951-1952

resulting into political protests. Particularly the nationalist police began to protect and promote the Egyptian resistance force known as Fedayeen. The revolutionary forces under the umbrella of Fedayeen began to attack British authorities in Cairo, Alexandria and the Suez Canal as well as British shipping facilities in Ismailia resulting in the death of several British soldiers.

On January 25, 1952, British troops attacked the Fedayeen, who tactically retreated into the local police barracks. Due to the refusal of the local police to surrender the Fedayeen, the British forces attempted to negotiate the surrender of the Fedayeen. In the process, the negotiator was killed and the British forces reacted by attacking the police barracks in Ismailia. Fifty Egyptian police officers were killed and one hundred were wounded and Egypt erupted in violent political protests.

The political protests further inflamed more riots and King Farouk reacted by dismissing Mustafa el-Nahhas's government and in the months that followed political instability became more obvious and pronounced. Three governments were formed in quick successions: Ali Maher (27 January- 1 March), Ahmed Naguib El-Hilali (2 March- 29 June) and Hussein Sirri (2-20 July). These governments called the 'Salvation Ministries' failed to halt the country's downward spiral into instability and anarchy. Political instability remained ubiquitous and stirred up discontent in the military as well as an ominous series of strikes. The Egyptian agitators began quoting the Koran in favour of a just, equalitarian society and against corruption and differences in individual wealth.

These series of unfavourable political events culminated in the July 23 revolution by the Free Officers Movement, a group of army officers led by Muhammad Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser. The revolution was aimed at overthrowing King Farouk, abolish the constitutional monarchy and aristocracy of Egypt and Sudan, establish a republic, end the British occupation of the country and secure the independence of Sudan. The revolutionists adopted a rigid nationalist and anti-imperialist posture expressed through Arab nationalism and international non-alignment. The revolution resulted in the expulsion of King Farouk and ended the monarchy system, Egypt became a republic. The revolutionists formed a new government known as the Revolutionary Command Council composed of 11 members headed by Mohamed Naguib (Robert, 1971).

## **THE CAUSES OF THE 1952 REVOLUTION**

The 1952 revolution was not an accident or unfortunate political event that happened by chance, unexpectedly and unintentionally without apparent or deliberate cause. The political events, aspirations and expectations of 1920s and 1930s culminated into the factors that stimulated the revolution. World War I spurred industrialisation and urbanization in Egypt which opened new opportunities and expectations for peasants to improve their standard of living. It created new classes of wage earners and merchants who challenged the feudal lords and serfs of the agrarian societies in Egypt. These merchants became wealthy through commodity market speculations.

They established industries and finance institutions and opened up opportunities for employment for peasants. These increased opportunities resulted in massive migration of peasants from the rural areas to the new urban cities in search of employment. Through the migration process, the peasants were uprooted from the customs and culture of their traditional societies and became aware that poverty and boredom is not the will of God as they were influenced to believe. During this period, there was more rapid economic progress and this continued throughout the 1930s to the outbreak of the World War II (Issawi, 1954).

But economic progress continued unevenly during World War II. Conventional exports, mostly cotton, declined tremendously. In 1945, over 250,000 wage earners, probably over a third of the working force lost their jobs, as a direct result of economic depression. The cost of living rose sharply to three times the index of 1937 depression (IMF, 1950). The large population of peasants, white collar workers and professionals in the cities were hit by unemployment, while the cost of living increased geometrically due to high rate of inflation. Though the peasants wallow in poverty, the number of millionaires mostly the governing elites increased eight times during the war because of corruption. The expectations and aspirations of the peasants and white collar workers were cut short. The generation of post-World War II could no longer see the economic progress their parents enjoyed in the 1930s. They blamed negative economic situations on the British whose economic imperialism and military power remained visible and strong leading to exploitation, corruption, inflation and economic depression. These situation stimulated feelings of frustration and aggressive behaviour towards the British troops and officers (Robert, 1971).

However, as the economic situation worsened, feelings of frustration and aggression gradually shifted closer to the king and his palace workers. Egyptian revolutionists began quoting the Koran in favour of a just and equalitarian society. They used religion as an instrument for the mobilization of the peasants, by making them to understand that differences in individual wealth is not basically the will of God but a creation of unjust distribution of wealth by the governing elite represented by the king and his palace works, who were so engrossed in corruption. These feelings of mistrust and exploitative allocation of wealth weakened the aspirations of the people, which resulted into series of strikes from 1946 to 1948 (Reich, 1953).

Another factor that contributed to the revolution in Egypt was the defeat of Egypt by Israel in 1948 war. This defeat by a new nation with only a fifteenth of Egypt's population was seen by many in Egypt as a disgraceful mark of national shame. The peasants were not happy that Egypt could not secure the independence of Palestine from Israel occupation. The defeat not only frustrated popular hopes for national glory but also humiliated the army and turned the military against the bureaucracy and the king. The military attributed the defeat to corruption and profiteering at the expense of national honour. In 1950, this resulted to a direct and open propaganda against the king.

However, the destabilising effect of the disastrous defeat was compounded by uncontrollable economic crisis. There was shortage of wheat and oil for stoves. These items constituted the basic goods needed for the daily survival of the peasants. The shortage of basic commodities and the negative effects of economic hardship experienced by the peasants was a daily reminder of a weak and corrupt government. The economy of Egypt collapsed as a result of drop in demand for cotton, because cotton was the key export commodity that drove Egyptian economy in the 1950s. For this reason, series of peasant uprising occurred, even in lands of the king and this was followed in 1951 by forty-nine strikes across most of the Egyptian cities. The uncontrolled riots of January 26, 1952 in Cairo marked the beginning of the revolution and the military officers' coup of July 23 completed the process of the revolution in Egypt (Robert, 1971).

## THE 1954 ALGERIAN REVOLUTION

The Egyptian revolution is seen as the catalyst that precipitated the Algerian revolution because the revolutionists in Egypt had proved that colonialism and imperialism could be pulled apart through the embers of revolution. Algeria was immersed in absolute colonialism and its socio-economic and political affairs submerged in French imperialism. Algeria was invaded and conquered by French troops in 1830.

The conquest was marked by violence; massacres, mass rapes and other forms of coercive instruments used to reduce the power of the native rulers and created the foundation for the introduction of colonialism. In 1834, Algeria became a French colony and by the 1884 Constitution was declared an integral province of France with three departments, Alger, Oran and Constantine. As a province of France, many French and other Europeans from Spain, Italy and Malta settled in Algeria. (Gallagher, 2002).

With the influx of French nationals into Algeria, the policy of assimilation was introduced to transform Algerian culture, perceptions and attitudes into French values and behavioural patterns. The implementation of assimilation policy was strengthened through the onus of laws and constitutional provisions. In 1865, a decree was promulgated to allow Muslims to apply for full French citizenship only when they had renounced the right to be governed by Sharia law. In 1870, this decree was modified by granting French citizenship to Jews. In order to consolidate the gains of assimilation policy, the 1881 decree was grossly enforced. The decree created specific penalties for indigenes and officially recognized the seizure or appropriation of lands that belonged to the natives. This made discrimination an official policy aimed at putting more pressure on the natives to aspire or become French citizens.

After World War II, the assimilation policy became more holistic in its approach and implementation. It was aimed at transforming all Algerians into French citizens and converting its territories into French ownership and control. To this effect, 1946 Constitution granted French citizenship to all the subjects of France's territories and overseas departments. By 1947, the French authority granted French citizenship to all Algerians who were not required to renounce their Muslim status. With the implementation of this law, Algeria

became engrossed in French imperialism and was legally classified an integral part of France (Gallagher, 2002).

The ascendancy of assimilation policies submerged Algerian identity, image and values making it increasingly difficult to distinguish from that of France. The quest to pull apart the pangs of assimilation and imperialism stimulated nationalism in Algeria. The Algerian nationalism was given more forte by the Algerian soldiers who participated in the First and Second World Wars. Their experiences contributed to growing sense of nationalism and desire for independent national sovereignty. Algerian intellectuals like Frantz Fanon nurtured these ideas into revolutionary values and theories.

Fanon advanced a theory of violent resistance because the French would never end colonialism without violent resistance. Colonialism was institutionalized in Algeria through violence and it can only be dismantled with violent resistance through a revolution. Violence was necessary in the face of an occupying power's intransigence. In this case, violence was needed to unify and strengthen the colonized and liberate them from feelings of inferiority. Fanon sees violence as a revolutionary tactic when other means of resistance fail (Malley, 1996).

Therefore, the role of Algerian intellectuals in supporting the use of violence against French imperialism boosted the morale of the revolutionists towards the establishment of resistance movements particularly the National Liberation Front (FLN). The FLN coordinated a national revolutionary struggle for the restoration of Algerian state, democracy and sovereignty within the framework of the principles of Islam. As an anti-imperialist revolutionary movement, the objectives of FLN according to Mohamed Kellou (1961) were:

The first objective was to ensure restoration of the sovereignty of the Algerian state and to make Algeria a republic. They seek to secure both internal and external sovereignty for Algeria through the proclamation of political independence and an end to colonialism.

The second objective of the revolution was to abolish the structures of the colonial system and privileges enjoyed by French nationals. In doing this the revolutionists seek to re-claim the liberties of all Algerian citizen which they lost to France through colonialism. They would also recover and protect all the property and interests of the Algerian people.

Thirdly, the revolutionists' aim was to end the totalitarian colonial political system and establish and promote democratic values, structures and institutions in Algeria. They believe that power resides with the people and as soon as colonialism is destroyed, an election would be conducted to give birth to a new National Assembly and a democratic constitution.

Also, the FLN revolutionary objective was to promote and protect the rights and obligations of Algerians. The Europeans in Algeria would enjoy Algerian citizenship and would have

equal rights and obligations as the Algerian citizens, eliminating all forms of discrimination. Once the colonial regime is overthrown, the French citizens living in Algeria would no longer enjoy special rights which the colonial system conferred on them. All citizens irrespective of social status, religion and race should be equal before the law.

Finally, the revolutionary goal of the FLN was to establish and consolidate Islamic socialism in Algeria by creating programmes of social welfare. They insisted that they would liberate Algerians from French exploitation and economic subjugation by abolishing the framework of the colonial system that kept Algerians as perpetual sub-proletariat; a condition created to exploit the economy of the country (Kellou, 1961).

Although these goals of national independence were unquestionably vital, but for the revolutionary struggle to be truly successful, the National Liberation Front (FLN) realized that these goals should be boosted with political will, armed operations and strategic use of violence. The essence was to ensure that the strategic principles of organization and discipline were strengthened and adjusted to the goals of FLN to make the revolutionary leaders adhere strictly to the principles and goals of the revolution to avoid mistakes and strategic errors. Also, the armed operation was designed to isolate the enemies and streamline possible areas of attack with high impact value.

On 20th August 1956, the first congress of FLN was held in the valley of La Soummam in the Algerian maquis. The political and military combatants of the national liberation movements sent representatives to the conference. The goal of the conference was to perfect the mechanism, structure and strategies of the Algerian revolution. During the conference, a National Council of the Algerian Revolution (CNRA) was elected, consisting of 34 members. The Council was the decision-making organ of the FLN and had the prerogative power to declare a ceasefire. Also, the conference established a new committee known as the Committee of Co-ordination and Execution (CCE). Members of this committee were drawn from the CNRA and consisted of only 5 members. The role of the CCE was to coordinate the activities of FLN and its military wing known as the Army of National Liberation. The Committee was given the power to implement the decisions of the CNRA (Kellou M. , 1961).

In furtherance of its revolutionary goals, the Committee of Co-ordination and Execution proclaimed the establishment of the Provincial Government of the Algerian Republic. It was a shadow government designed to govern the liberated areas and to take over the government of Algeria when the imperialists were defeated. To this effect, there was need to look for international support and cooperation to consolidate the political power, influence and logistics base of the provincial government.

Countries in Africa and Asia as well as Islamic and communist countries recognized the status of the provincial government of Algeria and its revolutionary struggles. These countries include Afghanistan, Cambodia, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ghana, Guinea,

Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Morocco, North Korea, North Vietnam, Pakistan, China, Soviet Union, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Yemen and Yugoslavia (Kellou M., 1961).

As the influence of Algerian revolutionists spread across countries and with strong backings from communist and Islamic countries, the French government responded with greater repressive actions and policies. The French National Assembly voted the 'special powers' by instructing the government to increase the repression in Algeria and at the same time carry out the policy of the right-wing political values. The National Assembly also voted for the establishment of detention camps and concentration camps in Algeria.

According to Kellou (1961) over two million Algerians live in concentration camps. To all intents and purposes, the French officials carried out continuous policy of ruthless repression against Algerian people and demanded the surrender of the provincial government and dismantling of all revolutionary structures. General De Gaulle in consolidating the repressive policy of French colonialism in Algeria strengthened the military power capability of the French army as a strategy to weaken the revolutionists.

## **THE STRATEGIC PAYOFF OF THE 1952 REVOLUTION**

Egypt is seen as the mother of the Arab world and whatever happens in Egypt will ripple and reverberate throughout the Middle East, Algeria, Morocco, Syria, Jordan, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Therefore, the revolution in Egypt triggered off nationalism and anti-imperialism movements throughout the Arab world. By the 1960s, nationalism was transformed into Arab socialism and became a dominant ideology in most of the Arab states. The Egyptian economy was transformed into a centrally planned economy. The introduction of socialist values and programmes in Egypt boosted industrialisation, leading to an unprecedented period of infrastructure building and urbanisation. Egyptian economy improved tremendously and became the desire of other Arab states.

The rising nationalist sentiments and the spread of Arab socialism to other territories became a threat to the interests of Western imperial powers particularly Britain and France, which had occupied Egypt and other Arab territories since 1882. There were fears of Western-sponsored counter-revolution because the success of the 1952 revolution had become a threat to the continued domination of Arab and African politics and economy by the imperial powers.

In 1956, Britain, France and Israel invaded Egypt in their quest to secure the control of the Suez Canal. Despite enormous military losses, the war was seen as a political victory for the Egyptian revolution. This is because Egypt was able to secure control of the Suez Canal for the first time since 1875. This victory erased the mark of shame and humiliation that Egypt suffered under Israel in 1948 before the revolution. Egypt regained its geopolitical influence and status as a regional power in the Arab world and in Africa after the revolution. This also strengthened the attraction and admiration of the revolution in other Arab

and African countries. Therefore, the 1952 revolution showed that imperialism and colonialism can actually be decimated through the mechanism of revolution. The success of Egypt encouraged nationalism in African countries under imperial rule leading to the decolonization of Africa. It also provided the foundational framework for other African countries to carry out revolution.

Another strategic payoff of the 1952 revolution was the declaration of Egypt as a republic. This brought to an end the constitutional monarchy and the aristocracy of Egypt and Sudan. Sudan which was governed as an Anglo-Egyptian condominium by the British imperial power was granted independence marking the end of British occupation of Sudan and Egypt. As a republic, the Egyptian revolutionary government adopted a nationalist and anti-imperialist foreign policy posture to promote Arab nationalism and international non-alignment. This posture influenced most of the newly independent states in Africa to pursue a non-alignment foreign policy during the Cold War era to avoid Africa being used as a theatre of conflict for the superpowers' ideological and military rivalry.

With the declaration of Egypt as a republic, Muhammad Ali dynasty ended. The revolutionists overthrew King Farouk's regime and forced him to abdicate the throne and went into exile in Monaco and Italy where he lived for the rest of his life and died. Although the young son of King Farouk succeeded him, but the political power and authority remained with the leaders of the revolutionary movement who formally abolished the monarchy ending the 160 years of the Muhammad Ali dynasty. This inspired the toppling of existing pro-Western monarchies and governments in Africa and most Arab states. Other Arab and African states such as Algeria, Congo and Kenya carried out anti-colonial rebellions against European empires and encouraged numerous nationalist movements to spring up in Africa including Nigeria.

However, Nasser ousted Naguib and became the undisputed revolutionary leader of Egypt. He profoundly made the revolution attractive to the Egyptians and many peasants and people in the Arab world and Africa because of his populist, pan-Arab stance and anti-imperialist posture. In January 1956, Nasser introduced a new constitution, setting up a presidential system of government. In the new constitution, the president has the power to appoint and dismiss ministers. In March 3, 1956, he passed new electoral laws granting women the right to vote for the first time in Egyptian political history. In 1957, the revolutionary government established the National Union (Al-Ittihad Al-Qawmi), the first parliament since 1952.

Elections were held to elect the first president and other members of the parliament. Finally, the success of the Egyptian revolution and its resultant structural political changes prompted the spread of revolutionary waves across Africa leading to the granting of independence to African states and the end of colonialism in the continent.

# REVOLUTION IN MODERN AFRICA

Traditional and modern revolutions in Africa focused on addressing basic issues of political repression, economic stagnation, poverty, mass unemployment, and control of political power by a few classes of elites made possible through the frameworks of colonialism and neo-colonialism. While traditional revolution overthrew the embers of repressive colonial regimes, modern revolutions in Africa seek to topple dictatorial domestic neo-colonialist regimes and enthrone democratic values and practices in governance of modern African states.

The modern revolution was a call for democratic reforms in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya occasioned by political protests against authoritarian leaders, whose long rule had brought hardship and misery for the people. In Egypt, Husni Mubarak ruled for thirty years; Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali ruled for twenty-three years and Muammar Gaddafi ruled for forty-two years. Their long period of rule was made possible through neo-colonial structure and exchanges with the Western powers that saw them as strategic partners for the promotion of their interests.

## THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXTS OF REVOLUTION IN AFRICA

Jack Goldstone explicates that the international environment is significant in spreading the ideas, values, and strategies that not only trigger revolution but also determine its eventual outcome. He argues that the international environment will be relevant to revolution only if the internal conditions are favourable. The internal condition that stands out as a key factor that gradually drive revolutionary impulses in Africa is the negative impact of neo-colonialism.

Neo-colonialism, imperialism, and capitalism go hand in hand to ensure the smooth operation and domination of foreign finance capital in Africa. This strategic alliance became prominent after the Second World War when the Western countries changed their tactics from colonialism to neo-colonialism. While colonialism seeks to exercise alien political control over conquered African territories, neo-colonialism encourages economic control and negotiated independence. In doing this, colonial powers handed over political power to a selected group of collaborators, who then became agents for the control of modern African states.

The impact of the new tactics was to give the control of the government in the hands of indigenous African political elites and to ensure that the economy is ostensibly under the dominance of foreign capital owned by Western European countries and the United States. These connote continued economic dependence on foreign capital and undermine the philosophy of self-reliance. Self-reliance represents a transformation from backwardness and authoritarianism to a modern democratic state.

But neo-colonialism pays less attention on self-reliance and more on profit maximization by persuading the political elites to play the role of local compradors of and junior partners to

foreign capital. To ensure their investments against the threat from progressive and patriotic local forces, the foreign mentors manoeuvre the state and the government to sign defence pacts and technical assistance agreement which invariably is used to protect regimes that protect Western interests leading to tenure elongation and absolute authoritarianism as was seen in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and other African countries.

However, these authoritarian African leaders seem not to be really aware of the fact that they are unwitting vehicles of neo-colonialism. They became puppet regimes and use state powers to conquer the minds of the people through massive use of police brutality and militarization of political activities and processes. They turn to extra-continental sources for guidance on economic and political issues while the citizens wallow in poverty and uncertainties.

Such feelings of uncertainty and hopelessness are the hidden variables that activate emotions of frustration and aggressive instincts. As the feelings of aggression increases the supports of international actors begin to decrease because of need to protect their investment. They create an atmosphere of support for the masses and through vehicle of effective propaganda portray the government as anti-people; hence the need to transform the political system from absolutism to democracy.

Therefore, international context is important for the transformation of society to succeed. The support the international powers provide to an authoritarian regime is very critical for its survival. This support comes in two different ways; the international powers can refuse to support the government or they can restrict the government from the use of force against the citizens agitating for transformational change (Goldstone, 2011). Applying this context to Africa, the West, particularly the United States aligned with most despots and repressive regimes in Africa. They favour status quo over freedom to ensure political stability of Africa particularly the Arab or Islamic states.

For the United States, support for Mubarak is significant to promote Arab-Israel peace initiatives and to contain Iran's nuclear programme. Mubarak was considered an ally despite his authoritarian rule. On the other hand, Ben Ali of Tunisia was seen as a dependable partner because of his regime's IMF inspired economic programme, democratic gradualism and secularism. Ironically this earned praises from the US and EU while ignoring his repressive political and economic policies. Their support for Gaddafi's regime was based on the premise that Libyan Arabs would play a role in keeping radical Islamist forces at bay. The support of international powers helped these regimes to earn international legitimacy and strengthened authoritarian rule in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and other Africa countries (Haugbolle R.H., 2012).

Tariq Ramadan argues that international support for or inducement of uprising against authoritarian regimes depends on comparative strategic advantage. He insists that uprising against repressive regimes are possible only if international support is secured. Ramadan

divided international support into two types:

### **Regime Level Support**

This is a form of support from one government to another. The Western countries gave support to Ben Ali of Tunisia, Mubarak of Egypt and Gaddafi of Libya that strengthened their regime against internal or external oppositions. But the Western decision to continue or withdraw their support to these authoritarian regimes came with much diplomatic reluctance. The international powers did not stand by the regimes of Mubarak, Ben Ali and Gaddafi during the uprisings. The decision to withdraw support was not easy. It was done only after a long circle of debates among policy makers.

In the US, Mubarak was considered as an ally and a bulwark against Islamist terrorist threat but lost the confidence of the people. Contrary to this assumption, some policy makers under Obama government argued that the US would benefit more if they withdrew their support for Mubarak and encourage the emergence of a friendly regime that has the support of the Egyptian people. Hence it was critical for US government to withdraw support for Mubarak leading to the regime's downfall. Had the US and EU continued to support the regime the revolution would not have succeeded (Stein, 2012).

### **Societal Level Support**

Societal level support according to Ramadan involves collaboration between the people or civil society members. It comes in form of logistics and training of resistance groups aimed at exerting indirect pressure on regimes perceived to be repressive. The social media played significant role in the Tunisia, Egypt and Libya revolutions and the activists received training from American NGOs. The training was carried mainly to train the revolutionists in acts of democratic values and non-violent methods of confrontation. Some of American corporation such as Google, Twitter and Yahoo provided training and dissemination of information to help activists to mobilize local support for their struggles (Boukhars, 2011).

International context has become increasingly necessary in Africa because of nexus of globalisation. With globalisation, there is increase in communication between governments and non-governmental organisations as well as cultural exchanges among peoples of different societies. This platform provided by globalisation have made revolution to succeed in East Europe and Africa. After the third wave of democratization of East Europe through revolution, the West became keen in democratizing the Arab world. This created hope for spreading democracy to Africa. George Bush government in US launched the freedom agenda that is based on three pillars of regime change, people's rights and freedom. The invasion of Iraq was based on this agenda. Therefore, mass protests and uprisings were strategically used to remove repressive regimes that no longer serve the interests of the West (Syed, 2014).

## **THE TUNISIA REVOLUTION**

The modern Africa revolution originated from Tunisia, a symbol of democracy and

secularism of the new Islamic world. But Ben Ali regime in the process of consolidating power drove the nation from the hills of democracy to the valley of authoritarianism. The revolution in Tunisia was generated from legitimate crisis which emanated from regime repression, growing alienation of the people, inflation, excess borrowing and corruption that retarded economic growth and increased mass unemployment. These economic problems culminated into political alienation of the people.

Since coming into power in 1987, Ben Ali had won five presidential elections with almost ninety percent of the vote. The activities of opposition were also under strict surveillance as political participation and freedom of expression were out rightly curtailed (Masoud, 2011). The twenty-three yearlong rule of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali came to an end in January 14, 2011 when he fled the country. The success of Tunisia revolution sparked region-wide revolutionary struggles in Africa.

### **THE SUCCESS STORY OF BEN ALI'S REGIME BEFORE THE REVOLUTION**

Tunisia under Habib Bourguiba leadership operated one-party system characterized by authoritarian rule. Opposition groups were stifled and not permitted to organise political activities or even form political parties. Membership to the ruling party was selective as most political elites were excluded from political processes; hence there were many political prisoners in Tunisia. Following the successful coup of November 1987, Bourguiba regime was brought to an unexpected end. Ben Ali took over and introduced new constitutional reforms that would uphold the tenets of democracy to end the era of totalitarianism (Parkins, 2004). His success story was:

To end epoch of political repression, Ben Ali brought together a multiparty system to replace the one-party structure. He removed restrictions on formation of political associations and allowed opposition groups to form political parties. A new structure of political inclusiveness was erected to strengthen popular participation in politics. Political prisoners were released and those on exile were allowed to return home to form political associations. The political scene became more vivacious and inclusive. The name of the ruling party was changed from Neo-Destour Party to Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD); its membership was opened to all Tunisians (Alexander, 2010).

Also, Ben Ali made remarkable achievement in the area of national reconciliation because the totalitarian regime of Habib Bourguiba brought instability, dissatisfaction and division among elites in the political system. To this end, in November 1988 he collaborated with the released political prisoners and representatives of the Islamic Tendencies Movement (MTI) to discuss and approve the National Pact. The Pact was designed to promote pluralism, human rights and fundamental freedom among the peoples of Tunisia. The Pact was also spectacular in the following areas of constitutional amendments (Alexander, 2010):

- i. Through constitutional amendment, the office of president-for-life was abolished. This allows a two-term limit for the president, with a maximum age limit of seventy years.
- ii. A new electoral law was initiated, that prohibited the establishment and running of

political parties base on religion. So, the Islamic Tendencies Movement changed its name to Hizb Ennahda (Renaissance Party). The party was the constitution permitted to run independent candidates for parliamentary elections.

Similarly, Ben Ali sustained and promoted values of secularism and pluralism by separating religion from partisan politics. Political parties based on Islamic religion were banned. Tunisia then became the most secularized nation in the Arab world by promoting progressive laws on women's rights, religious tolerance and peaceful coexistence. These measures became a bulwark against domestic terrorism, which had caused civil war in Algeria.

In addition, economic prosperity and stability contributed to the survival of Ben Ali's regime. He took bold steps to implement an International Monetary Fund structural adjustment programme. The nation's currency was devalued and the economy was able to sustain an annual economic growth rate of 5 percent for a decade. Through cooperation with IMF, he established close economic relations with European Union.

In 1993, Europe emerged as Tunisia's major trading partner, purchasing over 80 percent of its exports and supplying 70 percent of imports, resulting in increase in exports, foreign direct investments and tourism. The economic boom produced more jobs annually for university graduates and expanded the education and healthcare sectors. Living standard of the Tunisian working class tremendously improved and the country turned out to be politically stable. Tunisians were satisfied with economic stability and cared less about changing the political system (Parkins, 2004).

## **THE RISE OF AUTOCRACY**

Feelings of fear and threat of possible rise of secular opposition party stimulated impulse of autocracy in Ben Ali's regime. This fear became high when Hizb Ennahda won over 15 percent of the national parliamentary elections through their independent candidates. They secured high number of votes in the suburbs of Tunis, the capital as well as in some areas of the south (Perkins, 2004). Ben Ali interpreted this victory as sudden rise of strong opposition to his party's hegemony.

In November 1989, he announced that there was no room for religious party in Tunisia. Under such guise, the regime started to decimate the party using covert force. In response, the leader of Ennahda, Rachid Ghannouchi went to Algeria and called on the people of Tunisia to rise against the government leading to escalation of Islamist militancy in Tunisia. In his bid to contain the spread of Islamist militancy, the regime introduced certain coercive measures which included but not limited to the following strategies.

In his first move, Ben Ali regime adopted a counter-insurgency strategy aimed at cracking down on Ennahda. The government arrested over three hundred Ennahda leaders and activists whom they accused of plotting to overthrow the government. In July 1992, 279 Islamists were tried in Tunis Military Tribunal and were sentenced to periods of

imprisonment ranging from fifteen years to life imprisonment. Forced confessions, torture and police brutality were used to get evidence needed for prosecution (Murphy, 1999). Ben Ali became more intolerant of any demand to liberalize the political system. He outrightly clamped down on human rights advocates and outspoken critics. Khemais Chamhari of the Tunisian League of Human Rights was arrested for writing an open letter to Ben Ali over his restrictive political policies.

However, indirect method of censorship was introduced to silence critics and opinion leaders. Although there was no official censorship, freedom of expression was curtailed through intimidation and harassment. Newspapers prefer to have blank space or pages than to write articles that run contrary to the views of government. Newspapers were seized for having blank spaces and editors were forced to fire reporters; threat of becoming unemployed inhibited some reporters from being critical of public policy and corrupt practices of the government. Editors and reporters were given lists of public policies and subjects that they should not report on. Many reporters avoided writing on sensitive issues to play safe and avoid arrest or imprisonment. Freedom of press was lost and restrictions on news coverage increased unabated (Garon, 2003).

However, to perpetuate himself in power, Ben Ali enacted a self-serving electoral reform. Prior to 1999 presidential election, he established an independent electoral commission and appointed its members. Though independent by name, the electoral body has no authority to make decisions or funds to investigate violations. The electoral law was changed to allow candidates to compete for the presidency, but the new law was restrictive that most potential candidates were disqualified. Also, in 2002, a referendum was held to amend the constitution to allow Ben Ali to run again when his term expires in 2004. It was approved by a vote 99.5 percent.

This was possible because he sustained bureaucratic control over electoral politics to dominate the political system. In 2008, he introduced new eligibility requirements to limit the number of candidates seeking the presidential office. One of the requirements was that a presidential candidate must have headed a political party for two years. Through this process, he eliminated most of the candidates for 2009 election (Chrissafis, 2011). Only three less popular candidates were left to contest election.

None of them were expected to win, but their participation gave credibility to the electoral process as being democratic. The electoral process and voter registration were under the interior ministry which also controlled the police and security services that were used during the elections. This new arrangement created voters' apathy and opened up possibilities for rigging. The opposition parties were rendered incapable of challenging Ben Ali's autocracy or political domination (Watch, 2011).

Ben Ali held five elections and he won all through manipulation of the country's electoral laws. This made it possible for him to hold onto power for twenty-three years. These

laws were designed to stifle civil society, diminish judicial independence, limit political participation and shield him from accountability (Watch, 2011). In his quest to hold power, the regime drifted into authoritarianism and relied heavily on the police to control the state to preserve political power and hegemony. Tunisia lost its democratic values that were a mark of reference to other Islamic countries. The new road of autocracy provided and stimulated collective struggle and resistance against Ben Ali's regime.

## **THE TUNISIAN REVOLUTION CATALYSTS**

The causes of the revolution in Tunisia were neither economic nor political in nature. There was a convergence of factors brought about by a variety of demands and factors. These factors range from issues relating to lack of legitimacy, repression and corruption to issues on performance of the state. The convergence of causative factors unified opposition elites in their quest to start show of resistances to the regime. The factors are analysed in detail below.

The first contradictions that led to the revolution was the economic downturn in Tunisia which was worsened by Europe's financial crisis. Europe purchased 80 percent of Tunisia exports and the sudden drop in the European market demand for Tunisian products resulted in a decrease in exports. This gave rise to contraction in the industrial sector and a slower expansion in services. Though the economy rebounded in 2010 due to injection of capital by IMF and World Bank but economic opportunities decreased as state resources also reduced.

The reduction in state resources can be attributed to fall in revenue, failure to adjust revenue with inflation, excess borrowing and increase in the prices of key commodities. The masses became stark and frustrated over time as income disparity widens. The middle and lower class saw no window of opportunity for fulfilling their dreams. This resulted in show of resistance to the regime through demonstrations.

The youths were caught in between a rock and a hard place as unemployment rose tremendously. The 2010 economic recovery plan created substantial regional disparities between Tunis and the coastal areas in the east. Unemployment was more than 22 percent in Kasserine and Gafsa. Unemployment for youths was 30 percent in 2009 and for university graduates it was 45 percent (Cavatorta, September 2011). The university graduates were excluded from the economy as tourism only require low skilled workers; their high expectations were frustrated having neither prospects of jobs at home nor prospects for migrating and seeking employment abroad. These conditions convinced many graduates and poor people that the government did not care and was not going to reverse unemployment (Arieff, 2011).

Economic conditions became stringent for people in Tunisia. Remittances from Tunisians dropped considerably due to austerity measures in Europe. Food inflation was very high, as much as 36 percent of the house budget was spent on basic food. This was worsened by

over two decades of job-cuts by state owned companies and 350 political hiring with links to Ben Ali and his regime; the poverty ridden areas with few jobs' opportunities exploded with riots.

The regime responded ruthlessly and quelled the riots. The fresh graduates who were unemployed staged a sit-in-front of trade union's office, joined by low salaried workers, widows and other poor people. The movement lasted for six months due to lack of leadership and prominent activist figures. The authority was unable to suppress it immediately. The Gafsa movement set a new pattern of protests acting in a concerted action (Khusrokhavar, 2012).

The economic miseries of the people were accentuated by endemic corruption of the regime. The corruption of Ben Ali's family increased unabated and caused discontent among the unemployed youths and accelerated the collapse of the regime. The ruling family, including the extended family of over a hundred and forty people were involved in widespread corruption. This network was referred as 'the family' in Tunisia (Anderson, 2011). Tunisians were particularly wary of the lavish spending lifestyles of Ben Ali's family (Arieff, 2011). They owned over one hundred and eighty companies and other lucrative businesses including a shipping cruise line, pharmaceutical firm and real estate companies.

The privatization programme was highly mismanaged giving room to people of his clan to control major chunk of business in Tunisia. Import licenses were given on selective basis creating a wide imbalance in the society that undermined the economy. Contracts for tourism and construction were allotted on favouritism, excluding over 95 percent of the population from the economy. The discontentment among the people was aggravated by sight of Ben Ali's family and members of his clan having access to a better life. The wealth of Ali's family added to the frustration of masses, at a time of high rate of unemployment among youth under the age of twenty-four, who accounted for 40 percent of the population (Anderson, 2011).

Another remote catalyst that drove the Tunisian revolution was the exclusion of the military from the regime's security and political structure. Revolution cannot succeed without the support of the military, because the military's decision to support or refusal to stand by a particular regime determines the success or failure of a revolution. In Tunisia, the army was always been excluded from politics even under three-decade long rule of Habib Bourguiba, Ben Ali's predecessor. Ali followed this trend and kept the military out of politics.

The Army was poorly funded and its role was strictly limited to defence of the border. The regime gave more powers to the police and other security agencies than the military. These agencies were more in number and adequately funded by the Ministry of Interior. For these reasons, the army had no interest in the survival of the regime and when the regime was unable to surpass the protesters, General Rachid Ammar was asked to deploy troops; he refused and placed the troops between the protesters and the security agencies. The army sided with the revolutionaries and deserted the regime and this act decisively resulted in the

overthrow of Ben Ali's regime (Khashan, 2012).

As such, the above factor was compounded by cracks and divisions among the elites. The unity among the ruling and opposition elites makes a government to be immune to resistance and reinforces the stability of a state. In Tunisia, the fissures in elite unity were very visible with the introduction of anti-terrorism law to build up the repressive powers of the regime. Various political parties, civil society organizations and individuals were given restricted freedom by the regime.

Threat of repression was always there in case of non-compliance. The regime outlawed political expression. Reacting to this law, the elites including the leftists, liberalists, and Islamists came together and formed a political alliance to oppose the regime. They formed a movement called Movement for Rights and Freedom, whose primary aim was to oppose the ruling elites in Ben Ali's party.

Their demands include the legalization of all political parties, the release of political prisoners, freedom of media, and general amnesty. The refusal of the regime to meet these demands led to intra-elite struggles and disunity. The failure of the regime to create alliance with the elites gave rise to popular revolt against the regime; comprising the elites, peasants, workers and ethnic, regional and religious groups working together to see to the success of the revolution.

## **CRESCENDOS OF TUNISIAN REVOLUTION**

The Tunisian revolution was an intensive campaign of street demonstrations and civil resistance aimed at the ousting of Ben Ali's regime in January 2011. The revolution was caused by a variety of problems ranging from food inflation, corruption, and lack of political freedom to issues on human rights. But the most striking factor that triggered it, was not the cry for democracy but a demand for jobs. The revolution was also called the Sidi Bouzid revolt to reflect the city where the initial protests started, or the Jasmine revolution called after the Tunisian national flower to keep with the geopolitical classification of revolution.

The protests were sparked by the self-immolation of Muhamed Bouazizi on 17 December 2010. Muhamed, a street vendor, set himself on fire in front of Sidi Bouzid's municipal building to protest the acts of humiliation and brutality of police officers on street traders and other peasants. The incident became a symbol of the regime's corruption and its inability to provide jobs young people who are struggling to support their families in Tunisia. Bouazizi's act of self-immolation united people in Sidi Bouzid and encouraged them to mobilize protests against widespread unemployment in many parts of Tunisia. Also, on 22 December 2010, another youth, Houcine Falhi, killed himself in the midst of a demonstration in the town of Sidi Bouzid. These two incidents turned the local protest to regional violence spreading to neighbouring towns (Garon, 2003).

The police responded by using brute force and instruments of state violence against the protesters. Police fired on protesters who were rallying to demand jobs in solidarity with the

youths in the impoverished regions, using tear gas and ammunition. The security forces also arrested and beat protesters. When the government website was hacked and shut down, they began to arrest bloggers, reporters, activists and journalists. As the degree of police brutality increased, other group of professionals joined the protests.

On 2 January 2011, ninety-five percent of the country's lawyers went on a general strike protesting the arrest of some lawyers. They demanded an end to police brutality and attacks on demonstrators. In solidarity with the protesters, the teachers and the working class in Tunis joined the nationwide protests (Arieff, 2011).

Since the protesters were denied access to media coverage, they resorted to the use of social media to express their grievances and demands. They made good use of Facebook and Twitter to transmit pictures of the police beating and arresting demonstrators. The effective use of social media made other passive actors to join the protest which had spread to almost all the streets in the capital. The opposition Democratic Progressive Party (PDP) criticized the government use of force on the young people of Tunisia and demanded that they should focus on job creation instead of arresting and detaining the protesters.

The protest became widespread to the extent that the police could no longer contain it. Therefore, the failure to end the protests in the streets led Ben Ali to change tactics. On 13 January 2011, he announced that he would not run for re-election when his term expired in 2014. He also promised to allow more freedoms, introduce reforms and investigate the killing of protesters. To demonstrate his commitment, he directed the police to stop shooting at protesters and dismissed the interior minister who many Tunisians accused of been responsible for the killings and injuring of demonstrators. Similarly, he lowered the prices of sugar, milk and bread, to reduce the excruciating impact of inflation (Garon, 2003).

Despite these promises and reforms, protests across the entire country continued unabated. The trade union held a huge rally demanding that Ben Ali should step down immediately because he had lost his legitimacy. These protests and rally put more fears in the minds of Ben Ali and he became more desperate to hold on to power by all costs. He came up with repressive tactics to protect his regime. He declared a state of emergency, banned the gathering of more than three people in public places, and imposed a night curfew on the capital. He also, closed schools and universities in order to keep the youths off the streets. He ordered the army to shoot anyone who violates state of emergency laws.

The refusal of the army to carry out the directive increased the tempo and horizons of the protests. At this moment, the army chief-of-staff advised Ben Ali to quit. He left the country and flew first to Malta and then France; because he was refused landing permission, he ended up in Saudi Arabia. While in exile, Ben Ali was tried in absentia and sentenced to thirty-five years imprisonment for corruption. With his departure, his regime was classified as the most repressive and corrupt regime in the Islamic world (Goldstone, 2011).

# LIBYAN REVOLUTION AND THE FALL OF MUAMMAR GADDAFI

The Libyan revolution will be remembered in the history of modern African politics because of the totalitarian nature of Libyan political system and values driven by pseudo-socialist ideologies. Under the rule of Muammar Gaddafi, the country had no political parties and barely any state institutions. Gaddafi asserted that anyone found guilty of founding a political party would be executed. Through this strategy he was able to rule the country for 42 years with little or no opposition. He personalized state power, the process of leadership and denied the citizens the basic tenets of freedom and humanity.

He used extreme police brutality and torture to undermine political participation and expression of fundamental human rights. Dictatorship was at its peak. However, the events in Tunisia and Egypt which led to the ouster of the regimes of Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak respectively inspired political protests that eventually culminated in a revolution in Libya. Unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, the Libyan revolution was peculiar; social movements, opposition parties and trade unions played no role because such organizations were not allowed to exist under Gaddafi's regime.

But the Libyan revolution was a spontaneous political reaction driven by unorganized young men. The more they were killed, the more political, military and tribal leaders joined the revolt which escalated into a revolution. Like other revolutions in modern Africa, the Libyan revolution was aimed at overthrowing the dictatorial regime of Gaddafi and the creation of new political structures of pluralistic democracy.

## UNDERSTANDING LIBYAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Libya is located in North Africa and shares borders with Sudan, Chad, Niger and Algeria as well as with Egypt and Tunisia, the two countries that inspired modern African revolutions. Libya is also close to Europe particularly Italy that lies to its north just across the Mediterranean. It has an area of 1.8 million square km, the fourth largest country in Africa, with a population of about 6.4 million, one of the lowest in the continent. Libya has over 42 billion barrels of oil reserves, the ninth highest in the world, with a per capita income of \$14000. Also, Libya had the highest Human Development Index in Africa but with unemployment rate of 30 percent.

Taking a cursory look at Libyan political history, Libya for centuries was a Roman colony and at various times and periods colonized by Italy, Spain, France and Britain. In AD 647, Libya was conquered by the Arab forces and was made a caliphate of Utman bin Affan. Following this, the country was ruled by the Abbasids and the Shite Fatimids. After the collapse of the caliphate, the Ottoman Empire asserted its control over Libya in 1551. The Ottomans ruled Libya for over four centuries. During the Italian-Ottoman war, the Ottoman Empire was defeated and Italy assumed control of Libya under the Treaty of Lausanne in 1912. The

Italians ruled till their defeat in the Second World War (Ajish, 2011).

However, on November 21, 1949, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution stating that Libya should become independent before January 1, 1952. On December 24, 1951, Libya declared its independence with representatives of three major regions that make up the country. The three regions namely Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan declared a union which culminated in a country called the United Kingdom of Libya. At inception, the new country had a federal system of government with the three regions being autonomous.

The kingdom also had three capital cities, Tripoli, Ben ghazi and Bayda. Having attained independence in 1951, Libya became the first African country to achieve political independence through the United Nations. Mohammed Idris professed himself as the first king of Libya, enacted the constitution and established a monarchical political system. The monarchical rule in Libya came to an end on September 1, 1969, when a group of young military officers led by Muammar Gaddafi overthrew the government of king Idris while he was away to Turkey for medical treatment. As a result of the military coup d'état, Gaddafi became the military Head of State and changed the name of the country to Libya Arab Republic (Godwin, 2015).

Having assumed power in 1969, Gaddafi ruled the country for 42 years. With regard to the social conditions of Libya, Gaddafi suppressed all forms of oppositions within the military and tribal fields using brute force. Gaddafi adopted three strategies to eliminate internal opposition particularly represented by the Islamist fundamentalist groups. The strategies included undermining the religious authority of the ulema; Second, rejecting and opposing Islamist ideas; and third suppressing Islamist opposition with violence and police brutality. Gaddafi declared the Islamist fundamentalist groups the enemy of the state and in his bid to increase his political authority, he moved to implement the Islamic law strictly while also undermining the authority of the ulemas. This move led to the emergence of anti-Gaddafi groups outside the territory of Libya (Del, 2010).

In 2000, the anti-Gaddafi groups met to establish a joint strategy on how to remove Gaddafi from power. These groups were; the Libyan Islamic Group, the Libyan Constitutional Grouping, the Libyan National Organization, the Libyan National Democratic Rally, the National Front for the Salvation of Libya and the Libyan Movement for Change and Reform. Despite the meeting, the differences among the groups were too deep and they were unable to reach any accord.

As Gaddafi increased the degree of repression against opposition groups, five anti-Gaddafi groups signed the Declaration on the Principles, Fundamentals, and Objectives of the Libyan struggle in 2003. It was signed by the Libyan National Alliance, the Republican Assembly for Democracy and Social Justice, the Libyan Movement for Change and Reform, the Libyan Tmazight Congress and the National Front for the Salvation of Libya. In 2005, the National Libyan Opposition Conference was held in London with the view of

forging a common strategy and opposition against the regime. The conference called for the establishment of a transitional government aimed at replacing Gaddafi's dictatorship and implementing democracy (Watch, 2006).

To decimate international opposition, human rights violation was consistently perpetrated by the regime using the instruments of torture, rape, disappearances and unfair trials. The Libyan people were not free to form a political party and freedom of speech was censored. The state used acts of terror to suppress its citizens and also promoted insidiously the act of international terrorism particularly the bombing of Pan Am flight 103. As a result; the West placed sanctions on Libya and isolated the regime. The years of isolation left economic scars on Libya.

Both the terrestrial and maritime borders remained open, so that Libyan people would not starve. Nevertheless, the Libyan peoples' salaries were so poor that it covered only twenty percent of their needs. Only a small part of Libyan population could afford to buy primary products or goods despite government intervention in the market through subsidization of prices.

There was low job creation which led to unemployment. Gaddafi was aware of the economic hardships the people were going through, but instead of implementing a policy to raise salaries, he insisted on establishing more regional political bodies. He preferred to increase his international influence at the expense of providing good jobs and salaries for its citizens. The level of discontentment increased in the country that prompted insurrection in the garrisons of BeniUlid, Misurata, Garian, Zuara, Barak and Tarhunah. The insurrection lasted for four days with over two hundred victims. The insurrection was repressed with violence (Del, 2010).

## **INERT CAUSES OF THE 2011 REVOLUTION**

The bloodbath of the Abu Salim prison in 1996 provided the inert catalyst that triggered off political activities and protests that culminated in the 2011 revolution in Libya. The mobilization of citizens for the revolution was fostered by anti-Gaddafi opposition groups in Britain and United States. The protest was against the killing of about one thousand, two hundred inmates of Abu Salim prison by Gaddafi regime without any apparent reason.

Under the guise of upholding national security, the families of the slain inmates were not allowed access to the prison by security agents. By 2000 and 2001, the truth was unveiled that the prisoners were killed by guards of the prison. For this reason, the families and relatives of the inmates gathered in Benghazi every Saturday to cry and gripe against the lack of information regarding the death of the prisoners. They also demanded that the corpses of the victim be returned to their families for proper burial.

Despite covert threats by the state and lack of coverage by the state-owned media, the intensity of the protest increased. Gaddafi and his son responded by informing the families

of the victims of the death of their relatives and that they were killed by the guards to maintain order in the prison. The demonstration continued every year despite of the regime's entreaty to halt such protests. In reaction, the government arrested and imprisoned Eathi Terbil in February 14, 2011, the attorney who legally represented the families of the victims of Abu Salim prison for his refusal to compel the families to stop the demonstrations.

The imprisonment of the attorney transformed the low intensity demonstration into high intensity protests. Both in Libya and abroad, sit-in-front of Libyan embassies and demonstrations against the incarceration of the attorney continued unabated. These protests were fostered by a group of Libyan intellectuals in exile in Britain in collaboration with the National Conference for the Libyan Opposition. Their role was to mobilize all Libyans living abroad against the Gaddafi regime and its dictatorial tendencies (Godwin, 2015)

With the discovery of the mass grave of the Abu Salim prison by the National Transitional Council, the tempo of the demonstrations increased. In order to avoid a revolution as it was happening in Tunisia and Egypt, Gaddafi took certain measures. These measures include: The Gaddafi revolutionary committees were instructed to carry out counter demonstrations. In this regard, students and servicemen were compelled to carry image of Gaddafi and rally in the streets chanting pro-Gaddafi slogan and praises. The second strategy was the arrest of human rights activists who were mobilizing for the liberation of Libyan people from dictatorship. Thirdly, he made promises of enacting a new constitution, formation of a new government and a plan for economic development of the country. These promises were initiated as a strategy to dissuade the people from joining the demonstrations (Del, 2010).

However, the Libyan revolution broke out as a consequence of the botched measures, the imprisonment of attorney Fathi Terbil as well as the arrests of human rights activists like Jamal al-Hajji and Idris Mismari. New demonstration occurred in Libya as tens of thousands of people took part in the demonstrations demanding the release of the attorney as well as justice and freedom for all Libyan people. Images of Gaddafi carried by the students forced by the government to demonstrate in favour of the regime were broken on the streets while the offices of the revolutionary committees were destroyed by the protesters. The slogan of the protesters was 'Ya Gaddafi barra barra, Libya hurra hurra' meaning 'away Gaddafi, free Libya'. As the protests deepened, security forces attacked the citizens with guns and other lethal weapons.

The state media intentionally misrepresented the facts by reporting that all such protests were in support of Gaddafi regime. On the same note, Gaddafi asserted that all the regimes in the Arab world that were sustained by the West were destined to fall because they entertained peaceful relations with Israel. He added that the West could not destroy Libya and all Muslims had to fight against it. He also claimed that the demonstrations in Libya were not against his regime but against Western colonialism (Ajish, 2011).

To buttress his perception, Gaddafi forced more students to march yelling at the West and in addition released attorney Terbil all in an attempt to stop the demonstrations. Despite the release of the attorney, the demonstrations did not stop but rather spread all over the country; first in the oriental cities' regions of Cyrenaica. After three days of bloody repression, all the coastal oriental area was liberated from Gaddafi's military control because majority of the military forces joined the revolutionary forces. Also, the regime tempted to bomb Benghazi but the pilots refused to do it, hence, Gaddafi hired mercenaries to carry out his military operations. Benghazi became the linchpin of the revolution.

Benghazi located in the eastern Cyrenaican region of Libya had always been at the forefront of rebellion in the history of Libyan political evolution. The city was at forefront of the rebellion against Ottoman and Italian rule. The legendary Omar Mukhtar who fought the Italians hailed from the region. During the protest against Gaddafi regime, the revolt began from Benghazi and spread quickly to other regions.

The protest in front of the tribunal in Benghazi escalated into full blown rebellion that spread across the entire country, opposing Gaddafi regime and establishing an interim governing body named the National Transitional Council led by Mustafa Abu-Jalil. On September 16, 2011, the National Transitional Council was recognized by the United Nation as the legal representative of Libya, thus replacing Gaddafi government on a permanent basis.

The Security Council of UN also passed a resolution freezing the assets of Gaddafi and his inner circle and restricting their movement. As the pro-Gaddafi force tried to overrun Benghazi, they were confronted by the National Transitional Council forces in a coastal offensive. The Gaddafi forces lost and the NTC forces retook most of their lost territories and captured the capital city of Tripoli which was seen by the international community as a monumental achievement.

This monumental achievement prompted the intervention of the international community in Libya which provided the turning point of the revolution. The United Nations adopted Resolution 1973 which authorized the use of force to halt the massacre in Libya and to protect the country. The Resolution was adopted on March 17, 2011 and on March 19, 2011; NATO began to bomb Libya targeting military bases, military tanks and artillery.

After months of battles and precisely on October 20, 2011, Gaddafi was shot to death by a rebel outside the city of Sirte. Gaddafi dictatorship that lasted for forty-two years finally came to an end. Therefore, the Libyan revolution is very peculiar unlike the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. In Libya a real civil war broke out while in Egypt and Tunisia the revolutions were carried out through street demonstration and violent protests.

## **THE STARRING ROLE OF UNITED NATIONS IN LIBYAN REVOLUTION**

The United Nations played key role in 2011 Libyan revolution especially when the counter-offensive by Gaddafi intensified and weakened the military power capability of the

revolutionary forces of the National Transition Council. Undeterred, Gaddafi proceeded with characteristic bombing targeting the rebels and their sympathizers; in a strategic bid towards offsetting the strength and dynamism of the revolution. To build up the capacity of the revolutionary forces to remove Gaddafi from power and end the long years of dictatorship, repression, brutality and bloodbath in Libya, the United Nations intervened by passing two resolutions.

On February 26, 2011, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1970 condemning Gadhafi's crackdown, putting in place assets freeze and travel embargo of top officials and referring the regime's actions to the International Criminal Court. Paragraph 9 of 1970 mandated the United Nations to intervene in Libya to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory (David, 2011).

Undeterred by Resolution 1970, Gaddafi's air-force step up its heavy bombardment of the rebels, killing scores of civilians and taking hold of areas controlled by the National Transition Council. As the bombardment continued unabated, France and Britain pushed for further action against Gaddafi. French President Nicholas Sarkozy led an international campaign for UN to intervene more forcefully in Libya. Therefore, the primary aim of France was to get the United Nations support to declare a no-fly-zone to protect the rebels from heavy bombardment of Gaddafi's military force.

Consequent upon this, the Anglo- French initiative with America assistance received the backing of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and on March 17, 2011 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973 with ten votes in favour while five members: Russia, china, India, Brazil and Germany abstained from the vote (Abigail, 2011).

On the basis of resolution 1973, a UN coalition force was formed to intervene in Libya using the instruments of force. As soon as the resolution was passed, Gaddafi suggested a ceasefire but this was ignored as deceitful. However, several senior leaders of the coalition made it clear that they want Gaddafi to go. On March 20, 2011, after a bombing raid on Gaddafi's living quarters, the British Defence Secretary Liam Fox indicated that Gaddafi could be a legitimate target.

On April 15, 2011, Presidents Obama and Sarkozy and Prime Minister David Cameron made it clear that Gaddafi must be removed from power. The three leaders declared that it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Gaddafi in power and that he cannot play a part in the future government. Hence the coalition commenced its military action against the regime (David, 2011).

The first wave of the coalition attacks in Libya came from France which was christened Operation Harmattan. France deployed the Dassault Bombers to destroy Gaddafi's military

tanks used to weaken the rebels. Soon after, the United States' Operation Odyssey Dawn, the British Operation Ellamy and the Canadian Operation Mobile were launched and joined the coalition in enforcing the UN Security Council resolution 1973. In the first few days of the coalition intervention, Gaddafi's forces suffered considerable setbacks and the rebels made headway in taking control of key cities and military installations in Libya. As the attacks intensified, Gaddafi changed his tactics and kept his tanks and armoured vehicles well camouflaged and managed to thwart rebel advances.

Therefore, the United Nations in the bid to counter-balance ceded the leadership of the coalition to NATO and the mission was renamed Operation Unified Protector. The mission was commanded by Admiral James Stavridis, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander for Europe. He was assisted by the Canadian Lt. General Charles Bouchard who serves as the operation commander, Lt. General Ralph Jodice of United States as air commander and Vice Admiral Rinaldo Veri of Italy as the maritime commander.

With the ceding of UN coalition to NATO commanders, Gaddafi opted for a ceasefire and proposed a plan for the creation of an interim government that would include opposition figures. He also advocated for a reconciliation process which would culminate in a democratic election. Similarly, the African Union under the leadership of Jacob Zuma of South Africa was in agreement with this view. The African Union called for immediate ceasefire, relief supplies and negotiation between the two groups.

While Gaddafi appeared to be in agreement with the plan, the rebels rejected it and demanded for immediate ouster of Gaddafi (Kim, 2011). On September 16, 2011; the National Transition Council was recognized by United Nations as the sole legal representative of the Libyan nation, thus replacing Gaddafi's government in the comity of nations. This singular action by the United Nations sent a clear message to Gaddafi that he would be removed from power.

In furtherance of its military action against Gaddafi, the United Nations resolved and authorized member states to establish and strictly enforce a no-fly-zone over Libya. With this, the rebel forces gained comparative military advantage over Gaddafi's forces and recaptured most of the territories lost earlier and eventually captured Tripoli, the capital city of Libya. The revolution with the inert support of United Nations came to a highpoint on October 20, 2011; Gaddafi was apprehended and killed in Sirte while trying to escape from the superior military actions and bombardment of the National Transition Council. Therefore, based on the above analysis and data, the United Nations played a covert role in the success of Libyan revolution.

## **LIBYAN REVOLUTION AND THE PERCEPTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS**

The perceptions of state and non-state actors towards the Libyan revolution were shaped and influenced by divergences of interests and the strategic pay-offs each actor would

drive during and after the revolution. The discrepancies in interest were stimulated by the mode and styles of implementing the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 which determined the degree of support each actor gave to the domestic players during the revolution in Libya. In the course of the passage of the resolution in the Security Council, the interests and perceptions of the Western countries were at variance with the perspectives of China, Russia, India, Brazil and Germany about the political events in Libya. These five countries abstained from voting in support of using military action against Gaddafi.

India had a negative perception about providing military assistance to the revolutionary forces. India preferred political efforts in finding solution to the Libyan political crisis rather than the use of military actions against Gaddafi. This was because the Security Council did not have enough data or clear information about political situations in Libya on which to base their decisions, since the report of the Secretary-General's Envoy on Libya had not yet been received by the Council.

Therefore, India decided to abstain from the vote because of lack of uncertainty regarding who was going to enforce the measures. Just like India, Brazil felt that the resolution went beyond the goal of enforcing the no-fly-zone. The Brazilian envoy argued that the use of force as provided for in the resolution would not achieve the immediate end of use of violence by players or guarantee the protection of civilians. From the perception of Brazil, the use of military actions would not only exacerbate the current tension on ground but would also escalate the intensity of the civil war in Libya. Thus, Brazil withdrew from voting in support of Resolution 1973.

However, Germany abstained from the vote based on the proposition that the implementation of the resolution would lead to a protracted military conflict that could spread across the Arab world and pose great security risks to the region. The German envoy posited that the execution of the resolution by the Security Council would result into a large-scale loss of life of civilians in Libya. The communist countries of Russia and China shared the same view and their perceptions as super powers influenced diplomatic thoughts of Germany, Brazil and India on the Libya political crisis that preceded the revolution. Russia criticized the resolution and argued that its provisions was contrary to the practice and norms of the Security Council while China stressed that the crisis in Libya should be resolved through peaceful means rather than the use of war as instrument of political solution.

While the reasons cited for abstention by all these countries remained valid, the United States, Britain, France and other countries of NATO held different perceptions on Gaddafi and the Libyan crisis. To them Gaddafi was a problem and not a solution to the Libyan crisis and therefore, should be removed from power through military actions. They voted in support of Resolution 1970 and 1973 encouraging military assistance to the revolutionary forces in their bid to end Gadhafi's' forty-two-year rule of dictatorship and repression. Though China and Russia abstained from the vote but they were reluctant to use veto

powers, signifying their tacit bargain with the West. This implies that the overt and covert perceptions of the super powers were driven and shaped by the dynamics of oil politics and the strategic political benefit each state actor derives from it (David, 2011).

On the other hand, the perceptions of non-state actors will be given a cursory interpretation to understand the views of Arab League and African Union on the political activities that climaxed into a revolution in Libya. The Arab League response to the Libyan crisis provided the policy framework for the passage of the Security Council Resolution 1973. The League voted in favour of military intervention in Libya and the strategic execution of the Resolution on the no-fly-zone over Libya. Though Syria, Algeria and Mauritania registered their protest against sanctioning unilateral attacks on Libya the official statement concluded that the decision was unanimous. The decision of the league was based on the assumption that Gaddafi had lost legitimacy and support of the citizens because of long years of dictatorship, brutality and killings of Libyan peoples (Cooper, 2011).

Another regional organization, the African Union kept a low profile in the initial phases of the Libyan crisis. This was because of the rising influence of Gaddafi in region and his benevolence in giving financial support and aids to least developed countries of Africa. Also, Libya under Gaddafi had investments and business ties with many African states. These hidden economic interests made African states to withdraw their support for military action against Gaddafi regime. African leaders were wary of accepting or supporting the concepts of humanitarian intervention and regime change adduced by Western actors as reasons for the execution of resolution 1973 aimed at removing Gaddafi from power.

Though South Africa voted in favour of the resolution but grossly opposed the coalition airstrikes and bombardment of Libya by NATO forces. Jean Ping, chairman of the Standing Commission of the African Union asserted that the Union was not consulted about the crisis in Libya before resolution 1973 was passed and beginning of air strikes in Libya. This assertion represents the perception of African Union and its member states. Although the West tried to change the perceptions of African states, particularly South Africa, but the Union maintained a common perception of non-military intervention in Libya. They proposed a peaceful resolution of the conflict to circumvent the occurrence of bloody revolution in Libya.

## **LIBYAN REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON NATIONAL SECURITY OF NATIONS IN SAHEL REGION**

The Libyan revolution have far-reaching implications on the national security of not only its immediate neighbours like Egypt and Tunisia but also on other countries in Africa from Mali, Niger down to the current crisis of insecurity in Nigeria. The most destabilizing consequence of the revolution is the enormous increase in arms smuggling and proliferation of light weapons in the Sahel region of Africa. Since mid-2011, Libyan arsenals and armoury were plundered and large number of explosives, small arms and heavy weapons entered regional smuggling networks.

Libyan weapons have been seen in the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, Tunisia, southern Algeria and northern Niger. Given the region's porous borders, the bulk of the weapons are likely gone to Nigeria either through Chad or Niger, sustaining terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria. This allows existing and emerging armed or terrorist groups in the region to equip themselves more easily.

The greatest threat to national security of states in Africa is the unaccounted number of surface-to-air missiles that got missing from Libyan missile silo during the revolutionary struggle. While it is unclear to what extent such weapons have entered regional smuggling networks, they could pose a significant threat to civilian and military air traffic if they ended up in the hands of terrorist groups such as Boko Haram, killer herdsmen in Nigeria, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (John, 2012).

Another threat to the national security of states in the Sahel region is the return of combatants and mercenaries from Libya that fought on Gaddafi's side during the Revolutionary War. They also posed a great danger to regional security and political stability. These returnee combatants could be classified into three categories in terms of origin and recruitment. The first and largest group of returning combatants were the Tuareg from northern Mali and Niger. They were recruited in the 1980s from the Sahel states as part of the Libyan army under Gaddafi regime. When the revolution started, they were part of the pro-Gaddafi military forces and numbered several thousands of mercenaries that returned to Mali and Niger.

The second group of combatants are rebel groups from Niger, Mali and Sudan that enjoyed close relations with Gaddafi regime. These rebel groups were the leaders of the 2006/2007 Tuareg rebellions in Niger and Mali. Aghali Alambo and Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, both joined Gaddafi's forces with fighters from their group. Also, the Darfur rebel Justice and Equality Movement led by Khalil Ibrahim fought on Gaddafi's side during the Revolutionary War. The leaders of these three groups returned to their respective countries after the fall of Tripoli, with many of their fighters as well as weapons and vehicles.

The third category is the young men without prior battle experience, who were recruited as mercenaries in the first weeks of the uprising in Libya. Recruitment occurred through Libyan embassies and consulates or through intermediaries such as Aghali Alambo. Most of these young men came from Mali, Niger, and Chad who were recruited to fight against the revolutionary forces of the National Transition Council (Wolfram, 2012).

Now we shall take a cursory look on the consequences of the returnee combatants and mercenaries on the national security of Mali, Niger, Chad and Nigeria. The impact on the states of the Sahel region has been upsetting the crescendos of national security to date. In Mali, the return of fighters from Libya occurred within an already tense political context. The Algiers peace agreement, which had been supposed to put an end to the 2006 rebellion, was not being adequately implemented and the rebel leaders that returned from Libya had been threatening to revert to armed struggle.

In mid-January 2012, fighting erupted in northern Mali between a newly formed Tuareg rebel group and the Malian army. By mid-February, the rebels had confined the army's presence to three cities in the north, displaying military skills and firepower unseen in northern Mali's previous insurgences. The rebellion is a direct consequence of the Libyan revolutionary war. While tensions in northern Mali had risen in recent years, the return of Tuareg combatants from Libya with heavy weapons and vehicles triggered violent conflicts in the country.

Upon their return to Mali, the combatants set themselves up in different camps according to their tribal allegiances. Some of the fighters were given assurance by the government that they would be integrated into the army while others, mostly Ifoghas and Idran Tuareg allied themselves with the members of the 2006 rebellion. Among this group, the *Mouvement National pour la Liberation de l'Azawad* (MNLA) explicitly espoused a separatist agenda and increased the intensity of violence and as a result over one hundred and twenty thousand refugees had fled the country. In addition to the insurgency war, tensions over cocaine smuggling and other criminal activities occurred between the rebels and the Malian army over control of such activities. Such tension aroused tribal enmity and violent confrontations, constituting great dangers to Mali's national security (Wolfram, 2012).

In Niger, the return of the combatants from Libya took a more favourable context, with former Tuareg rebel leaders accommodated politically during the transition from military coup to an elected government. Aghali Alambo was appointed advisor to the speaker of the National Assembly following his return from Libya while another rebel leader, Rhissa Ag Boula was appointed an advisor to the president.

The appointment reflected their military weight after their return from Libya, giving them an unofficial mandate to maintain stability and peace in the north. However, the controversies over the demobilisation and integration of these returnee fighters into the official security force have created tension in Niger. The threat of destabilisation in the aftermath of the Libyan revolutionary war persists in Niger, threatening the structure of national security (Wolfram, 2012).

For Chad and Sudan, the return of Khalil Ibrahim's JEM from Libya was a major security threat. The JEM had become the most militarily powerful Darfur rebel group mainly due to lavish support from Chad and after President Idris Deby expelled Ibrahim to Tripoli in May 2010 and cut off Chadian assistance to the group. Although JEM returned from Libya with an expanded arsenal, it was dealt a heavy blow by the loss of its main foreign backer.

In late 2011, JEM's splinter factions entered into talks with the Sudanese government but this did not impact positively on the prospects of Darfur peace process. The group was further weakened in December 2011, when Ibrahim was killed in an airstrike in Kordofan. This also eased the pressure on Deby from his ruling Zaghawa Kobe clan to support their

fellow clansmen in JEM (Wolfram, 2012).

Finally, in Nigeria the return of the mercenaries and fighters from Libya to Chad and Niger has become more destructive, constituting a colossal threat to Nigeria's national security, political stability and unity. Due to lack of strict border control, large numbers of small arms, explosives and heavy weapons from Libya through the regional smuggling networks have entered Nigeria powering terrorism, insurgencies, kidnapping and massive killings of civilians.

In London with the Archbishop of Canterbury, President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria asserted that the fall of Gaddafi and the revolutionary war in Libya prompted the influx of armed gunmen from the Sahel region into different parts of the West African sub-region. These gunmen and fighters were trained and armed by Gaddafi, when he was killed the fighters moved out of Libya with vast arsenals of military weapons. Some of the fighters joined Boko haram, while others joined killer herdsmen unleashing terror on Nigeria farmers in north central states of Benue, Taraba and Nasarawa.

In the first quarter of 2018, the herdsmen had killed over a thousand civilians, with hundreds of thousands of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), creating humanitarian emergencies in Nigeria. Since most of these killings occurred in Christian dominated and minority tribe areas, the secularity of Nigerian political system is being threatened resulting in mistrust and reprisal attacks. Hence the herdsmen terror attacks pose great danger to Nigeria national security, unity and stability (Samuel, 2018).

## CONCLUSION

Finally, this lecture has critically examined all the basic issues in the African revolution by conceptualizing the specific conditions and dynamism that make up the African revolution which differentiates it from the Western concept of revolution. Due to these dynamic differences, most scholars from the West do not believe that revolution could occur in Africa. Karl Marx held a highly negative view of Africa. He sees Africa as a stagnant and backward continent led by barbarians and despots that lacked the capacity to carry out a revolution that would transform its development on the path of socialism. Marx asserts that Africa should be colonized.

With the colonization of Africa, the European colonial powers used the Marxist proposition to justify the annexation of Africa. They adopted barbaric methods to defeat African peoples' unwillingness to submit them to foreign rule. With the granting of legal independence to countries in the 1950s, neo-imperialism was introduced to sustain despotism, and economic and political exploitation of Africa by the northern industrialized capitalist countries of Europe in collaboration with local elites in Africa. Hence colonialism and neo-imperialism became the instruments of domination, exploitation, intimidation, and underdevelopment of Africa.

However, unlike the Western European revolution that was based on three pillars of justice, freedom, and liberty, the African revolution goes beyond these abstract ideas. African revolution does not seek to fight for ideas alone but for material benefits, improved conditions, and a better future for African peoples. Therefore, the African revolution seeks to destroy the colonial system and emancipate Africans from the web of oppression, poverty, and suffering induced by the strategic application of neo-imperialism in Africa.

The key pillars of the African revolution are liberation, emancipation, and development. The core value of the African revolution is to eliminate imperialist domination, neo-colonialism, and neo-liberal policies that throw up cogs in the wheels of Africa's quest for development. Since the key pillars of the African revolution reversed Western revolutionary goals of freedom, justice, and liberty, revolutions in Africa are seen and interpreted as mere uprising, terrorism or insurgency.

This misinterpretation defeats the main essence of revolution in Africa, leading to the emergence of terrorist groups and post-revolutionary crisis and instability in Africa. Therefore, African revolution is more than the struggle to remove dictatorial leaders but a direct attempt to dismantle the embers of neo-imperialism that uphold underdevelopment, poverty and longevity of despots in Africa.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The goal of African revolution is the re-establishment of the values of Pan-Africanism that: Africans should rule Africa, control its resources and peoples by eliminating the cogs of resource curse, colonialism, neo-colonialism and imposition of neo-liberal economic system, strategically designed to under-develop Africa, create poverty and promote economic and political catastrophe in the periphery states.

The structural mechanism of international politics is premeditated to make weak states weaker and great powers greater in their struggle to control and regulate the authoritative allocation of resources to determine who gets what, when and how. Therefore, African revolution laid the pathway towards achieving freedom, emancipation and needed changes to move Africa from passive to active actor in international politics. To achieve this goal in modern African politics, the following recommendations will be of tactical and reformative value.

1. Pan-African tertiary educational institutions under the supervision of African Union or sub-regional governmental organizations should establish active learning centres or units to coordinate and promote the teaching of African politics, economic ideals and modern concept of Pan-Africanism. These centres should be headed by professionally qualified and experienced scholars to transmogrify the concept of Pan-Africanism into an ideology; to direct African economic and political policies as well as to act as a bulwark against contending ideologies of neo-liberalism from USA and European Union; communism from Russia and socialism from China. This is necessary to assert Africa's ideological independence and emancipation from exploitative orientations of liberalism and socialism that has done more harm than good to African economy and politics.
2. There is need for attitudinal change by African Heads of State, Ministers and policy makers from Euro-centric economic policies and governance to an Afro-centric politico-economic development policy. To achieve this continental goal, there is need to establish a Pan-Africa School of Thought specifically designed for serving African leaders to encourage positive review of African problems instead of going cap in hand begging for aids, loans and grants from their counterparts in Europe, Asia and US. This change in attitude would help to tune them up for the challenge of giving functional application to the theory of social constructivism, intra-regional collaboration and self-reliance to reduce the sudden occurrence of revolution in Africa.
3. Extremely conservative African political leaders, who always use the principle of liberal democracy and its electoral process to capture state power, win elections and promote authoritarian governance, should take pain to create empirical and problem-solving political system to avoid the caprices of revolution. Governments should be working out modalities for a more interactive multilateral allocation of values to enhance greatest happiness to the greater number of Africa peoples. Outlines of a written development plan by countries of Africa, including plans for economic engagements and resource industrialization should be encouraged and implemented timely to build the confidence of Africa and African peoples in the contemporary world order.

## CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIETY

Many articles address revolution, but only a few scholars, such as Frantz Fanon and Amílcar Cabral, have focused on revolution in Africa. A novel contribution of this study is the introduction of the concept of the “African Revolution” into African studies literature.

For years, revolutions in Africa have been misunderstood and subjected to controversial conceptualizations by Western scholars. Many scholars and policymakers argue that revolutions cannot occur in Africa due to perceived backwardness and a lack of political culture and values necessary for successful revolutions. Consequently, most African uprisings are often mislabelled as the Arab Spring, terrorism, insurgency, or mere uprisings.

Empirical data on African revolutions is scarce. Western scholars have frequently classified African revolutions as the “Arab Spring,” a claim unsupported by robust empirical evidence or literature. While many articles focus on the Arab Spring, the justification of this classification as a revolution remains weak.

This inaugural lecture aims to provide a more robust explanation, filling a gap in our understanding of the African Revolution and expanding the theoretical assumptions of Frantz Fanon and Amílcar Cabral to the realities of modern African politics.

My research on African revolutions, published in 2020 by Galda Verlag, Germany, was listed in WorldCat, the world’s largest library catalog. Within days of its publication, it was displayed in prestigious libraries, including:

- German National Library, Frankfurt
- Bayreuth University, Germany
- German National Library, Leipzig
- Freie Universität Berlin, Germany
- Universität zu Berlin
- Harvard University Library, USA

I have contributed significantly to the global body of knowledge on African revolutions, with numerous citations spanning Europe, Asia, Africa, and the United States. My book on African revolutions has garnered over 557,021 seller feedback ratings, with 97.9% positive feedback.

Based on this positive reception, universities and African Studies centers in Africa and the United States invited me to present on the new concept of the African Revolution, advancing its theoretical development. In collaboration with professors and scholars from San Joaquin Delta College, California, I delivered lecture series on topics including:

- **The Politics of Colonialism and Revolution in Africa: Pre-Colonial and Colonial African Revolution**
- **Neo-Colonialism and the Politics of Revolution in Africa: Post-Colonial Revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt**
- **French Democracy and Resource Control in Africa: The Military Coup in Gabon**

These lectures, published in the institution's series, attracted an international audience and became valuable resources for policymakers, academics, and students in the United States.

I also collaborated with African Live, a research center in Accra, Ghana, with offices in California, USA. This collaboration involved live lectures featuring African researchers, professors, and professionals. My research was featured in live lectures at universities in the USA and contributed to literature on topics such as:

- **The Berlin Conference, Colonialism, and Africa's Development Crisis**
- **The Impact of the British Industrial Revolution on Africa**  
My research is included in leading global libraries such as:
  - **Harvard University Library** – I am one of the few African scholars whose work is cataloged in the world's largest academic library.
  - **German National Library** – My works on African politics and revolutions are housed in this global library, which sets international library standards.
  - **Humboldt University of Berlin** – My research provides data for researchers, students, and professors at this leading research university.

At Nile University of Nigeria, my works on African studies are accessible through databases such as:

- **ProQuest**
- **JSTOR**

I have taught courses related to African studies at various universities, including:

- **Zirve University, Gaziantep, Turkey:** Africa in World Politics, War
- **Turgut Ozal University, Ankara, Turkey:** Turkey-Africa Relations
- **Meliksah University, Turkey:** Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism in Africa
- **Nasarawa State University, Keffi:** Security Policy and Strategy
- **Nile University of Nigeria:** African Politics, African International Relations, Issues in International Relations

I have supervised numerous undergraduate projects, master's dissertations, and PhD theses at Nile University of Nigeria, including:

- **Islamic State in West African Province and Terrorism in Nigeria: Impact on National Security (2015–2022)**
- **Democracy, Good Governance, and Leadership Challenges: A Perspective for National Cohesion and Development in Nigeria**

- **China-Nigeria Bilateral Relations: An Assessment of Economic and Security Cooperation (2013–2022)**

In institutional collaborations, I have delivered lectures at:

- **National Defence College, Nigeria** – Focus on regional security and diplomacy.
- **Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nigeria** – Research on soft power diplomacy and South-South cooperation.
- **Cardinal Onaiyekan Foundation for Peace** – Research on policies for social change and peaceful coexistence.
- **NNPCL** – Training on enhanced performance and strategic management in collaboration with ORBIS Consulting Nigeria.

In collaboration with international scholars such as Toyin Falola and Kenneth Kalu, I co-authored *Africa and Globalization: Challenges of Governance and Creativity* (Palgrave Macmillan). Additionally, I contributed to research published in Turkish and by Covenant University, Nigeria.

Finally, my ongoing research focuses on the sudden occurrences of military coups and political protests in contemporary African countries, in collaboration with professors from the United States, Canada, and Nigeria.

## MY STEWARDSHIP IN THE ACADEMIA

- Pioneer Head of Department of Political Science and International Relations, Nile University of Nigeria 2010-2015. Functioned in various capacity towards the development of departmental administrative structure, curriculum for undergraduate and postgraduate programmes, resources verification, examination regulations and accreditation of programme that have sustained the smooth running of the Department.
- Member of professional societies and associations including Nigerian Political Science Association and British International Studies Association (BISA).
- Editor to many national and international journals and engaged in peer-review of research articles for publication in journals.
- Research collaboration with the Directorate of Technical Aid Corps, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja.
- My research works are widely accessible and catalogued in various libraries and universities, including but not limited to the following: German National Library Frankfurt, Germany, German National Leipzig, Freie University Berlin, Harvard University USA, University of Texas, Stanford University USA, University of Cambridge United Kingdom, University of Liverpool United Kingdom, Columbia University USA, Simon Fraser University Canada, University Of Hong Kong etc
- Served as visiting professor in Delta College California USA, Zirve University Gazantep Turkey, Turgut Ozal University, Ankara Turkey, Meliksah University, Turkey
- Resource person to Cardinal Onaiyekan Foundation for Peace, Ufuk Dialogue Foundation, Nigeria Defence College, Federal Ministry of Education committee for development of SDG instruments, FCT Department of Science, Technology and Innovation, African Conference, University of Texas etc

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I owe my achievements today to God Most High. From the beginning of my academic career, He has been and still very visible. He has used my journey in the field of academics to show that “man does not live by bread alone but by every word that proceeds out of the mouth of the Lord doth man live”. To Him alone be all glory and honour. I appreciate the roles my Father, Elder W.I. Enwere and my mother Nnennaya Enwere (Ochommakparaaku) played in my life. They gave me a sound moral upbringing and paid my fees from primary school to my Ph.D Postgraduate studies, I never lack any thing in life. They contributed greatly to my success. My in-depth gratitude goes to my family members particularly my immediate elder brother Barrister Uchechukwu Moses Enwere for his advice and encouragement.

As an undergraduate and postgraduate student at Abia State University, Uturu and University of Abuja respectively, I wish to express my gratitude to my lecturers, who taught me the art and science of Political Science and International Relations. They were first class lecturers, and I am quite sure that they will definitely be proud of my achievement as one of their best students to become a Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies. These lecturers include: Professor Aja Akpuru-Aja, Professor David Njoku, Professor Akaeze, Professor Mbachu, Professor Mohamadu Wader, Professor Saleh. Professor Zoaka. I gained tremendously under the tutelage of these wonderful professors. Professor Mohamadu Wader taught me simplicity that scholarship without humility is useless.

I must also express my gratitude to the doyen of African history and politics, Philips who lives in California USA, took me up after reading my book titled: “Issues in African Revolution” he invited me for presentations in the US. I also thank Rev. Sister Agatha Chikelue for making me a facilitator in Cardinal Onaiyekan Foundation for Peace Fellowship programme in Africa.

My gratitude goes to the Vice Chancellor, Nile University of Nigeria Professor Dilli Dogo an administrator par excellence for his numerous achievements in the university, he is the first Vice Chancellor to introduce the inaugural lecture series in this university, he has done wonderfully great. He also gave me the opportunity to serve as the Head of Department, Political Science and International Relation.

I also recognise the Dean, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Professor Jide Oladipo for his encouragement and support; he is like a brother to me. I appreciate my colleagues at the Department of Political Science and International Relations: Dr. Dimas who is currently the HOD for his great display of administrative knowledge in the running of the department, others are Dr. Izu, Dr. Yaya Yakubu, Dr. Saleel, Dr. Alami, Dr. Maigari, Dr. Abdulkarim, Dr. Princewill, and Shully. Among the non-Academic staff, I am grateful to the Registrar, David and all the Directors. In addition, I specially acknowledge all the undergraduate and postgraduate students of the Department.

Finally, to my family, my wife, Oluchi and the children, Nkwachukwu, Chinonso, Ogechi and Ebubechi who have had to bear my long absence from home during the course of my research and international engagements. I dedicate my achievement to this wonderful woman and her children.

## REFERENCES

- Abdel Fadil, M. (2011). *Capitalism of the Cronies*. Cairo: Dar El-Eiyn.
- Abdel, F. (2011). *Capitalism of the Cronies*. Cairo: El-Eiyn.
- Abdilahi, B. H. (1985). *Frantz Fanon and the Psychology of Oppression*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Abgail, H. (2011). *Among the Mercenaries: Portrait of Gaddafi Soldier*. Times, March.
- Abigail, H. (2011). *Among the Mercenaries: Portrait of a Gaddafi Soldier*. Times, March 1.
- Ajish, J. (2011). *The Crisis in Libya*. ORF Issue Brief, 1.
- Ajish, J. (2011). *The Crisis in Libya*. ORF Issue Brief.
- Al-Aswany, A. (2011). *On the Sate of Egypt*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Al-Aswany, A. (2011). *On the State of Egypt*. New York.
- Alexander, C. (2010). *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb*. New York: Routledge.
- Alexander, C. (2010). *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb*. New York: Routledge.
- Andeliman, D. (1970). *Profile: Amilcar Cabral*. Africa Report, 19.
- Anderson. (2011). *Demystifying the Arab Spring*. Foreign Affairs, Vol 90, No. 3.
- Anderson, I. (2011, May/June). *Demystifying the Arab Spring*. Foreign Affairs vol. 90 No. 3.
- Anderson, I. (2011). *Demystifying the Arab Spring*. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 3.
- Anderson, L. (2011). *Demystifying the Arab Spring*. Foreign Affairs vol. 90, No. 3.
- Arieff, A. (2011, December 16). *Political Transition in Tunisia*. CRS Report for Congress, no. 7-5700. Washington DC, USA: Congressional Research Service.
- Arieff, A. (2011). *Political Transition in Tunisia*. Washington DC: CRS Report for Congress, No. 7-5700.
- Barry, S. a. (1990). *Revolution and Political Change in Third World*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Blackey, R. (1974). *Fanon and Cabrial: A Contrast in Theories Revolution for Africa*. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 191-209.
- Boukhars, .. (2011). *The Arab Revolution for Dignity*. The Journal of the Nationa Committee on American Foreign Policy vol. 33, No. 2, 182.
- Boukhars, L. (2011). *The Arab Revolution for Dignity*. The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, Vol. 32 No. 2.
- Cabral, A. (1972). *Identity and Dignity in National Liberation Struggle*. Africa Today, 47.
- Cavatorta, F. (2011). *The End of Authoritarian Rule and the Mythology of Tunisia under Ben Ali*. Third World Quaterly, Vol. 32, No. 7.
- Cavatorta, F. (September 2011). *The End of Authoritarian Rule and the Mythology of Tunisia under Ben Ali*. Third World Quaterly vol. 32, No. 7, 187-195.
- Campbell, P. R., Linton, M., & Kaiser, T. (2024). *Conspiracy in the French Revolution*.
- Chilcote, R. (1968). *The Political Thought of Amilcar Cabral*. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 373-388.

- Chrissafis, A. (2011, October 19). Tunisian Elections: The Key Parties. *Guardian*.
- Chrissafis, A. (2011). Tunisian Elections: The Key Parties. *Guardian*.
- Cooper, T. (2011). Doctrine for Libya: Not Carved in Stone. *New York Times*, March.
- Cooper, T. S. (2011). Doctrine for Libya : Not Carved in Stone. *The New York Times*, March 29.
- Cyrus, M. a. (2007). *Readings in African Political Thought*. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books.
- David, Z. (2011). Libyan Rebels Accused of Targeting Blacks. *The Los Angeles Times*, March 4, 6.
- David, Z. (2011). Libyan Rebels Accused of Targeting Blacks. *Los Angeles Times*, March.
- Davies, J. (1962). Toward a Theory of Revolution. *American Sociology Review*, February.
- Del, B. (2010). Ghaddafi: Una Sfida dal Deserto. Bari: Laterza.
- Del, B. (2010). Ghaddafi: una Sfida dal Deserto. Bari: Laterza Ed.
- Doxiadis, E. (2024). Liberalism after the Revolution: The Intellectual Foundations of the Greek State, c. 1830–1880 by Michalis Sotiropoulos. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 42(2), 332-336.
- Eileen, B. (2011 ). Fears as Tunisia’s Old Guard Regroups. *Financial Times*, July 26, 1.
- Eileen, B. (2011). Fears as Tunisia’s Old Guard Regroups. *Financial Times*, July 26.
- Eric, S. (2012). Prices and Production: Agricultural Supply Response in Fourteen Century England. Discussion Paper in Economics and Social History. Oxford: University of Oxford.
- Fanon, F. (1968). *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York.
- Gallagher, N. (2002). Lessons from the Algerian War of Independence. Middle East Research and Information Project.
- Garon, L. (2003). *Dangerous Alliances: Civil Society, the Media and Democratic Transition in North Africa*. New York: Zed.
- Garon, L. (2003). *Dangerous Alliances: Civil Society, the Media and Democratic Transition in North Africa*. New York: Zed.
- Godwin, O. (2015). The Libyan Revolution: Philosophical Interpretations. *Journal of Philosophy*, 31-38.
- Godwin, O. (2015). The Libyan Revolution: Philosophical Interpretations. *Journal of Philosophy*.
- Goldstone, J. (1993). *Revolutions: Theoretical Comparative and Historical Studies*. San Diego: Harcourt.
- Goldstone, J. (2011). Understanding the Revolution of 2011. *Foreign Affairs*.
- Goldstone, J. (2011). Understanding the Revolutions of 2011. *Foreign Affairs* vol.90, 8.
- Gurr, T. (1970). *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hakim, A. (2012). *Africa and the Transatlantic Slave Trade*. London: BBC History.
- Hamdan, F. (1984). *Egypt’s Identity: A Study of the Ingenuity of the Geographical Location*. Cairo: Dar el-Helal Publications.
- Hamdan, G. (1984). *Egypt’s Identity: A S tudy of the Ingenuity of the Geographical Location*. Cairo: Dar el-Helal Publications.
- Hannah, A. (1976). *On Revolution*. New York: Penguin.

- Haugbolle R.H., F. C. (2012). The End of Authoritarian Rule and the Mythology of Tunisia Under Ben Ali. *Mediterranean Politics* vol. 17.No. 2, 182.
- Haugbolle, R. (2012). The End of Authoritarian Rule and the Mythology of Tunisia under Ben Ali. *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol, 17, No. 2.
- Hazem, F. (2012). An Initial Perspective on the Winter of Discontent: The Root Causes of the Egyptian Revolution. *Social Research* vol. 29, No. 2, 352.
- Hazem, F. (2012). An Initial Perspective on the Winter of Discontent: The Root Causes of the Egyptian Revolution. *Social Research*.
- Heikal, H. (2012). Mubarak and His Age from the Platform to the Meidan. *Dar Al-Shorouq*, 23.
- Heikal, H. (2012). Mubarak and His Age from the Platform to the Meidan. *Dar Al-Shorouq*.
- Huntington, S. (1962). *Changing Patterns of Military Rule*. New York: Free Press.
- IMF. (1950). *International Financial Statistics*. Washington D.C: IMF.
- Issawi, C. (1954). *Egypt at Mid-Century: An Economic Survey*. London: Oxford University Press.
- James, D. a. (1990). *Contending Theories of International Relations*. New York: Harper and Row.
- John, P. a. (2007). *African History: A Very Short Induction*. Oxford: Oxford Press.
- John, R. (2012). *Libya: From Colony to Revolution*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- John, R. (2012). *Libya: From Colony to Revolution*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania.
- Joshua, D. (1996). *The Impact of Colonialism on Africa Economic Development*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee.
- Kellou, M. (1961). Independence for Algeria. *Pakistan Horizon*, 272-279.
- Kellou, M. (1961). Independence for Algeria. *Pakistan Institute of International Affairs*, 274.
- Khashan, H. (2012). The Eclipse of Arab Authoritarianism and the Challenges of Popular Sovereignty. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No.5, June, 920.
- Khashan, H. (2012). The Eclipse of Arab Authoritarianism and the Challenges of Popular Sovereignty. *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No.5.
- Khusrokhavar, F. (2012). *The New Arab Revolution that Shook the World*. Boulder: Paradigm.
- Khusrokhavar, F. (2012). *The New Arab Revolutions that Shook the World*. Boulder: Paradigm.
- Kim, S. (2011). Fight for Libya's Future Enters New Phase as Gaddafi's Son Talks. *The Independent*, April 2.
- Kim, S. (2011). Fight for Libya's Future Enters New Phase as Gaddafi's Son Talks. *The Independent*, April 2.
- Kirkpatrick, D. (2011). Tunisia Postpones Elections, Possibly Aiding New Parties. *New York Times* 8 June, 1.
- Kirkpatrick, D. (2011). Tunisia Postpones Elections Aiding New Parties. *New York Times*, June.
- Kwame, N. (1968). *Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare: A Guide to the Armed Phase of*

- the African Revolution. London: Panaf Books.
- Lasswel, H. a. (1950). *Power and Society*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Londono, E. (2011). Egyptian Man's Death Became Symbol of Callous State. *Washington Post*, February 9.
- Londono, F. (2011). Egyptian Man's Death Became Symbol of Callous State. *Washington Post*, February.
- MacQueen, B. (2011). *The Political Economy of Transition in Egypt*. *Ortadogu Etutleri*, Vol. 4, No. 1, July, 257-261.
- MacQueen, B. (2011). *The Political Economy of Transition in Egypt*. *Ortadogu Etutleri*, July, Vol. 4, No. 1.
- Malley, R. (1996). *The Call from Algeria: Third Worldism, Revolution and the Turn to Islam*. Berkeley: University of Californis Press.
- Masoud, .. (2011). The Road to and from Liberation Square. *Journal of Democracy* vol 22, No. 3, 22.
- Masoud, E. (2011). The Road to and from Liberation Square. *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 22, No. 3.
- McCollester, C. (1973). The Political Thought of Amilcar Cabral. *The Monthly Review*, 10-20.
- Michael, B. (2007). *Our First Revolution: The Remarkable British Upheaval That Inspired America's Founding Fathers*. New York: Crown.
- Murphy, E. (1999). *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia: From Bourguiba to Ben Ali*. New York: Macmillan.
- Murphy, E. (1999). *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia: From Bourguiba to Ben Ali*. New York: Macmillan.
- Parkins, K. (2004). *A History of Modern Tunisia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Parkins, K. (2004). *A History of Modern Tunisia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Perkins, K. (2004). *History of Modern Tunisia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Peter, S. (2004). *African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation*. Belmont: Wadsworth.
- Reich, J. K. (1953). *Leister's Rebellion*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Reid, R. (2025). *The African Revolution: A History of the Long Nineteenth Century*. Princeton University Press.
- Remi, A. a. (2008). *Elements of Politics*. Lagos: Sam Iroanusi Publishers.
- Robert, J. a. (1971). *Issues in Comparative Politics*. New York: Macmillian.
- Rudebeck, L. (1972). Political Mobilization for Development in Guinea-Bissau. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 3.
- Samuel, O. (2018). Buhari Blames Gaddafi for Killings Across Nigeria. *Abuja: Premium Times*, September 4.
- Samuel, O. (2018). Buhari Blames Gaddafi for Killings Across Nigeria. *Premium Times*.
- Schraeder, P. (2004). *African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation*. Belmont: Wadsworth.
- Shlomo, A. (1968). *Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization: His Dispatches and other Writings on China, India, Mexico, Middle East and North Africa*. New York:

- Doubleday.
- Stein, .. (2012). Revolution or Coup? Egypt's Fraught Transition. *Global Politics and Strategy* vol54. No. 4, 49.
- Stein, K. (2012). Revolution or Coup? Egypt's Fraught Transition. *Global Politics and Strategy*, Vol. 54, No. 4.
- Syed, .. (2014). Exploring the Causes of Revolution in Tunisia and Egypt. *Ortadogu Etutlert* vol 5, No. 2, 58-60.
- Syed, D. (2014). Exploring the Causes of Revolution in Tunisia and Egypt. *Ortadogu Etutlert*, Vol. 5, No. 2.
- Tanter, R. (1966). Dimensions of Conflict Behaviour Within and Between Nations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, March.
- Thomas, G. (2009). *Comparative Revolutionary Movement*. Eaglewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
- Thomas, M. (2006). *Understanding Politics*. Belmont: Wadsworth.
- Tocqueville, A. d. (1955). *The Old Regime and French Revolution*. New York: Doubleday.
- Ukielski, P. (2024). Introduction of Communism in Central Europe After 1944: Export of Revolution. In *1989 in Central Europe: A Counterrevolution* (pp. 43-62). Cham: Springer International Publishing.
- UNESCO. (2007). *The African Slave Trade from 15th to the 19th Centuries*. New York: UNESCO Report.
- Watch, H. (2006). Libya, Words to Deeds: The Urgent Nedd for Human Rights Reform. *Human Rights Journal*.
- Watch, H. (2011). Tunisia's Repressive Laws: The Reform Agenda. *Human Rights Watch*.
- Watch, H. R. (2006, January). Libya, Words to Deeds, The Urgent Need for Human Rights Reform. vol. 18, p. 1.
- Watch, H. R. (2011). Tunisia's Repressive Laws: The Reform Agenda. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Wells, M. (2024). *The Real Story of the French Revolution: Separating Myth From Reality*. Pen and Sword History.
- Woddis, J. (1972). *New Theories of Revolution: A Commentary on the Views of Frantz Fanon, Regis Debray and Herbert Marcuse*. New York.
- Wolfram, L. (2012). Regional Repercussion of Revolution and Civil War in Libya. *SWP Journal*.
- Wolfram, L. (2012). *Regional Repercussions of Revolution and Civil War in Libya*. Berlin: SWP.

## **BIO: PROFESSOR CHIGOZIE ENWERE, B.SC. (HONS), M.SC., PH.D.**

Professor Chigozie Enwere is the pioneer Head of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Nile University of Nigeria, Abuja. His research interests include policy development and analysis, African politics, international relations, strategic studies, and diplomacy.

He holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Abuja, an M.Sc. in International Relations and Diplomacy from Abia State University, Uturu, and a B.Sc. in Government and Public Administration from the same institution.

Prof. Enwere is deeply engaged in capacity building and professional training at both domestic and international levels. He has served as a visiting professor at San Joaquin Delta College, California, USA; Zirve University, Gaziantep, Turkey; Turgut Ozal University, Ankara, Turkey; and Meliksah University College of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Kayseri, Turkey. He has delivered keynote addresses at prominent events such as the International Turgut Ozal Congress on Business, Economics, and Political Science in Ankara, Turkey, and the Annual African Conference at the University of Texas, Austin, USA.

In addition to his academic engagements, Prof. Enwere contributes regularly to policy discussions through articles for the Istanbul Centre for Global Affairs, focusing on policy and development issues in Africa. Nationally, he has served as Director of the Centre for Policy Studies, Abuja, where he contributed to capacity building for government and non-governmental organizations. He is currently an adjunct lecturer at Nasarawa State University, Keffi, where he teaches Security Policy and Strategy.

Since 2013, Prof. Enwere has been a regular analyst on television and radio in Nigeria, discussing policy and political issues aimed at fostering societal development. His media engagements include programs such as Vision Nigeria (sponsored by the German government) and AIT Focus Nigeria, as well as BBC radio town-hall discussions.

Prof. Enwere is an accomplished scholar with numerous publications in reputable international journals across Europe, the United States, and Asia. His notable books include *Political Behaviourism: A New Perspective in African Politics* and *Issues in African Revolution*, both published by Galda Verlag, Germany. His works are featured in prestigious libraries, including Harvard University, Freie Universität Berlin, and the German National Library in Frankfurt and Leipzig.

Previously, Prof. Enwere worked with the American Centre for International Labour (West African Regional Office) and is an editorial board member of the *Global Journal of Human Social Science*, based in Massachusetts, USA. He is a member of the Nigeria Political Science Association (NPSA) and the British International Studies Association (BISA), organizations committed to advancing the study of global politics and international relations through research, teaching, and scholarly collaboration.

**Nile University of Nigeria**  
**2025**